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2Abstract
The thesis investigates the impact of changes in house­
hold income on household welfare in Russia during 1994 to 
1998. Part I introduces the main estimation techniques (In­
strumental Variables, Difference-In-Differences and Match­
ing), the data sources and the context of the Russian ar­
rears crisis. Part II contains the empirical analysis. Chap­
ter 5 simulates the effect of government cash transfers on 
poverty with Instrumental Variables estimation, taking into 
account consumption smoothing of households. Changes in 
cash transfer policy led unambiguously to a rise in poverty 
between 1994 and 1998. Chapter 6 explores the welfare ef­
fects of non-payments of pensions in 1996 using a Difference- 
In-Differences model. The loss of pension income doubled 
poverty rates and worsened nutrition among affected pen­
sioners. Elderly men suffered from a decline in health and 
were more likely to die in the two years following the crisis. 
Households responded in ways that mitigated the impact of 
the crisis, replacing one-fifth of lost pension income through 
increased labour supply and asset sales. Chapter 7 analyses 
the impact of wage arrears on the elderly who were either 
working themselves or living together with workers. Match­
ing techniques establish that wage arrears had a detrimen­
tal impact on old age welfare, including current and future 
health, over a wide range of control variables and sample re­
strictions. In line with the findings on pension arrears, the 
effect was larger on men than on women. Arrears households 
compensated about 10 to 14 percent of the wage loss from 
other income sources. Chapter 8 studies the link between 
wage arrears and child health. Wage arrears resulted in a 
decline of economic well-being, nutrition and growth status 
of affected children. Arrears households replaced up to one 
fifth of the wage reduction with other receipts. The final 
chapter summarizes the main findings.
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Chapter 1 
Preface
1.1 Introduction
With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the 500 million people from 
Central Europe to Central Asia embarked on a transition from cen­
tral planning to the market economy. While the old socialist system 
disintegrated quickly, new institutions were slow to emerge (World 
Bank 2002b and World Bank 1997). Many countries of the For­
mer Soviet Union faced a prolonged decline in GDP, rising poverty 
and demographic and health crises (Klugman et al. 2002). Under­
standing the links between socioeconomic status and welfare became 
central for protecting the well-being of workers, elderly, mothers and 
children.
The economic literature has emphasized the difficulties in identi­
fying the channels and directions of causality that underlie this rela­
tionship (Strauss and Thomas 1995). However, the bulk of the em­
pirical evidence is based either on cross-sectional data or on changes 
of agricultural income in developing countries. Only few historic 
episodes spanning multiple data points have been analysed, and little 
is known whether the findings generalize to economies where house­
holds rely primarily on non-farm resources.
The thesis contains an integrated empirical study of the role of 
economic resources for household welfare in Russia from 1994 to 
1998. This period presents a rare chance to study the impact of 
exogenous income shocks on well-being. In the early 1990s, Russian
15
16 CHAPTER 1. PREFACE
families lived through the creation of a new nation, double-digit neg­
ative GDP growth rates, and the first-generation reforms of price 
liberalization and large-scale privatization. After a few years, the 
economy began to stabilize and price signals in nascent market sys­
tems started to guide household decisions. However, the state sector 
run into severe budgetary problems, and enterprises suffered from 
low profitability. Payment arrears of pensions and wages, the main 
source of livelihood for most Russians, became widespread. The 
analysis traces the impact of shortfalls in household income on multi­
ple dimensions of living standards. Even though the evidence is spe­
cific to Russia in the mid-1990s, this episode provides policy lessons 
relevant to other countries and periods.
1.2 Overview
The remainder of this chapter gives a preview over the content of 
the thesis and explains how it contributes to the economic literature 
on household welfare in Russia. The next chapter introduces the 
three principal estimation techniques used in the analysis (Instru­
mental Variables, Difference-In-Differences and Matching). Chapter 
3 presents the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), the 
main data source, and discusses the construction of welfare measures. 
Chapter 4 lays out the context of Russia’s arrears crisis during the 
mid-1990s, emphasizing the link to the financial malaise of the pub­
lic sector. Some payment arrears, like pensions and child benefits, 
were directly related to the shortfall of government cash revenues, as 
they were financed from budgetary funds. Others, like wages arrears, 
originated in enterprises or institutions, such as schools and hospi­
tals, that were either fully or partially owned by the public sector or 
provided goods and services to the public sector. Furthermore, the 
fiscal crisis generated an economic climate, characterized by liquid­
ity shortages, high-yielding financial investment opportunities and 
low returns of the enterprise sector, in which payment arrears could 
flourish.
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 of Part II contains the main empirical 
analysis. The chapters study different income sources, population
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subgroups and time periods, and employ different methodologies and 
identification strategies (Table 1.1). Chapter 5 looks at the impact 
of government transfers on poverty during 1994 to 1998 for the en­
tire population of about 147 million persons. It uses Instrumental 
Variables estimation. Chapter 6 to Chapter 8 employ a treatment- 
control group set up. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 analyse the welfare 
of the elderly using alternative income sources, approaches and time 
periods. Chapter 6 studies the period of 1995 to 1996, the peak of 
the pension crisis. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 cover the time span of 
the wage arrears crisis from 1994 to 1998, differing only with regard 
to the population subgroup investigated (the elderly versus children 
aged less than 7 years). As explained in Chapter 2, the matching 
estimators account for heterogeneity in the impact of wage arrears. 
The final chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis and 
draws policy lessons.
Table 1.1: Empirical analysis: overview
Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8
Income source Government 
cash transfers
Pensions Wages Wages
Methodology IV DID CS Matching 
DID Matching
CS Matching 
DID Matching
Heterogeneity No No Yes Yes
Identification Regional and personal Donor and debtor Regional, enterprise Regional, enterprise
characteristics; regions; and personal and personal
Entitlement rules Programme rules characteristics characteristics
Pop. subgroup Entire population Pensioner Elderly in worker Children in worker
households households households
Pop. share (mn.) 147 38 18 10
Time period 1994-98 1995-96 1994-98 1994-98
Note: IV stands for instrumental Variables; DID for Difference-in-Differences; and CS for cross-sectional.
Individual welfare is a multidimensional concept. Economists 
tend to favour measures of well-being that are closely oriented on 
economic theory, and for practical reasons often use consumption 
or income. Yet, going beyond these standard measures is useful for 
various reasons. Following Sen (1999), increasing economic resources 
is essential as a means to enhancing individual welfare, but it is just 
an instrument and not the desired outcome. Measures of education 
or health are closer to the overarching objective of expanding the 
real freedoms, or capabilities, enjoyed by the members of the society.
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This wider notion of welfare has been embraced by the international 
community in the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations 
in September 2000, which defines human development along seven 
goals in the areas of poverty, nutrition, education, health, gender 
and environment, quantified using 31 indicators.1
The thesis recognizes that welfare is more than just economic re­
sources. Economic changes are integrated into a broader picture of 
the expansion or deprivation of capabilities. Chapter 5 focuses on 
consumption as outcome measure which is likely to capture longer- 
term welfare more accurately than income. Chapter 6 to Chapter 8 
characterise welfare changes for the elderly and children, separately 
for men and women and boys and girls, in terms of poverty, income, 
nutrition and health outcomes (Table 1.2). The analysis also in­
vestigate coping mechanisms, health service, health behaviour and 
self-rated environment (for Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) as inputs into 
health and welfare outcomes. With the exception of education, the 
analysis covered aspects of all sectors of the Millennium Declaration.2
There are other advantages of considering a broad set of welfare 
measures. As argued in Section 3.3, welfare is a characteristic of 
individuals, not of families. Household income and consumption are 
typically converted into individual measures of welfare by dividing 
through household size, assuming that households share resources 
equally among members. However, this ignores the possibility that 
intra-household inequality leads to larger deprivation of some mem­
bers than others. Alternative measures, like health outcomes, are 
collected for individuals rather than households, allowing one to dis-
1An eight goal concerns the global development partnership.
Environment was covered through subjective assessments as part of the dis­
cussion of identification issues of the wage arrears chapters. Education was not 
considered as outcome variable for two reasons. The population subgroups under 
investigation (the elderly and children less than 7 years of age) are outside of 
school age. It is also unlikely household-level income shocks had a large impact 
on education. The bulk of primary and secondary education is provided for free 
by state schools. Enrolment rates remained high throughout the period of the 
1990s. For example, 98 percent of the children aged 7 to 15 years were enrolled 
in education in 1998. While the quality of education may have been affected, the 
RLMS provides little information on this issue. Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva 
(2000) study returns to education during the 1990s in Russia.
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Table 1.2: Dimensions of welfare in Chapter 6 to Chapter 8
Chapter 6 7 8
Poverty
Income
Poverty headcount
Coping
Employment 
Sales and borrowing 
Private Transfers
Health service
Medication
Check-up
Treatment
Medical insurance
Vaccination
Health behaviour
Smoking
Drinking
Walking
Breast-feeding
Health outcomes
Functional limitations 
Chest pain 
Mortality
Cognitive functions 
Self-rated health
Stunting and wasting 
Sickness
Nutrition
Nutrients 
Vitam ins and
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pense with the arbitrary assumption of equal allocation. Similarly, 
contentious measurement issues do not arise, such as adjusting for 
economies of size and composition and converting nominal into real 
variables. Looking at a range of welfare measures is also important 
for data concerns. The reliability of any given welfare indicators can 
be severely undermined by measurement problems (Deaton 1997). 
Additional evidence can indicate whether observed changes are real 
(Baulch and Hoddinott 2000).
1.3 Literature Review
Various papers investigate the trends in poverty and inequality dur­
ing the 1990s in Russia. One key question is to what extent the rise 
in poverty is due to lack of income (or consumption) growth or an 
increase in inequality. Commander et al. (1999) draw on the first 
seven rounds of the RLMS. Poverty declined from 1992 to 1994 and 
increased from 1994 to 1996. Russia was marked by high inequality 
already at the beginning of the 1990s and inequality rose further up 
to 1996. The authors contribute the rise in inequality to changes 
in the composition of household income, namely the increase in en­
trepreneurial, self-employment and capital income at the expense of 
wage income and public transfers with the exception of pensions, 
and to a divergence in regional living standards. A decomposition 
analysis based on Ravallion and Datt (1991) suggests that lack of 
growth rather than rising inequality accounts for the bulk of the rise 
in poverty from 1994 to 1996.
Shorrocks and Kolenikov (2001) extend the Commander et al. 
(1999) analysis in a number of ways. First, they cover the period 
from 1985, the beginning of the economic reforms under President 
Gorbatchov, to 1999. Second, to span this 15-year period, they have 
to rely on a constructed income distribution based on official sum­
mary statistics for per capita income, income quintile shares, and 
poverty lines. Third, since the poverty line was revised various times 
over this period, they decompose changes in poverty into changes in 
three factors: mean income, inequality and the poverty line. Fourth, 
they argue that the results of the Ravallion and Datt (1991) decom­
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position method axe sensitive to both the choice of the base year 
and the order in which the factors are considered. As an alterna­
tive, they develop a new method of assigning contributions to factors 
based on the Shapley decomposition rule in cooperative game theory. 
The results indicate that the change in mean income has the largest 
quantitative impact on poverty in most years, but the effects cancel 
out when cumulated over the period from 1985 to 1999. In contrast, 
the cumulative effect of rising inequality is the principal cause of the 
high poverty rates experienced in the 1990s. However, the analysis 
confirms the finding of Commander et al. (1999) that changes in 
mean income axe the main factor in increasing poverty after 1994.
In a companion paper, Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2003) apply 
the Shapley decomposition to account for the regional dimension of 
poverty in 1995. In fine with Commander et al. (1999), they argue 
that Russia is marked by large regional differences in economic con­
ditions. For the two-way decomposition, they find that inequality 
has a greater impact on the poverty rate than real income per capita 
in about half the regions. However, once real income per capita is 
separated into nominal income and price components, nominal in­
come differences axe the most important factor determining regional 
poverty.
Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) assess the performance of the so­
cial safety net during the 1998 financial crisis on Russia using the 
RLMS. They find that consumption fell, and more than income, and 
subjective economic well-being deteriorated. Under the assumption 
of no behavioural responses, they find that the changes in the public 
transfers reduced consumption poverty by one percentage point, and 
income poverty by three percentage points. This reduction in poverty 
was due to better targeting of the safety net, even though outlays per 
capita declined by almost one fifth. The changes in the safety net 
helped to promote previously poor household from poverty, although 
it did little to protect non-poor households to fall into poverty.
Other papers analyse the changes in the wage distribution dur­
ing transition. Brainerd (1998b) draws on the 1991, 1993 and 1994 
rounds of the cross-section household surveys of the All-Russian 
Centre for Public Opinion Research. She find that wage inequal­
ity has become higher than in the United States and that returns to
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skills have increased substantially. In addition, women’s wages have 
declined relative to men’s wages, and older workers have suffered 
sharp relative wage declines. Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva (2000) 
use the 1992 to 1998 rounds of the RLMS to estimate the change 
in the returns to education. They find that the returns to educa­
tion in Russia are quite low compared with those reported for other 
countries. In contrast to Brainerd (1998b), the results suggest little 
sign of increasing returns to education during the period. They in­
terpret this as evidence for a mismatch between demand and supply: 
white-collar workers are in over-supply whereas blue-collar employ­
ees are in high demand. Turunen (2004) investigates the mobility 
of workers from state employment to either non-state employment 
or non-employment in the first half of the 1990s. Using the RLMS, 
he finds that those with university education, with supervisory re­
sponsibility and in white-collar occupations are less likely to leave 
state jobs, suggesting that non-state employment comprises mostly 
unattractive low skill jobs. These findings are consistent with those 
by Cheidvasser and Benitez-Silva (2000).
Another theme of the literature is to identify population sub­
groups most prone to chronic or persistent poverty. The studies 
develop similar poverty and vulnerability profiles. Using the first 
seven rounds of the RLMS, Klugman and Braithwaite (1998) argue 
that poverty is higher for families with children, the unemployed, 
and elderly people living alone. Commander et al. (1999) confirm 
that chronic poverty is associated with low educational attainment, 
being unemployed and living in large families. They also uncover a 
large degree of vulnerability, with only one third of the households 
never being poor in at least one round. Spryskov (2000) uses the 
1994 to 1998 rounds of the RLMS to estimate a proportional haz­
ard model. He also finds that single mothers with children, elderly 
living alone and households with unemployed are particularly vulner­
able. Gerry and Li (2002) investigate which groups suffered from the 
largest contraction in consumption during the 1998 financial crisis. 
Quantile regressions show that vulnerability is associated with low 
education in urban areas, living in pensioner households and lack of 
access to home production.
A set of papers look at the relationship between subjective and
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objective well-being in Russia. The evidence suggests that objec­
tive and subjective measures are broadly consistent. Ravallion and 
Loshkin (1999) use the 1996 round of the RLMS to examine the de­
terminants of subjective economic welfare. The underlying idea is to 
rely on individuals themselves to define the level of well-being. Un­
der the assumption that individuals provide comparable responses, 
they investigate ladder questions where persons are asked to rank 
themselves on a nine-point scale. Ordered probit regressions show 
that household income per equivalent adult is positively related to 
subjective economic welfare. However, other factors, such as expen­
diture, educational attainment, health status, and employment, are 
important in addition to income. Drawing on the 1994 to 1996 panel 
of adults, Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) extend their analysis of sub­
jective economic welfare to control for individual fixed-effects. The 
results confirm that subjective economic well-being increases with 
income and decreases with ill-health and unemployment. Ferrer-I- 
Carbonell and Praag (2001) use a household panel data set RUSSET, 
organized by the University of Amsterdam, to contrast objective and 
subjective measures of poverty. They argue that alternative subjec­
tive measures show strong consistency and can be reconciled with 
objective measures. Lokshin and Ravallion (2002) investigate self- 
rated economic well-being and power in Russia, using the 1998 and 
2000 rounds of the RLMS. Ordered probit regressions are estimated 
to assess to what extent economic welfare and empowerment are re­
lated to a common set of covariates. They find that both self-rated 
power and welfare increase with higher individual and household in­
come, and that the impact of individual income is primarily direct 
rather through higher household income.
Risk is a pervasive characteristic of life in developing countries 
and households are exposed to unexpected events affecting economic 
resources (Morduch 1994, Chaudhuri 2000, Dercon 2001, and Hess 
et al. 2003). A number of authors investigate the impact of in­
come shocks on welfare measures in Russia. The findings indicate 
that households are only partly successful in preserving welfare levels 
through coping strategies.
Some contributions deal specifically with pension and wage ar­
rears. Desai and Idson (1998) draw on the 1994 to 1996 rounds of
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the RLMS to look at the wage arrears crisis. They employ cross- 
sectional probit regressions to assess the impact of non-payment of 
wages on poverty, income, and subjective well-being. They establish 
that wage arrears have a detrimental impact on worker households. 
Foley (2002) looks at pension arrears and coping mechanisms among 
elderly Russians using the 1994 to 1996 rounds of the RLMS. He finds 
that pension arrears increase the likelihood of poverty and identifies 
the reduction of remittances and increase in asset sales as princi­
pal coping strategies, while home production appears to have played 
little role in cushioning the income shock. Gerry and Li (2002) inves­
tigate whether households save in anticipation of wage arrears. Using 
the RLMS round from 1994 to 1998, they construct a balanced sam­
ple of household heads employed as working-age civilian. Income 
risk is defined as a household’s probability of suffering from wage 
arrears one year ahead. They find that savings increase with higher 
income risk, which they interpret as evidence for a precautionary sav­
ing motive. Kolev and Pascal (2002) investigate the determinants of 
pensioner employment in Russia. Using the RLMS from 1994 to 
1999, the analysis confirms that family income and access to alter­
native coping mechanisms affect the probability of holding a job and 
the number of hours worked for women. There is little evidence that 
pension arrears and pension benefits have a bearing on pensioner em­
ployment for either men or women. According to Kolev and Pascal 
(2002), this indicates that pensioners have to rely on supplement­
ing pensions with wages even in the absence of payment arrears as 
pension levels are so low.
Other authors have turned to alternative sources of income shocks 
than payment arrears. Stillman (2001) looks at the impact of the 
macroeconomic crisis of 1998 on household income and consumption. 
He finds that both household income and non-durable expenditure 
declined by one quarter to one third. Overall, he concludes that there 
is an almost one-to-one correspondence between exogenous shocks 
to income and changes in non-durable expenditures. Stillman and 
Thomas (2002) use changes in oil prices to identify exogenous shocks 
to household resources in urban areas. They find that food quanti­
ties and energy intake appear to be resilient to variation in income, 
although diet composition does change in response to transitory in­
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come variation.
Studies on developing countries have looked at the differences be­
tween covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, following the seminal work 
by Townsend (1994) on testing for complete risk pooling within vil­
lages. While the findings of these studies are mixed, a typical out­
come is that full pooling is rejected but that there is evidence for 
incomplete risk sharing across households (Deaton 1997 and Strauss 
and Thomas 1995). Skoufias (2003) applies this framework to exam­
ine the extent to which households are able to insure their consump­
tion from fluctuations in their real income and specific economic 
shocks. Drawing on the RLMS from 1994 to 2000, he shows that 
consumption is only partially protected from idiosyncratic shocks, 
and food consumption is better protected than non-food consump­
tion. Households complement their self-insurance strategies with in­
formal risk sharing arrangements with households within their com­
munity. Mu (2003) extends the framework to investigate whether 
education affects the consumption smoothing ability of household in 
Russia. Using the 1995 to 2000 rounds of the RLMS, he confirms 
that income changes matter to consumption change. Education of 
household members enhances the consumption smoothing in the high 
wealth group but not in the low wealth group. This suggests that 
the ability to deal successfully with economic crises is enhanced by 
education.
The life expectancy of the Russian population is one of the low­
est in Europe. Poor health status is not just a legacy of the So­
viet period, but also reflects an unprecedented upswing in morbidity 
and mortality rates in the early 1990s. A substantial literature has 
emerged on the causes of the drop in life expectancy during 1991 to 
1993, and more generally about the poor health of the Russian pop­
ulation. Explanations point to lifestyle factors, like alcohol abuse, 
smoking, and poor nutrition, to a deterioration in health services 
and the sanitation system (Lui et al. 1998), to the slow progress 
in economic reforms (Brainerd 1998a), and to the unravelling of the 
social fabric and “transition stress” (Bobak et al. 1998, Kennedy 
et al. 1998, and Shkolnikov et al. 1998).
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1.4 Contribution to Literature
The thesis considers income shocks, occurring in the form of pay­
ment arrears of wages and pensions and other government transfers, 
to explore the nature of the linkages between economic resources and 
various measures of welfare. The connections run typically in both 
directions. Lack of income can cause malnutrition and ill health, 
just as better nutrition and health can boost an individual’s earn­
ings ability. The focus of the empirical analysis is on identifying the 
impact of the lowness of economic resources on the deprivation of 
individual capabilities. While feed-back effects from poor health to 
low economic status are a concern for the econometric analysis, the 
analysis do not provide direct evidence on such reverse causality. The 
key methodological challenge in the research is to disentangle the im­
pact of a change in household income on consumption, health and 
other outcomes from the effects of these other factors. The principal 
contribution of the thesis is twofold. First, the thesis applies mod­
ern tools of non-experimental impact evaluation to investigate the 
welfare impact of payment arrears in Russia during the mid-1990s. 
Second, the analysis provides an integrated assessment of a range of 
changes in welfare outcomes as a result of the payment arrears for 
particular population subgroups. The study covers poverty, coping 
mechanisms, nutrition, health behaviour, health service utilization, 
and health outcomes.
The literature shows the poverty and inequality increased dur­
ing transition while public transfer programs were cut back. Chap­
ter 5 extends the analyses of Commander et al. (1999), Shorrocks 
and Kolenikov (2001), Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2003) and Lokshin 
and Ravallion (2000) in four ways. First, rather than assessing the 
contribution of growth and inequality to poverty trends, it evalu­
ates the impact of changes in public cash programmes on changes in 
poverty. Russia inherited from Soviet times large-scale cash trans­
fers that were part of the overall anti-poverty strategy. Pensioners 
and families with children are among the groups identified in the 
literature as being vulnerable to poverty, and the two most impor­
tant transfer programmes are pensions and child benefits. Second, 
the analysis explores in detail the changes in cash transfer entitle­
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ments and the incidence of payment arrears of cash transfers. Third, 
it allows for behavioural responses to changes in cash transfers by 
estimating propensities to consume from cash transfer components. 
Using Instrumental Variables estimation, the chapter estimates the 
propensity to consume from government cash transfers separately for 
each transfer type and account for the differences in the coefficients. 
The propensity to consume is higher from permanent than from tran­
sitory income sources, and larger for pensions than for child benefits 
and other income. Fourth, it modifies the Ravallion and Datt (1991) 
decomposition technique to quantify the contribution of changes in 
cash transfers to the changes in poverty. The adjustments in cash 
transfers led unambiguously to a rise in poverty between 1994 and 
1998.
The literature suggests that economic shocks, such as payment 
arrears or the 1998 financial crisis, affect income, consumption, and 
subjective economic well-being. Households differ in their ability to 
cope depending on assets, education, and regional characteristics. 
There is also evidence that the health crisis during the first part of 
the 1990s was related to the economic downturn. Chapter 6 to 8 
build on these findings to explore in detail the economic, nutrition 
and health impacts of specific income shocks on particular population 
subgroups during the mid-1990s.
Chapter 6 investigates the impact of pension arrears on pensioner 
welfare.3 It differs from Foley (2002) in three ways. First, the chap­
ter focuses on the 1996 pension crisis rather than the overall period 
from 1994 to 1996. A decline in tax revenues and a break-down of 
the Pension Fund finances led to a sharp rise in pension arrears from 
1995 to 1996. Second, it exploits the panel nature of the RLMS and 
utilizes a difference-in-difference setting, while Foley (2002) applies 
cross-sectional regressions. As discussed in Chapter 2, this method 
is suitable under certain assumptions for identifying the causal effect 
of pension arrears on the welfare of old-age pensioners. Third, the 
analysis goes beyond a discussion of the economic impact to cover 
nutritional and health impacts. Poverty rates doubled and the in­
takes of calories and protein declined significantly among affected
3This chapter is based on a joint paper with Robert Jensen (Jensen and 
Richter 2002).
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pensioners. Male pensioners experienced higher functional limita­
tions and more chest pains, and were more likely to die over the 
next two years. The health status worsened even though households 
responded in ways that mitigated the impact of the crisis, replacing 
one-fifth of lost pension income through increased labour supply and 
asset sales.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 deal with wage arrears. The analysis ex­
tends the work by Desai and Idson (1998) in four dimensions. First, 
the treatment variable is defined at the level of households rather 
than individuals. Instead of focusing on the well-being of workers 
themselves, the chapters look at the welfare impact of groups liv­
ing together with workers. Chapter 7 investigates the impact of 
wage arrears on the elderly who are either working themselves or 
living together with workers. Chapter 8 studies the impact of wage 
arrears on children in worker households. Second, the analysis em­
ploys cross-sectional and difference-in-differences matching estima- 
tion rather than cross-sectional regression analysis. As explained in 
Chapter 2, matching allows for heterogeneity in treatment impacts 
and ensures that arrears households are compared only to observa- 
tionally similar non-arrears households over the common support. 
Third, the discussion covers a broader range of outcome variables, 
including health behaviour, health service utilization, objective and 
subjective health outcomes and nutrition. The results of Chapter 
7 show that wage arrears had a detrimental and significant impact 
on old age welfare, including current and future health, over a wide 
range of control variables and sample restrictions. Similar to the find­
ings on pension arrears, the effect was larger on men than on women. 
Arrears households compensated about 10 to 14 percent of the wage 
loss from other income sources. I exploit the rich data set to rule 
out alternative channels, including health services, environmental 
conditions, alcohol and cigarette consumption, and other economic 
circumstances. The findings of Chapter 8 suggest that wage arrears 
had a large negative impact on economic well-being, nutrition and 
the growth status of children in households with wage arrears. As in 
the previous chapters, these families were only partially successful in 
replacing the wage reduction with alternative revenues.
Chapter 2
M ethodology
2.1 Introduction
A broad distinction can be made between two types of empirical re­
search in economics: descriptive analysis and causal inference. In 
general, they are not competing but complimentary methods. This 
thesis contains examples of both descriptive and causal research. De­
scriptive analysis can help to establish facts about household welfare 
that need to be explained by theoretical reasoning. Much of the mo­
tivation for my research is based directly on findings from descriptive 
analysis. For example, the macroeconomic context of Russia’s non­
payment crisis in the mid-1990s is summarized in Chapter 4, which 
draws on public expenditure and revenue data to emphasize the fis­
cal origins of the explosion in arrears. Chapter 5 unravels the broad 
features of the trends and incidence of arrears in government cash 
transfers, presenting both official entitlement levels from official na­
tional statistics and actual receipts according to the household survey 
data. This analysis is essential for understanding the (implicit) allo­
cation rules applied for deciding which pensioner, worker, or mother 
receives payments in case of funding shortfalls.
In contrast with descriptive analysis, causal inference research 
seeks to determine the effects of particular interventions or policies, 
or to estimate features of the behavioural relationships formulated 
on the basis of economic theory. The principal evaluation problem of 
the thesis is to estimate the impact of income changes on household
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welfare. The literature originated with contributions from Ashen- 
felter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), and Heckman and Robb 
(1985). My research relies heavily on economic models and econo­
metric methods developed for the analysis of the evaluation problems 
in labour, public and development economics for cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data. I employ mainly three approaches:
•  Instrumental Variables;
• Difference-In-Differences, and
•  Matching.
While IV estimation have played an important role in empirical 
studies for a long time, the applied economic literature using the 
matching or difference-in-differences approaches originates from the 
last fifteen years.
Taking the example of non-payment of wages, the researcher is 
confronted with a missing data problem. At any moment in time, 
a worker is either receiving or not receiving wages. As a individual 
cannot be observed in both states at the same time, it is neces­
sary to construct the counterfactual. This chapter introduces these 
three distinct but related solutions to this issue, in cases where no 
explicit social experiment with a randomly selected control group 
was conducted.1 In contrast to standard cases in the evaluation 
literature, the wage arrears crisis constitutes a reverse experiment. 
Rather than identifying the impact of participation in a program 
(wage payment), the analysis investigates the impact of dropping 
out of a program (arrears in wage payments).
This chapter presents a reference model, borrowed from Blun­
dell and Dias (2002), and introduces the three main estimators and 
their applications in Chapter 6 to Chapter 8. The discussion in­
corporates insights from Blundell and Dias (2002), Heckman et al.
1 Well-designed social experiments are a convincing solution to the missing 
data problem, yet this approach can suffer from various limitations. They are 
expensive to conduct, cannot easily be extrapolated to evaluate modified policy 
proposals, and require the control group to be completely unaffected by the 
policy, both directly and through general equilibrium effects.
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(1997), Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998), Blundell 
et al. (2001), Jalan and Ravallion (2003), Ravallion (2003) and ?). 
Section 2.6 turns to an overview of evaluations of non-experimental 
estimators compared to experimental estimators, with a particular 
focus on matching estimators. The final section draws lessons for the 
empirical applications in Part II of the thesis.
2.2 Model
Before I present the three methods, it is useful to lay out a model as 
a reference point. The basic setup is in the form of an endogenous 
selection model.2 Suppose households experience payment arrears at 
time k, and the objective is to identify the impact on some outcome 
variable, say health status if, such as caloric intake, child stunting 
rates or old-age mortality of household members. H  depends on 
exogenous variables, X,  and this relationship differs for arrears and 
non-arrears households. Let A be a dummy variable indicating the 
arrears status (A =  1 if arrears and A =  0 if no arrears). Using 
superscripts 0 or 1 to identify treatment status and subscripts i and t 
to represent, respectively, household (or individual) and time period, 
the outcome equations at t > k become:
Hlt =  9]{Xi) +  Ult (2.1)
H% =  s?(Xi) +  U% (2.2)
which can be combined to:
Hu =  A t H i +  (1 -  At)H?t =  g°(Xi) +  a,t(X,)At +
(2.3)
where
au(Xt) =  H}t -H ?t =  f e fp y  -  sf(Xi)] +  [Ul -  u a
(2.4)
2The model is based on Blundell and Dias (2002).
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is the household specific treatment effect, the functions g° and g1 re­
late regressors X  to outcomes (if0, i f 1), and the error terms (C/°, U1) 
are of mean zero and uncorrelated to observables X, which represent 
characteristics of the household and its members and other relevant 
factors, such as community variables. The variables X  are exogenous 
as they should not be affected by treatment or pre-determined at the 
time of the treatment. Equation 2.3 highlights that arrears status 
Ait is assumed to have a direct impact on the welfare measure. The 
treatment effect varies across households even conditional on Xu due 
to the impact of the unobservables.
The assignment of households into arrears and non-arrears cat­
egories depends on observable characteristics W  and a mean zero 
error term V, such that
Si = f(Wi) +  Vi (2.5)
and a household is part of the arrears group when S  is positive:
An — 1 if Si > 0 and t  > k
Ait =  0 otherwise. (2.6)
In the simplest case, the arrears impact is unrelated to the ob­
servable or unobservable characteristics of the household. Such ho­
mogeneous treatment effect is represented by an intercept shift in 
9:
at =  ait(Xi) =  g]{Xi) -  gt(Xi) with t > k for any i.
(2.7)
Equation 2.3 becomes
Hit =  gat {Xi) +  a tAxt +  Uit, (2.8)
as the arrears status does not affect the error terms and the ar­
rears outcome differs from the non-arrears outcome by a constant.
The assumption of homogeneity has another important implication. 
Since the treatment impact is not related to X, it can be extrapo­
lated outside the range of household characteristics X  represented by
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both arrears and non-arrears groups, i.e. outside the area of common 
support of X.
However, the homogeneity assumption is unlikely to hold in most 
cases. For example, the effect of wage arrears on household welfare 
may vary depending on demographic composition, wealth, or skill 
levels. Consequently, treatment effects depend on household charac­
teristics and population subgroups and different definitions of treat­
ment effects have to distinguished. In particular, the mean treatment 
on the treated effect at t > k is given by
aT =  E(ait\X =  Xi,At =  1).
where Qt is the impact of arrears on households of type i among 
those who are assigned to arrears. It is the most com m on parameter 
of interest in the recent literature on non-experimental evaluation of 
heterogeneous treatment impacts.3
Under this more general setting where the treatment impact de­
pends on household characteristics, the assignment to arrears status 
is most likely not random. For example, wage arrears may affect 
workers with low productivity more often than workers with high 
productivity. At the same time, workers with low productivity level 
might have worse health than workers with high productivity level. 
If productivity levels of workers are unobserved, then treatment sta­
tus A and the error terms of the outcome equation (C/°, U1) will be 
correlated.
Such a selection on unobservables implies that the OLS estimator 
is inconsistent. In particular, Equation 2.3 can be rewritten as
Hu =  rf(X«) +  at(Xi)Ait +  [US +  M U l  -  U?)]
where
M X ,)  =  E[at(Xt)] =  g](Xi) -  g°(Xi)
is the expected treatment effect at time t  among worker house­
holds characterized by X*. In general, the OLS estimator fails to 
identify this parameter as
3If the outcome of interest is earnings, a comparison of c tj with the mean 
programme costs per participants indicates whether the programme’s economic 
benefits outweigh its costs.
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E [at(X)] =  at(X)  +  E [u}\X, At =  l ]  -  E [u?\X, At =  o] 
which is different to at(X)  for selection on unobservables as 
E [Ult \X, At =  l ] ^ E  [ t / ° \X, At =  0 ] .
The following sections will introduce three alternative methods 
for consistent estimation of the treatment impact.
2.3 Instrumented Variables Method
The standard econometric approach to endogeneity is the use of 
instrumental variables (IV). In the simple linear model with ho­
mogeneous treatment effects, the IV estimator removes all the bi­
ases resulting from the non-randomised control under an exclusion 
restriction.4 Instrumental variables Z have to be excluded from the 
outcome equation but included in the selection equation. They are 
a source of exogenous variation linked only to arrears status but not 
to the outcome directly. Two conditions have to hold:5
1. Conditional on X, Z  is not correlated with the error terms V, 
U°, and U1.
2. Conditional on X, the selection rule is a non-constant function 
of Z.
The second assumption implies that Z  affects A, so that in gen­
eral
E{A\X , Z) =  P(A  =  1 |X ,  Z) ^  P(A  =  1\X).
The first assumption ensures that Z  influences the outcome only 
through A  rather than also through unobservables. Under these two
4The instrumental variable method can also be used to estimate heteroge­
neous treatment effects under more stringent assumptions than those presented 
here (Blundell and Dias 2002 and Imbens and Angrist 1994).
5The instrumental variable estimator requires only one time period, so sub­
scripts axe suppressed.
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assumptions, the IV estimator identifies the treatment effect a  by 
using only that part of the variation in A that is associated with Z:
aiv  =  Cov(H{, Zi)/Cov(Ai, Zi).
The main difficulty in IV estimation fies in identifying appropri­
ate instruments Z, as they are not supposed to affect the outcome 
directly yet determine the selection.
The IV approach is applied in Chapter 5 (Table 1.1). The objec­
tive of this chapter is to estimate the propensities to consume from 
cash transfers taking into account consumption smoothing. Follow­
ing previous studies on estimating the propensity to consume (Case 
and Deaton 1998, Ravallion, van de Walle, and Gautam 1995, and 
van de Walle 2001), cash transfers are instrumented to address con­
cerns over endogeneity and measurement error. In the terminology 
of the model outlined above, the outcome variable H  is consump­
tion, the treatment variable A is cash transfers, and the instruments 
Z  are variables that control for the incidence of payment arrears and 
proxy for benefit rules. IV estimation is more suitable than DID 
or matching estimation for this setting. The focus is to explore the 
link from cash transfers to consumption among household eligible for 
cash transfers. With cash transfer being a continuous variable, the 
population of interest cannot be easily divided into treatment and 
control groups. While arrears in cash transfers were widespread dur­
ing some years, they were relatively insignificant during other years. 
Instead of contrasting consumption levels of eligible households be­
tween those with and without cash transfers, the IV estimation uses 
determinants of the incidence of cash benefit arrears as instrumental 
variables for the amount of cash benefits. Cash benefits also differ 
as a result of entitlement rules, which provide an alternative set of 
instruments used in the analysis.
2.4 Difference-In-Differences Method
The Difference-In-Differences (DID) method relies on comparing out­
comes for groups exposed to a policy change to those of a control 
group that proxies the features of comparison groups used in social
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experiments. This approach, which is sometimes also referred to as 
natural experiment, has important advantages to the IV estimator. 
It does not require any exclusion restrictions or any modelling of the 
selection equation, and even the outcome equation does not have to 
be specified as long as the treatment impact enters additively. How­
ever, it relies on stringent data requirements and strong restrictions 
on the specification of the error terms and common trends.
The DID estimator relies on longitudinal data or repeated cross- 
sections as it involves taking double-differences of the outcome vari­
able. The change in the outcome of the treatment group before and 
after the policy intervention is compared to the corresponding change 
in the outcome for the control group. Prom Equation 2.3, Hit can 
be rewritten as follows:
Hu =  gt(X,) +  a  t(Xi)At +  (Vi +  «* +  e#). (2-9)
which decomposes the error term Uft into three components: an in­
dividual-specific (or household-specific) fixed effect (fi, a common 
macroeconomic effect 0t and a temporary individual-specific effect 
eit. Under the identifying assumption
E(U$\Xi, At) =  E(<pi\Xu A*) +  6t (2.10)
the selection into arrears status is independent of the temporary 
individual-specific effect
This DID estimator eliminates Pi and 0t through differencing 
twice, or ’’double-differencing”:
S d w (X)  =  p jJ ,(X )  - B M  -  K  P 0  ~ K ( X )}
(2.11)
where H  represents the mean outcome for the considered subgroup, 
and ti > k > to. Differencing between t\ and to for treatment and 
control group cancels out while subtracting the change of the 
control group from the change of the treatment group eliminates
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6t. Given Assumption 2.10, it recovers the average effect of the 
treatment on the treated households since
E(aDID(X)) =  E(ai(X)\Ai =  1) =  qt[X).
Assumption 2.10 suggests that there are two essential issues for 
DID estimation. First, if the assignment A to arrears and non-arrears 
group is linked to the unobserved temporary individual-specific com­
ponent €it, then DID estimation is inconsistent, yielding
E ( oldid( X ) )  =  c*t ( X )  +  E f a t i  ~ £ito\Ai  =  1 )  ~  ~ £ito\Ai  =  0).
For example, suppose workers are less likely to receive a wage if 
they suffered a recent temporary deterioration in health status. The 
worsening in health outcome attributed to wage arrears might then 
be overstated.6
In addition, the two groups may be exposed to differential changes 
in the macro environment, or react differentially to the same macro 
trend. For example, households experiencing non-payment of wages 
could also face a worsening in public health services, as enterprises 
run up both wage and tax arrears. The DID estimation would then 
attribute all the deterioration in workers’ health status of the treat­
ment group to wage arrears, even though some of it may be the result 
of a reduced provision of public health care.7
Chapter 6 applies DID estimation to study the impact of the 
pension arrears crisis of 1996 (Table 1.1). A sudden collapse of the 
pension system implied that about 30 percent of the pensioners had 
to make ends meet without pension receipts. This natural experi­
ment is well-suited for the DID method, which relies on comparing 
outcomes for groups exposed to a policy change (move from payment 
to non-payment of pensions between 1995 to 1996) to those of a con­
trol group not affected by that change (pensions paid both in 1995
6This example is analoguous to the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip for job training 
programmes. Enrolment in such programmes is more likely if a temporary dip 
in earning occurs just before the programme is launched (Ashenfelter 1978). See 
also Section 2.6.
7Bell, Blundell, and Reenen (1999) develop a modified DID estimator that 
is adjusted for differential trend components. It requires at least three survey 
rounds.
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and 1996). Since the focus is on a homogeneous population subgroup 
(old-age pensioners), the analysis relies on a linear DID estimator, 
which simplifies Equation 2.9 to
Hu =  i'X i  +  a  An +  (<£» +  @t +  £it)-
N y  /
U\t
The identification strategy relies on two sources of variation in 
the incidence of pension arrears. The decentralized structure of the 
pension system implied that nearly all pensioners in wealthier re­
gions continued to be paid, while between one third to one half of 
pensioners in debtor regions experienced arrears. Debtor regions 
also created programme rules which established priorities for which 
pensioners should be paid in the event of revenue shortfall.
2.5 Matching Method
The matching method assumes that households with similar charac­
teristics respond in the same way to policy interventions. Treated 
households are paired with non-treated households on the basis of 
observable features, so that the only remaining difference between 
the two groups is the arrears status. Like the DID method, the 
matching estimator is based on comparing outcomes for treatment 
and control groups. It also does not require any exclusion restric­
tions or specification of selection and outcome equations. In contrast 
to DID, matching does not rely on the additive specification of the 
error term. Most importantly, the non-parametric method is not 
plagued by two important sources of evaluation bias for parametric 
approaches: mismatching and misweighing.
To be more specific, the matching estimator is based on two key 
assumptions. The conditional independence assumption (CIA) re­
quires that8
H° _L A | X. (2.12)
®The conditional independence assumption is sometimes referred to as un- 
confoundedness assumption (Ichino 2002).
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Controlling for X, non-arrears outcome H° is independent of as­
signment status A. Intuitively, this assumption ensures that, condi­
tioning on observable covariates, assignment to treatment is random 
and unobservables play no role in the selection. In particular, it ex­
cludes that households may be selected according to the impact of 
arrears.
The critical issue is whether the right matching variables are con­
sidered, as otherwise the counterfactual, the outcome under non­
selection of the arrears group, is not recovered. It is also important 
to limit the set of X  variables to those that are not influenced by 
arrears. Otherwise, the matching estimator will not capture changes 
in the distribution of the X  variables as a result of the programme 
and therefore not identify correctly the programme impact.
The following decomposition underlines the importance of CIA. 
The average treatment effect on the treated can be rewritten as
E(Hl -  H°\X, A =  1) =  EiH^X, A =  1) -  E(H°\X , A =  1)
=  Eiff^X, A =  1) -  E(H°\X, A =  0)
S ■ 1 .  —  I .1 . —  I ■ III ^
<*T
+ E(H°\X, ,4 = 1 )-  E(H°\X, A =  0)
BIAS
where the first term is the average treatment effect on the treated 
and the second term is the bias. Given Assumption 2.12, conditional 
on observables X , the selection is independent of unobservables and 
the bias is equal to zero. By matching arrears households with non- 
arrears households such that the X  realizations are replicated, the 
counterfactual non-treated outcome for the arrears group is identi­
fied.
A second assumption ensures that this counterfactual exists for 
X.  The observable characteristics X  of the non-arrears group cover 
the same range as those of the arrears group:
0 <  P(A  =  1\X) <  1. (2.13)
This condition ensures that both arrears and non-arrears obser­
vations exist for each X.  Denote this common support of treatment
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and control groups by C*. While Assumption 2.13 ensures that the 
regressors of the two groups share the same support, Assumption
2 .12  guarantees the absence of selection bias at com m on values of 
the regressors for both groups. Given these two assumptions, a con­
sistent estimator for olt is given by the empirical counterpart of:
Jo. E [H1 -  H°\X, A =  1] dF(X\A =  1)
Sc . dF(X\A =  1) ' l j
It equals to the expected impact of arrears among the subset of 
sampled worker households for whom comparable non-arrears worker 
households can be found. The expected gains are rescaled by the 
population in the common support C*.
2.5.1 Propensity Score M atching
The main difficulty in implementing this estimator lies in ensuring 
matching over the relevant set of observables X.  In particular, the 
more information is used for matching, the higher the dimensionality 
of X  and the smaller the common support C*. For example, one 
could stratify the data into bins, each defined by a particular value 
of X.  Within each bin, this amounts to conditioning on X.  Assuming 
there are k relevant binary X  variables, the number of cells equals 
2fc. The number of cells increases further if some variables in X  take 
more than 2 values or are continous.
In such circumstances, propensity scores can be used to reduce 
the matching problem from a multi-dimensional to a one-dimensional 
problem. Let P(Xi) =  P(Ai =  1|X) represent the likelihood of 
arrears status. As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), CIA still 
holds if one controls for P{X)  rather than X , and Assumption 2.12 
is modified as follows:
H° _L A  | P(X).  (2.15)
Given this property of the propensity score, it is possible to 
match arrears and non-arrears observations on the basis of a mono­
dimensional variable, the propensity score, instead of the multidi­
mensional vector of observables X.  The advantage of using the
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propensity score is simplicity, as it allows estimation in two stages. 
The first stage is to calculate the predicted values from standard logit 
or probit models to estimate the propensity score for each household. 
Once estimated, P(X)  can be used to define the comparison group 
for each treated household, based on some distance measure. The 
selected set of non-treated observations are then weighted according 
to a specific scheme, ranging from nearest neighbour (unity weight 
for closest observation and zero for the others) to kernel weights (ob­
servations are weighted relative to the distance to the treated house­
hold). The matching estimator can then be calculated in general 
form as follows:
a M =  £  J H i -  £  WijHAwi  (2.16)
{t:A=l} [  {j:A=0} J
where Wy is the weight associated with each comparison observation 
j  for household i and W{ represents the re-weighting to reconstruct 
the outcome distribution for the treated sample.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 employ matching estimation to investi­
gate the impact of wage arrears on children and elderly during 1994 
to 1998 (Table 1.1). In contrast to pensions, the non-payment of 
wages affected a significant proportion of the labour force throughout 
the entire period, and relatively few households change wage arrears 
status from one round to the next. The estimation relies primarily 
on cross-sectional matching techniques which compare households 
with wage arrears to suitable comparison households without wage 
arrears. Similar to Chapter 6, the estimation strategy exploits both 
inter-regional and intra-regional differences in wage arrears incidence 
to construct treatment and comparison groups. The matching pro­
cedures ensure that arrears and non-arrears households are placed in 
a common economic and geographic environment.
2.5.2 Difference-In-Differences M atching
Matching and DID can be combined to obtain the double-difference 
matching estimator. This assumes the specific structure of the error 
terms of Equation 2.9. As in the case of DID, this method allows for 
selection into arrears status related to household-specific fixed effects
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and for common trends between treatment and control groups. The 
identifying assumption is that the matched control group evolves 
from pre- to post-treatment period in the same way as the treatment 
group would have done in the absence of arrears.9 CIA of Equation
2.12 or 2.15 becomes:
(et, - e * )  X A | P(X)  (2.17)
where t\ > k > £0. Modifying Equation 2.16, the average treatment 
effect on the treated ax is estimated as follows:
% d =  E  I [Hit, ~  Hit0] -  E
1} I 0} J (2.18)
The evidence presented in Section 2.6 suggests that the difference- 
in-difference matching (DIDM) estimator outperforms the matching 
estimator in many applications. Chapters 7 and 8 use DIDM to 
verify results from cross-sectional matching. The DIDM estimation 
is based on one fifth to one third of the impact estimates for cross- 
sectional matching.
2.6 Evaluations of Estimators
A number of authors have assessed the reliability of the techniques 
described in the previous sections using experimental data based on 
random selection. Estimates from non-experimental approaches are 
compared to those from experimental design.10 This section summa­
rizes some of these contributions.
9The approach requires longitudinal data. A corresponding estimator for 
repeated cross-sections can be designed by matching each household after treat­
ment three times (to the treatment group before treatment, and the control 
group before and after treatment).
10Heckman and Smith (1998) conduct a fully controlled experiment with sim­
ulated data. The authors construct a structural model of an individual’s partici­
pation and earnings decisions to investigate the biases of different methods under 
alternative underlying hypotheses. Three estimators (cross-sectional differences, 
DID, and IV) are compared for alternative assumptions regarding the nature 
of the effect (homogeneous versus heterogeneous), the amount of information 
available to the individual, and the magnitude of variability of the individual
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LaLonde (1986) was the original methodological study on the 
impact of labour market programmes for disadvantaged workers on 
earnings. He uses data from the National Supported Work Demon­
stration (NSW), a labour market programme in which participants 
were randomised between treatment and control groups. For two 
population subgroups (women in receipt of aid for families with 
dependent children and disadvantaged men), the study compares 
the coefficients from an experimental design to parameter estimates 
of traditional non-experimental techniques (cross-section regression, 
before-after, and DID methods) where the control groups are drawn 
from alternative data sources, namely the Panel Study of Income Dy­
namics (PSID) and the Current Population Survey (CPS).11 The pa­
per finds that the non-experimental approaches significantly change 
the results. Alternative estimators produce very different coefficients 
and specification tests provide little help in choosing among compet­
ing estimators. LaLonde (1986) concludes that non-experimental 
methods are not reliable in evaluating programmes.
The LaLonde (1986) analysis was first criticized by Heckman and 
Hotz (1989). They propose a wider range of specification tests to sort 
among non-experimental estimators and find that such tests rule out 
estimators that yield substantially different treatment impacts than 
those from experimental design. The tests are primarily based on 
pre-programme data, so their validity depends on the similarity of 
the selection and outcome models in pre- and post-programme time 
periods.
Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) extend the crit­
icism of the LaLonde (1986) study beyond the issue of specification
fixed-effect. Under either homogeneity of impacts, or heterogeneity together 
with allowing individuals to know only about the expected gains rather than 
individual gains from the programme before the treatment, the cross-sectional 
estimator is downward biased, DID has a substantially smaller bias as it con­
trols for fixed effects, and IV gives consistent estimates. In case of heterogeneity 
and perfect foresight, the performance of the cross-sectional and especially DID 
estimators improve, as selection depends now largely on at|, while IV produces 
less satisfactory results.
11 More specifically, LaLonde (1986) compares the programme impact esti­
mated experimentally to that estimated non-experimentally. The difference con­
stitutes the evaluation (or selection) bias.
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tests. First, the data for treatment and control groups comes from 
different questionnaires, resulting in different measurements of the 
outcome variable. Second, the data is not sufficiently rich to distin­
guish clearly among different types of workers, leading to a failure to 
account adequately for heterogeneity. Third, the control groups are 
not taken from the same local labour market, implying that partici­
pants and control differ in key observables prior to the programme.12 
To illustrate the last point, compared to the NSW group, the PSID 
and CPS sample units are on average 8 to 9 years older, have differ­
ent ethnic composition, have mostly completed high school degrees 
rather than dropped out of high school, and have much higher pre- 
treatment earnings. Separating four different demographic groups 
(male and female adults; male and female youth), they decompose 
the evaluation bias from using a non-experimental control group into 
three components:13 (a) selection on unobservables, (b) failure to
12Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen (2001) show that different comparison 
groups can play an important role in understanding the impact of labour mar­
ket programmes. They investigate the introduction of the British ’New Deal for 
the Young Unemployed’ policy, a manadatory job search assistance programme 
combined with various subsidized options including wage subsidies to employers, 
temporary government jobs and full time education and training. The study 
evaluates the effectiveness of the scheme by exploiting design features to con­
struct two comparison groups: individuals who are slightly too old for eligibility 
but otherwise similar characteristics than eligible unemployed; and individuals 
who satifies the eligibility criteria but who live outside of participating areas dur­
ing the pilot phase prior to the national roll-out. The second comparison group 
also provides insights into possible general equlibrium effects of the programme, 
including substitution effects (participants get job that non-participants would 
have received in absence of the programme) and equilibrium wage effects (pro­
gramme is large enough to affect overall wage levels by changing labor supply). 
The results of the analysis suggest that the outflow rate from unemployment for 
men increased by about 20 percent as a result of the new policy. This suggests 
that the substitution and wage effects are either not important or cancel each 
other out. Other evaluations of labour market programmes are presented in a 
special edition of Labour Economics (Smith 2002).
13Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) define the evaluation 
bias slightly differently than LaLonde (1986) (see Footnote 11). They compare 
the randomized-out controls to non-participants. Since both groups do not take 
part in the programme, a consistent non-experimantal estimator applied to the 
controls combined with the non-participants should produce an estimated impact 
equal to zero (Smith and Todd 2004a).
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compare treatment and control groups at common values of match­
ing variables, and (c) failure to weight the two groups comparably. 
They find that differences in unobservables play only a small role 
in accounting for evaluation bias, while failure to locate participants 
and comparison group members in the same labour market, to in­
clude data on recent labour market histories, and to reweigh control 
observations appropriately are majors sources of evaluation bias. In 
addition, Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998) and Heck­
man et al. (1998) introduce kernel and local linear matching esti­
mators that use multiple control observations for constructing the 
counterfactual outcome for each treatment observation and propose 
DID versions of matching estimators. Compared to matching, DIDM 
leads to a reduction in the evaluation bias for three out of the four 
demographic subgroups, and leaves it approximately unchanged for 
the fourth one. Heckman et al. (1998) also argue that the matching 
estimators performed best when a rich set of conditioning variables is 
used.14 The evaluation bias becomes larger when matching is based 
on only a crude set of variables.
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) pro­
vide an alternative criticism of LaLonde (1986). Drawing on the 
same data sources as LaLonde (1986), they evaluate the performance 
of propensity score matching methods in non-experimental settings. 
They motivate their study by arguing that the dimensionality of the 
observable characteristics is typically high and data on the outcome 
variable for the control group costly to obtain. In particular, they ar­
gue that an evaluation of NSW programme has to take into account 
two features. First, it requires comparing treatment and comparison 
units across a large set of pre-treatment characteristics. Second, for 
some observations in the treatment group, the non-comparison group 
contains only few comparable units. For this setting, the authors 
propose propensity score matching with replacement: many treated 
units are allowed to be matched to the same control unit. They 
find that cross-section propensity score matching, implemented as 
nearest neighbour or caliper matching, succeeds in producing accu­
rate estimates of the treatment impact. Their analysis confirms the
14This is supported by Lechner (2002) and Jalan and Ravallion (2003).
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importance of checking the comparability of the treatment and con­
trol units in terms of pre-treatment characteristics and of discarding 
unmatched comparison units.
Smith and Todd (2004a) reexamine the LaLonde (1986) results 
in light of the findings of the studies by Heckman et al. (1997), Heck­
man et al. (1998), Heckman et al. (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (2002) 
and Dehejia and Wahba (1999). They argue that the good perfor­
mance of propensity score matching in Dehejia and Wahba (2002) 
and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) is surprising given the lesson learnt 
from Heckman et al. (1997), Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman 
et al. (1998). Smith and Todd (2004a) show that the performance of 
cross-sectional matching estimators is highly sensitive to the choice 
of the subsample from the NSW data. In particular, 40 percent of 
the observations used in LaLonde (1986), containing mostly high 
earners, are excluded in the Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Dehejia 
and Wahba (1999) papers. Smith and Todd (2004a) show that the 
cross-sectional matching estimators perform worse once this data is 
included in the analysis. Further, they find that DID matching esti­
mators exhibit lower biases than cross-sectional estimators, as they 
wipe out temporally invariant differences in outcomes between par­
ticipants and non-participants. These differences could be arising 
from geographic mismatch and alternative measurements of the de­
pendent variables. Finally, Smith and Todd (2004a) find that the 
details of the matching procedure related to the specific weighting 
scheme or the choice of bandwidth, have little impact on the es­
timated bias for the NSW data. However, the imposition of the 
common support condition is important in some cases.
In a reply to Smith and Todd (2004a), Dehejia (2004) empha­
sizes three issues. First, the conclusions in Smith and Todd (2004a) 
regarding the reliability of the cross-sectional matching estimators 
are based on applying the specification developed for the Dehejia 
and Wahba sample to alternative samples. As a result, a number 
of pre-treatment covariates are no longer balanced and therefore the 
cross-section matching estimators are no longer reliable. By contrast, 
if the propensity score estimator is based on a specification specific 
to each treatment group-control group combination, the propensity 
score method fares well. Second, Dehejia (2004) argues that the De-
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hejia and Wahba sample produces more reliable and robust estimates 
than the alternative samples, as the treatment impacts are less sen­
sitive to alternative specifications of the propensity score. Finally, 
Dehejia (2004) accounts for the selection of the Dehejia and Wahba 
sample. It includes only those observations with data on at least 
two years of pre-treatment earnings, in fine with the emphasis of 
the training programme literature to account for the recent earnings 
history of participants and non-participants (Ashenfelter 1978).
In a rejoinder to Dehejia (2004), Smith and Todd (2004b) point 
out that the Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Dehejia and Wahba 
(1999) findings are based on a small sample. As a result, the conclu­
sions about the nearest neighbour bias estimates are quite sensitive 
to specific choices in the estimation of the propensity score model, 
the definition of the bias and how ties axe broken in single nearest 
neighbour matching.
Diaz and Handa (2004) apply the techniques of Heckman et al. 
(1997), Heckman et al. (1998) and Smith and Todd (2004a) to 
evaluate the reliability of propensity score matching outside the US 
and beyond employment programmes. They draw on experimen­
tal data from a Mexican anti-poverty programme (” PROGRESA”) 
which in its first phase provided conditional cash transfers to poor 
rural households. The experimental control group is compared to 
a non-experimental group of non-participants selected from a na­
tionally representative household survey. Diaz and Handa (2004) 
show that simple cross-sectional matching displays a low bias for 
outcomes that are measured using similar survey instruments, such 
as children’s schooling outcomes, and a large bias for outcomes that 
are measured differently by different survey instruments, such as 
household expenditure levels and household composition.
2.7 Lessons
The literature on non-experimental impact evaluation techniques 
highlights a number of important messages for empirical applica­
tions of such estimators. First, estimators differ in their identifying 
assumptions, and the assumptions underlying a given estimator will
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sometimes hold in the data and sometimes fail. There is no general 
solution to the evaluation problem. Hence, the methods have to be 
carefully applied and cautiously interpreted. Second, data quality is 
a crucial ingredient to any reliable estimation strategy. Gathering 
information from programme participants and non-participants in a 
similar way and in controlling for observed characteristics, including 
local economic conditions, are important for accurate impact esti­
mates. Finally, the analyses document the importance of discarding 
unmatched comparison units, weighing treatment observations ap­
propriately and ensuring comparability of the treatment and control 
units in terms of pre-treatment characteristics.
The estimation procedures used in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 ap­
ply lessons from these studies. First, as explained in Section 2.3 to 
Section 2.5, the methods are selected in relation to the specific eval­
uation problem of each chapter. Key results are checked for their 
sensitivity to alternative estimation procedures. Second, the RLMS 
provides a high quality data set. The same surveys are used for 
arrears and non-arrears households, so that relevant variables are 
measured in an analogous way. In Chapter 6 to Chapter 8, arrears 
and non-arrears households are grouped with regard to geographic 
and regional-level variables, ensuring that they come from a similar 
economic setting. A rich set of variables is used to derive the proba­
bility of incurring arrears and to characterize welfare outcomes. Fi­
nally, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 ensure that treatment estimates are 
estimated strictly over the area of the common support only. Sam­
pling weights are known and applied in the calculation of treatment 
impacts, ensuring that misweighing is excluded as a source of bias. 
Chapter 7 employs a balancing test, confirming a close matching of 
treatment and control units.
Chapter 3 
Data
3.1 Introduction
The core of the empirical analysis draws on the Russian Longitu­
dinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).1 This chapter presents this data 
set, introduces complementary data sources and explains the deriva­
tion of basic monetary measures of welfare (income, expenditure and 
poverty).
3.2 Household Survey
The RLMS is a repeated cross-sectional household survey with a 
large panel component. It was designed to measure the effects of the 
sweeping changes in Russia since the early 1990s on the economic 
well-being of households and individuals. The project was started 
in 1992 with the aim to create the first national sampling frame for 
Russia. By now, ten rounds of data on individual health status, di­
etary intake, and labour supply, on household expenditures, incomes, 
and assets, and on community infrastructure and prices have been 
collected. The survey is organised and coordinated by the Carolina 
Population Centre at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.
11nformation on the RLMS is available on the web
(http: /  /  www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms).
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3.2.1 Sampling
Various factors complicate the drawing of a nationally-representative 
sample. Russia covers a vast territory of around one tenth of the 
world land mass with eleven time zones. The regions vary widely in 
terms of ethnicity of the population, urbanisation, degree of industri­
alisation etc. In the early 1990s, Russia had no own tradition of con­
ducting surveys, as Goskomstat, the National Statistical Office, had 
relied during Soviet times on micro-censuses to monitor living stan­
dards of the population. The RLMS was collected over two phases, 
covering 1992 to 1994 and 1994 to 2002, respectively.2 The objective 
of the first phase included capacity building at Goskomstat for mod­
em survey techniques. Starting with Round 5, which was collected 
during autumn 1994, the RLMS began to work together with other 
Russian institutions, as the emphasis shifted to providing timely in­
formation on policy-relevant issues. A new sample was selected using 
complex survey design, resulting in a leaner and more representative 
survey instrument. Even though the number of households declined 
from around 6000 in the first phase to around 4000 in the second 
phase, the sampling error was likely to be lower due to an increase 
in the number of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).
The thesis analyses data of Round 5 to Round 8 (1994 to 1998) 
from the second phase of the RLMS.3 The sample for this phase 
involved a multi-stage design. Starting from a list of 2029 consol­
idated districts, 38 strata were defined using geographical factors 
and the level of urbanisation. Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Moscow 
Oblast were selected as self-representing strata. The remaining dis­
tricts were allocated to 35 equal-sized strata, and one district was 
selected from each strata based on ‘probability proportional to size’ 
(PPS). Within each selected PSU the population was separated into 
urban and rural substrata, and the target sample size was allocated 
proportionately to the two subsample. In rural areas, a fist of all 
villages was compiled to serve as secondary sampling units (SSUs). 
In urban areas, SSUs were defined by the boundaries of the 1989
2Further rounds may be collected if funding is forthcoming.
3 As explained in the next chapter, this period coincided with the non-payment 
crisis, which is the focus of the empirical work.
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census enumeration districts.
A sample of 4718 households was drawn, allowing for a non­
response rate of 15 percent given the target of 4000 households. 
The sampling frame implies that RLMS statistics are typically rep­
resentative nationally and at the level of eight ‘geographical regions’ 
(Metropolitan areas; Northern and North Western; Central and Cen­
tral Black-Earth; Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin; North Caucasian; 
Ural; Western Siberian; and Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern).
Interviewers were required to visit each selected dwelling up to 
three times to secure interviews. The household questionnaire was 
administered to the most knowledgeable and willing member of the 
household. Additional interviews were conducted with as many 
adults as possible for the adult questionnaires. Adults also pro­
vided the information for the children’s questionnaires. Interviews 
with community representatives were conducted to fill in community 
questionnaires, and interviewers were instructed to provide informa­
tion on food prices. Reporting periods varied from the last week for 
parts of the consumption data to one year for some information on 
subsidiary farming, but consistent estimates for monthly income and 
expenditures can be constructed.
3.2.2 Panel Component
The RLMS was designed to provide a panel of dwelling units. With 
the exception of the construction of new housing structures, the re­
newed contact with a fixed national probability sample of dwelling 
units is an easy and cost efficient way to ensure national represen­
tativeness. The interviewers returned to the same addresses in late 
1995, 1996, and 1998. Over 97 percent of all adults in households 
were covered in separate interviews.
As any panel survey, RLMS has been affected by sample attri­
tion. During the first round of the second phase, about 94 percent 
of households were still living in the same dwelling, and overall in­
terview completion rates averaged 84 percent. However, rates were 
generally lower in urban areas, partly due to higher vacancy rates 
of housing stock. Lower rates were anticipated in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg at the design stage, and households in these cities were
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over-sampled. The combined influence of non-response attrition and 
change in dwelling unit occupants does not seriously distort the geo­
graphic distribution of the sample or its size or household-head char­
acteristics. The nominal representation of households in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg is declining, and households with a male head aged 
18 to 59 may be subject to slightly higher than average attrition.
Overall, the impact of attrition in the second phase does not 
severely affect the representativeness of the household panel.4 The 
RLMS provides sampling weights for nationally representative esti­
mates. The formulae for calculating standard errors of the welfare 
measures are adjusted for the clustering and stratification in the set­
up of the survey design (Howes and Lanjouw 1997).
3.2.3 Regional Information
To take account of regional determinants, I complement information 
on individuals and households with data on communities and states 
(or oblasts). The RLMS contains a community section for each of 
the 157 sites visited for the interviews. It provides information on 
demographics, housing, transport, the economy, hospital, schools, 
social offices and prices of 97 food items. Out of the 89 Russian 
states, 32 are represented in the RLMS. The analysis complements 
the RLMS with state-level information on fiscal and economic factors 
and prices from the Russian Ministry of Finance, State Tax Service, 
the Pension Fund and Goskomstat.
3.3 Welfare Measures
This section focuses on monetary measures that will be used through­
out the thesis. As the derivation of monetary measures is substan­
tially more complex than for other indicators and there is no agree­
ment on the best approach, it is useful to lay out the steps for deriving
4Comparing welfare statistics for the cross-sections and the panel, there is 
no evidence that the panel compromises the representativeness of the sample. 
Heeringa (1997) comes to the same conclusion.
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these indicators.5
3.3.1 Income and Consum ption
The basic choice is between an income and a consumption indica­
tor of well-being. Common practice for most developing countries is 
to adopt a consumption-based measure. For example, much of the 
Word Bank’s operational work and policy analysis is based on con­
sumption aggregates derived from survey data to measure poverty, 
analyse changes in welfare over space and time, and assess the distri­
butional impacts of various projects, programs, and policies.6 Con­
sumption is likely to be a more useful and accurate measure of living 
standards than income (Deaton 1997). Income, together with assets, 
measures the potential claims of a person or household, while con­
sumption captures the level of welfare in terms of what living stan­
dard individuals actually acquire. From a theoretical point of view, 
both concepts can be defended as an approximation to utility. More 
relevant is the issue of the time period over which living standards are 
to be measured. The main reason for preferring current consumption 
to income as an indicator of living standards is variability. In Russia 
of the mid-1990s, households receive incomes often irregularly due to 
payment arrears, and depend on the vagaries of agricultural in-kind 
income from subsistence farming on ‘datchas’, or huts with small pri­
vate land plots. Households often have some consumption smoothing 
opportunities through asset accumulation or depletion, and lending 
and borrowing. Thus, consumption is likely be a better indicator of 
current consumption than current income, and current consumption 
is also like to be a better indicator of longer term welfare, since it 
reveals information about incomes at other points in time.
A separate issue is how to convert the welfare indicator, be it 
consumption or income, into a measure of individual welfare. Com­
5 Each chapter introduces separately other welfare measures utilized in the 
analysis.
6The Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) Working Paper Se­
ries lays out the methodology and gives examples of analysis of house­
hold survey based poverty research as conducted by the World Bank 
(http: /  /  www.worldbank.org/lsms).
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mon practice is to start off from the assumption that expenditures 
and incomes be pooled in a household. The RLMS collects expen­
ditures on consumption items only at the household level. Most 
purchases occur for the household as a whole (e.g. food), and the 
bulk of food consumption takes place jointly during meals. While 
most income receipts, like wages and pensions, are recorded by indi­
vidual, the RLMS contains no information about the intra-household 
allocation of income resources. Once the measure of household re­
sources is defined, the next step is to account for the differences in 
size and composition of households (Coulter et al. 1992). In par­
ticular, the needs of household members differ, between adults and 
children. One option is to try use a system of weights, whereby for 
example, children count as a fraction of an adult in terms of needs, 
and convert all households into the number of equivalent adults. But, 
in addition, there are also economies of scale in consumption. Some 
non-food items (for example, housing to an extent, durable goods) 
have public goods characters, as their usage by one member of the 
household does not reduce their value to other household members. 
Thus, because people can share such goods and services without re­
ducing their welfare, the cost of attaining a given level of welfare may 
be lower in larger households. In principle, household size based on 
equivalent adults can be adjusted for economies of scale to get the 
number of “effective” equivalent adults. However, attempts to esti­
mate the relative costs, or equivalent scales, faced by different types 
of families have failed to establish a generally accepted methodology 
(Deaton 1997 and Howes and Lanjouw 1997). Furthermore, due to 
subsidised prices for household utilities, economies of scale are likely 
to be small in Russia (Lanjouw, Milanovic, and Paternostro 1998). 
At various points in the thesis, I follow standard practice and as­
sume that families allocate resources equally among members, and 
use household total expenditure, or income, in per capita terms as 
measure for household resources.7
7The official poverty line accounts for modest economies of scale as discussed 
further below in this section.
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3.3.2 Construction o f the Aggregates
Deriving a consumption measure from the information provided by 
the RLMS involves going through a series of steps, guided both by 
theoretical and practical considerations. This section describes the 
procedure adopted to obtain the consumption, income, and poverty 
measures.
C onsum ption
Total household consumption is built up from several components. 
The consumption aggregate is composed of four main types of goods 
and services: food items, non-food items, consumer durables and 
housing. For any given household, the shares of these categories de­
pend on a number of factors, including living standards, demographic 
composition, location and tastes. Consumption includes all reported 
expenditures on goods and services, and then adds in a value for con­
sumption that does not go through the market, like home produced 
consumption items or in-kind receipts from employers and donors. 
For perishable goods, it is mostly safe to assume that a household’s 
consumption is closely tied to their purchases. However, for durable 
goods, a correction has to be made for the difference between con­
sumption and expenditures. Finally, I convert all components into 
real terms using a price index which accounts for differences in re­
gions and interview dates.
The consumption measure used in the analysis diverges from the 
constructed consumption measure of the RLMS. The main differ­
ences concern the evaluation of home production, the exclusion of 
expenditures on taxes and levies and goods given away, the calcu­
lation of accrual-based values for durables and housing (rather than 
expenditure-based as in the constructed measure), and the consider­
ation of regional price variation.
Food item s Conceptually, constructing a food consumption aggre­
gate is straightforward, involving the aggregation of the total value 
of the food consumed during the recall period. Practical difficulties 
arise for two reasons. First, households receive food from different 
sources (purchases, home-production, gifts or remittances, in-kind
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payments), and all of them should be included to obtain an aggre­
gate welfare measure, even though they may well be recorded with 
different recall periods. However, food given away to other house­
holds is excluded, as it does not add to the donor’s but the recipient’s 
consumption (Deaton and Zaidi 1998). The RLMS asked households 
to record the consumption of a list of 57 food items and beverages 
composed of twelve categories (milk products, meat, fish, potato, 
bread, eggs, oil and fat, fruits, sweets, vegetables, food away from 
home, and miscellaneous foods). The common recall period of all 
items is the last 7 days. These items were deemed to be purchased 
relatively frequently so that this short recall period was adequate. 
For each item, households reported separately the consumption of 
purchased, self-produced and in-kind items.
Second, the non-purchased food items need to be valued in mon­
etary terms to include them in the welfare measure. This involves 
typically identifying reference prices at which food quantities can 
be valued. The RLMS included separate community price ques­
tionnaires, recording high and low Ruble prices for each food item. 
I used the low prices to assign values to the home produced food 
items. Subsistence income from agriculture is collected with a 12 
months recall period.
N on-food item s The RLMS collected information on consump­
tion of 35 non-food categories, covering health and education ser­
vices, clothing, footwear and headgear, durable goods, rent, taxes 
and insurance, festivities and ceremonies, and other expenses. In 
line with other households surveys, the RLMS asked for information 
on expenditures only, as most non-food items are too heterogeneous 
to permit the collection of information on quantities consumed. It 
recorded expenditures, depending on the likely frequency of pur­
chases, with recall periods ranging from the last 7 days to the past 12 
months. The information was included regardless of whether items 
were purchased or received in-kind. The computation of the non­
food aggregate involves a simple aggregation over the relevant items. 
The main difficulties relate to which items to include, and how to 
deal with durable goods.
Concerning the first issue, the basic principle is that only those
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non-food items should be included, which can be considered to add 
to the consumption of the household. For example, expenditures on 
taxes and levies or interest on loans are deductions from income, 
and thus not included. In any case, such expenditures are very small 
and infrequent. More complicated is the issue of lumpy or infrequent 
expenditures, such as marriages, dowries, births and deaths. Ideally, 
one would want to smooth these expenditures linked to rare events 
over several years but such information is missing. Including them 
would risk to potentially substantially overestimate the longer-term 
average of consumption of those households which happened to in­
cur such expenditures during the survey period. I follow common 
practice and exclude such items.
Durable goods require special treatment as they last typically for 
several years, so that lumpy and infrequent expenditures on durable 
goods are not a good indicator of the utility derived from these 
goods during the reference period. Instead of including purchases 
of durable goods, I follow the standard procedure to estimate the 
flow of services accruing to the household from the owned durable 
goods, based on their current value.
The underlying principle for housing is the same as for other 
consumer durables. The consumption aggregate should include the 
value of the flow of services received by the household from occupy­
ing its dwelling. Assuming rental markets are well functioning, the 
rent of the dwelling could be used as such measure. However, many 
households own the dwelling in which they reside. The consump­
tion aggregate uses actual rents whenever available and otherwise 
imputed rents as obtained from hedonic housing regressions. These 
estimations model the determinants of rent payments for the sub­
group of rent paying households to predict rent payments for house­
holds not reporting rent payments. The predicted rent payments 
and imputed rent estimates match each other fairly closely nation­
ally, though there are some differences across regions.
C ost o f living differences To compare welfare in different parts 
of the country and over time, consumption has to reflect differences 
in the cost of living. Round 5 to Round 8 were implemented over a 
period of four years, and households interviewed at the beginning of
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the survey period faced different prices than households at the end of 
the period. Adjustment over time is important due to double-digit 
inflation rates over parts of the period. Transportation is difficult 
and expensive, and local markets not well connected, giving rise to 
possibly large spatial variations in the cost of living. Price differences 
are taken into account by dividing nominal variables with Goskom- 
stat’s monthly state-level consumer price index. The deflation varies 
both across states (to take account of spatial differences) and across 
time (to account for different interview dates). Following the con­
vention of the RLMS, Ruble (R) values are expressed in prices as of 
June 1992.
Incom e
Income is composed of wage and non-wage income, home produc­
tion, financial income, and public and private transfers received. In 
contrast to expenditures, the amount sold to others is added to, and 
production costs are subtracted from, home production. To under­
line the impact of behavioural responses to wage arrears, Chapter 
7 and Chapter 8 employ slightly modified income concepts. A nar­
row income concept equals income before private transfers received, 
and the broad income concept is defined as income including the dif­
ference of private transfers received and given, and the amounts of 
durable sales, borrowing and overdue rental bills.
3.3.3 Poverty M easure
The poverty fine is the official poverty line of the Russian Federa­
tion. It is calculated by the Ministry of Labour in accordance to 
recommendations of the World Bank and the World Health Organi­
sation, and adjusted for regional price differences across regions. The 
food part of the poverty line reflects a food basket constructed on 
the basis of nutritional criteria. Separate subsistence budgets are 
calculated for the working-age population, children and pensioners. 
The derived poverty line has an elasticity of about 0.8 to household 
size, implying a modest degree of economies of scale (Ravallion and
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Lokshin 1998).8 It varies according to the demographic composition 
and regional location of a household.
Much of the research on poverty measurement is based on three 
poverty statistics (Ravallion 1992, Deaton 1997 and Cowell 2003). 
They belong to the class of measures proposed by Foster, Greer, and 
Thorbecke (1984) and are characterised by the following equation:
where a  is some non-negative parameter, z  is the poverty line, y 
denotes either nominal household consumption or nominal house­
hold income, i indexes individuals, n equals the total number of 
individuals in the population, and q is the number of individuals 
with expenditures below the poverty line. The measure Pq =  H  is 
called head-count, Pi =  PG  the poverty gap, and P2 =  FGT the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measure. H gives the share of the poor in 
the total population, PG  equals the average expenditure shortfall of 
the poor relative to the poverty line, and FGT measures the severity 
of poverty. The measures are additive in the sense that aggregate 
poverty equals the population-weighted sum of the poverty levels in 
the subgroups of the population.
These poverty measures can serve as welfare measures in their 
own right, or be used to derive other welfare measures. For example, 
Chapter 5 analyses the welfare ratio which is defined as the ratio of 
household consumption to the poverty line.
8See Klugman and Braithwaite (1995) for more details on the construction of 
the poverty line.
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Chapter 4 
The Arrears Crisis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter lays out the macroeconomic and fiscal context for the 
analysis presented in Part II. It gives a brief account of the scope 
and causes of Russia’s payment crisis in the mid-1990s. The arrears 
crisis was characterized by a sharp increase in non-cash transactions 
and arrears, including offsets (the exchange of goods and services for 
debt), barter (the exchange of one good for another) and debt. The 
phenomenon marked a partial return to practices from the Soviet 
era, where enterprises used money primarily as a unit of account.
International data on government transfer and wage arrears are 
sketchy but the following numbers are suggestive that Russia’s ex­
perience was typical for other transition countries:
•  Azerbaijan: The financial gaps of the public pension system 
amounted to 0.7 percent of GDP in 1999, or about 25 percent 
of total outlay.
•  Baltic countries: During 1999, 20 percent of workers in Lithua­
nia, 15 percent of workers in Latvia and 14 percent of Estonian 
workers experienced delays in payment of wages (Aasland and 
Tyldum 2000).
• Bulgaria: According to Bulgaria’s Confederation of Indepen­
dent Trade Unions, the overall backlog in unpaid wages owed
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to public sector workers or workers in wholly or partially state- 
owned enterprises amounted to of $150 million in 2000, equal 
to about 500,000 average monthly industrial wages.
•  China: According to figures published by the All China Fed­
eration of Trade Unions, the total wage arrears of 13.9 million 
workers across the country amounted to $13.9 billion in 2000. 
According to figures from the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security, arrears in pensions during the period from January 
to May 2000 alone totalled $1,174 million (Pringle 2001).
•  Kazakhstan: Arrears in wages stood at 6 percent of GDP and 
arrears in pensions at 2 percent of GDP at the end of 1996 
(World Bank 1998).
•  Kyrgyzstan: About 58 percent of workers experienced delays 
in wage payments in 1993, and 24 percent in 1996 (Namazie 
2002).
•  Tajikistan: According to World Bank estimates, a third of the 
formal sector employees reported wage arrears in 1998
• Ukraine: According to the 1999 International Labor Organiza­
tion (ILO) labour survey, over 80 percent of all factories had 
difficulty paying their wages, and wage arrears lasted on aver­
age for over 20 weeks. The IMF estimates that arrears to the 
pension fund, which finances pensions to 14 million elderly, in­
creased from 0.1 percent of GDP in 1995 to 1.4 percent in 1996 
and 1997 and to 1.9 percent of GDP in 1998.
4.2 Scope
The very nature of Russia’s payment crisis implies that reliable data 
on its extent and pattern are scarcely available. Unorthodox and 
frequently changing budgetary classification rules, cash rather than 
accrual-based accounting, the hybrid public-private nature of some 
agencies, contingent liabilities and the non-monetary means of pay­
ment make it difficult to construct consistent time series.
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4.2.1 Enterprises
Arrears of the enterprise sector rose from less than 10 percent in 
1994 to close to 25 percent of GDP in 1998 (International Monetary 
Fund 1999). The growth in arrears reflected to a large extent rising 
arrears in taxes and contributions to extrarbudgetary funds, which 
increased by about 5 percent of GDP. Wage arrears amounted to 
around 2 percent of GDP in 1996 and 1997, and rose to 3.3 percent 
in 1998. Non-monetary means of transactions also increased during 
the mid 1990s. Barter, as a percentage of industrial sales, increased 
from about 5 percent in 1992 to almost 50 percent in 1998. Some 
estimates suggest that about half of barter was arranged through 
chains and intermediaries. Offsets, involving the mutual settlement 
of preexisting debts, were common among enterprises. Veksel, as 
a primitive form of tradable promissionary notes, issued by banks, 
large enterprises and different levels of governments, became a fre­
quent feature in offsets.
4.2.2 Government
The public sector was often part of offset arrangements, writing off 
enterprise tax arrears for cancellations of government debts to en­
terprises. All levels of government practised such tax offsets. While 
some tax offsets were initiated in response to the lack of government 
liquidity, others were an integral part of transactions right from the 
outset. Tax arrears to the consolidated budget grew from around 
3.4 percent of monthly GDP in January 1993 to some 80 percent of 
monthly GDP by mid 1997. The share of cash receipts in federal 
tax revenues dropped from 95 percent in 1994 to 55 percent in 1998. 
The numbers for local budgets are likely to be of similar order, and 
possibly even lower.
The crisis became especially severe in 1996. According to the 
State Tax Service, about one third of all enterprises did not pay 
any taxes, and only 17 percent of all enterprises regularly settled 
tax liabilities on time. Federal tax revenues failed to reach either 
the revenue targets in the federal budget or the tax revenue floor as 
stipulated in IMF loan agreements. Federal budget revenues were 
about 15 percent below plan and 18 percent short of the revenue
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target specified in the original IMF Extended Fund Facility. The 
IMF targets were subsequently lowered in September, and then again 
in December, ensuring that the year-end revenue target was met.
State energy monopolies, such as Gazprom (gas monopoly) and 
RAO UES (electricity monopoly), provided large implicit subsidies 
to enterprises through arrears and transactions at off-market prices, 
amounting for most of the mid-1990s to around 4 percent of GDP 
(Pinto, Drebentsov, and Morozov 2000). Figures on arrears in gov­
ernment spending are sketchy, but estimates suggest they amounted 
about 2.5 percent of GDP in 1996 and 2 percent of GDP in 1997 for 
the federal government alone (Ivanova and Wyplosz 1999).
These figures indicate that the payment crisis was directly re­
lated to a fiscal crisis (Table 4.1). The persistent decline in revenues 
required repeated down-scaling of government expenditures in order 
to contain the budget deficit. Russia’s consolidated government ex­
penditures in 1998 were down by over 6 percent compared to 1994. 
In spite of the cutbacks on spending, the fiscal deficit exceeded the 
targets specified in the 1996 IMF adjustment program during 1996 
to 1998 by between 3 to 5 percent of GDP.
4.3 Origin
While there is some dispute about the underlying causes for this cri­
sis (Alfandari and Schaffer 1996 and Ivanova and Wyplosz 1999), it is 
likely that a combination of mutually reinforcing factors contributed 
to the problem. At the microeconomic level, most explanations fink 
the crisis to a failure to enforce hard budget constraints at the enter­
prise level (International Monetary Fund 2000). At the macroeco­
nomic level, the payment crisis emerged against a backdrop of strict 
disinflation policies, pursued since the end of 1994. The government 
shifted from monetary financing of the deficit to bond financing, cre­
ated a flourishing bond market of short-term bills, and anchored the 
exchange rate in a corridor vis-a-vis the US-Dollar. These policies 
facilitated the emergence of a payment crisis for three reasons.
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Table 4.1: General government budget (percentage of GDP)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998-92
Total revenues 39.1 36.2 34.6 34.1 33.5 36.5 33.4 -5.7
Consolidated 28.6 27.8 25.7 26.6 25.8 27.5 25.2 -3.5
Federal 16.7 13.7 11.8 12.9 12.5 12.3 11.0 -5.7
Regional 13.5 16.7 18.0 15.6 16.4 18.5 16.2 2.6
Fiscal transfers* 1.6 2.6 4.1 1.8 3.0 3.4 2.0 0.4
Extra-budget 10.9 8.6 9.1 8.0 8.1 9.9 8.7 -2.3
Federal transfers 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.4
Total expenditures 57.8 43.6 45.0 40.2 42.4 44.4 41.4 -16.4
Consolidated 39.1 36.3 40.7 34.5 37.6 38.8 34.3 -4.8
Federal 27.1 20.2 23.2 18.6 20.9 19.4 16.9 -10.2
Regional 12.0 16.0 17.5 15.9 16.7 19.4 17.4 5.4
Extra-budget 8.3 8.0 8.6 8.0 8.2 9.8 9.6 1.2
Import subsidies** 12.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -12.0
Deficit -18.2 -7.3 -10.4 -6.1 -8.9 -7.9 -8.0 10.2
Federal -10.4 -6.5 -11.4 -5.7 -8.4 -7.1 -5.9 4.5
Regional 1.6 0.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 -1.2 -2.8
Extra-budgetary 2.6 0.6 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.9 -3.5
GDP in R tm 19.2 171.5 611 1540 2146 2522 2696
o^urce!TOp,7333r3555rO!nIstryorPfnance^^™^^— 
’From federal to regional budgets. "Outside the budget.
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4.3.1 Economic Factors
First, the real exchange rate appreciated as the programmed rate 
of exchange rate depreciation was typically below the rate of infla­
tion. With hindsight, this led to an ‘overvaluation’ of the Ruble, 
which contributed to the low competitiveness of Russian enterprises. 
Productivity increases did not match the rise in the real exchange 
rates as, among other reasons, weak corporate governance resulted 
in a lack of effective restructuring of enterprises. Manufacturers were 
largely unable to compete with foreign imports on domestic markets, 
access to which had been widely liberalized, and were unsuccessful 
at selling products abroad.
Second, with firms struggling to find customers, the government’s 
political imperative was to provide support to enterprises. With 
monetary financing of budget revenue shortfalls ruled out, the gov­
ernment replaced explicit subsidies to the enterprise sector, which 
had been faced out in the first half of the 1990s, by implicit sub­
sidies. They came in two main forms. The government lowered 
the effective tax rates on enterprises by allowing tax arrears without 
the enforcement of bankruptcy, declaring tax amnesties and valu­
ing firms’ output at inflated prices for tax offsets. In addition, the 
public sector provided energy inputs through the main energy mo­
nopolies at below market prices. These practices softened enterprise 
budget constraints and worsened the liquidity of the public sector. 
The flipside of the cash shortage was an increase in public debt and 
the rise in payment arrears to pensioners, family with children and 
other welfare recipients. This not only added to the arrears prob­
lem in the economy as a whole but also had destructive impacts on 
tax discipline via negative demonstration effects. Enterprises could 
legitimize running up wage and tax arrears by pointing to the gov­
ernment’s own track record of unpaid bills.
Third, the payment crisis reached systemic dimensions as a result 
of thick market externalities and network effects. The more enter­
prises engaged in non-monetary transactions, the more difficult it be­
came for fundamentally viable enterprises to find firms willing to pay 
in cash. In consequence, they were forced to deal in barter or with 
offsets. This process was accelerated by multilateral non-monetary
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transactions, which typically involved the public sector. While most 
firms owed taxes to the state, only some of them directly supplied 
to the public sector. The government or public utilities issued tax 
offsets that were passed on not just to its direct supplier but also to 
enterprises with claims on the government’s direct supplier.
4.3.2 Fiscal Factors
The Soviet Union was a federation more in form than in substance 
(Schiffer 1989).1 After its breakdown, the bargaining between re­
gions, which favoured greater autonomy, and the centre, which ar­
gued for the preservation of Russia as a federation, led to a shift 
of influence away from Moscow. The outcome was a form of hy­
brid federalism, which combined national and territorial elements of 
the ethno-federal legacy. The constitution of December 1993 defines 
Russia as a three-tiered federal state consisting of 89 ‘subjects’ (krais, 
oblasts, okrugs, autonomous regions, national regions, metropolitan 
cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and autonomous republics). All 
governments, whether federal, regional or local, have independent 
budgetary and administrative status. The federal government ac­
counted in 1998 for over 41 percent of all expenditures (including 
transfers), as against 42 percent for regional budgets, 6 percent of 
which was financed by transfers from the centre to the regions.2 Re­
gional budgets collected also a higher share of total revenues (48 
percent compared to 33 percent for the federal budget).
The fragmentation of the government proved detrimental for both 
for revenue collection as well as expenditure management (Grafe and 
Richter 2001). The decline in overall revenues was accompanied by 
an increase in the relative revenue share of subnational budgets. The 
drop in tax revenues from shared taxes, together with the reduc­
tion in federal transfers to the regions after 1994, resulted in grow­
ing financial independence of subnational governments, which relied 
increasingly on its own revenue sources, including borrowing from 
emerging market investors. The federal government was unable to
1See Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) for an assessment of regional differ­
ences in living standards in the Soviet Union.
2Extra-budgetary funds accounted for the rest.
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enforce a uniform tax allocation system across the federation, as some 
regions were granted special fiscal arrangements. Regions threatened 
to split from the federation in order to extract tax concessions from 
the centre. In addition, the bottom-up system of tax collection en­
abled regions to withhold revenues from the centre. Furthermore, re­
gions had a strong incentive to collect taxes in non-cash form, since 
this resulted in less cash revenues had to be shared with the federal 
government. Finally, sequestration of federal transfers put further 
strain on relationships between the federal government and regions. 
In 1996, federal transfers fell 15 percent short of the level stipulated 
in the budget law, and most of them were paid out only at the end of 
the year. In anticipation of delayed and reduced transfer payments, 
regions withheld tax revenues from the federal government, adding 
to the dilution of federal government control. Similarly, they reacted 
to sequestration by building-up precautionary balances to ensure the 
financing of top-priority programmes that might later fail to obtain 
funding.
The federal authorities responded to the decline in budget rev­
enues by transferring expenditure obligations to lower-level govern­
ments. By 1996, the share of regional and local budgets in con­
solidated non-interest expenditures had increased to over one half. 
About 75 percent of spending on industry, agriculture and other pro­
duction activities and over 80 percent of that on social programmes 
were at subnational levels (Table 4.2). As a result of new expenditure 
responsibilities, subnational budgets run deficits from 1995 onwards. 
Decentralization of government spending was facilitated by the fact 
that expenditure responsibilities of the different government levels 
were not prescribed by law. The federal government was thus able 
‘unilaterally’ to unburden itself of expenditures without violating any 
expenditure code. In addition, legal arrangements specified by the 
federal government over enterprise privatisation meant that social as­
sets from enterprises were transferred mostly to local governments.3
Weaknesses in the budget management system contributed to 
the fiscal crisis. The absence of centralized control over government 
spending made it difficult to impose fiscal discipline, or to protect
3Frye and Shleifer (1997) estimate that the associated fiscal burden on local 
budgets amounted to around 2 percent of GDP.
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Table 4.2: Social spending of the general government sector (per-
centage of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total social spending 23.1 19.8 20.7 23.7 22.0
Budgetary programmes 14.5 11.8 12.6 14.0 12.3
Federal 1.4 1.2 1.4 2.1 2.4
Education 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
Health 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5
Social policy 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.4
Local 13.1 10.6 11.2 12.0 9.9
Housing 5.5 4.0 4.2 4.3 3.5
Education 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.7 3.1
Health 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.2
Social policy 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0
Extra-budgetary programmes 8.6 8.0 8.1 9.7 9.7
Pension fund 6.1 5.6 5.9 7.0 7.1
Employment fund 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
Social insurance fund 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
Medical insurance fund 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.2
GDP In R trn 611 1540 2146 2522 2696
Source: IMF 2066, Ministry of Finance.
70 CHAPTER 4. THE ARREARS CRISIS
high priority spending items. Without a fully developed treasury 
system, the Ministry of Finance lacked control over all stages of the 
spending proces s (commitment, verification and payment). Rev­
enue projections in budgetary legislation were too optimistic, and 
fiscal consolidation came at the cost of ad hoc sequestration and 
government arrears. Furthermore, some fiscal regulations created 
incentives for enterprises to engage in non-monetary transactions. 
For example, taxes like VAT were levied only on a cash basis. En­
terprises with tax arrears were required to channel all transactions 
through one bank account, and any money coming through this ac­
count was to be directed to the state tax service.
4.4 Conclusion
The non-payment crisis in the mid-1990s was fuelled by a difficult 
economic transition, weak fiscal management and a fragmented pub­
lic sector. It involved government and enterprises and cash transfer 
recipients and workers. The following chapters will investigate in 
detail the implications for household welfare of the rise in arrears of 
government transfers and wages.
Part II 
Analysis
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Chapter 5 
Poverty and Cash Transfers
5.1 Introduction
What is the impact of government transfers on household consump­
tion? Standard incidence studies compare the distribution of con­
sumption levels before and after government intervention. Typically, 
only the post-intervention distribution is observed, and the pre­
intervention distribution is approximated by subtracting the amount 
of government transfers from actual consumption. This procedure 
assumes implicitly a propensity to consume from cash transfers of 
unity. Yet, the propensity to consume differs from unity in the 
presence of consumption smoothing.1 Households may smooth con­
sumption over income fluctuations. They may arise from payment 
arrears or volatile returns on agricultural activity and home pro­
duction, like changing weather conditions, sickness, and price fluc­
tuations (Deaton 1997, Paxson 1992, Townsend 1995 and Wolpin 
1982),2 or, as considered in this analysis, changes in government 
transfers (Cox and Jakubson 1995, Ravallion et al. 1995 and Van de
10ther reasons, such as variation of the propensity to consume over the life 
cycle of household members or by the recipient of cash transfers, are not consid­
ered explicitly (Strauss and Thomas 1995). The analysis does also not explore 
the difference between average and marginal propensities to consume.
2Besley (1995) describes how households overcome the lack of formal in­
surance and credit markets that characterises many developing and transition 
countries.
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Walle 1995). The elderly with pension arrears may take on new jobs, 
receive transfers from their children, or sell off assets in order to keep 
consumption levels constant.
This chapter develops and applies a new approach for measur­
ing the impact of government cash transfers on poverty alleviation 
that takes into account consumption smoothing of households. The 
methodological contribution is twofold. First, building on work by 
Ravallion et al. (1995), I estimate reduced-form regressions to ob­
tain the propensities to consume from government cash transfers 
separately for each transfer type. As the scope for endogenous trans­
fers of families with children receiving child benefits is different than 
for elderly on old-age pensions, the coefficients are likely to be dif­
ferent across transfers. In addition, some cash transfers are more 
regular sources of income than others, suggesting differences in the 
propensities to consume according to Friedman’s permanent income 
hypothesis. Following Deaton (1997) and Wolpin (1982), I use IV 
techniques to separate transitory from permanent income compo­
nents, and compare the degree of consumption smoothing across 
types of cash transfers. The regressions confirm that the propensity 
to consume from transitory income is lower than from permanent 
income. Furthermore, pensions, as a more regular form of income 
source than other incomes, have consistently higher coefficients than 
other incomes. Second, I extend an established decomposition tech­
nique to disentangle the impact of changes in government transfers 
from changes in the pre-transfer expenditure distribution on poverty.
The methodology is applied to investigate the impact of govern­
ment cash transfers on poverty alleviation in Russia during 1994 to 
1998. The dramatic changes in living standards and the high preva­
lence of arrears in government transfers make Russia a rich source for 
studying the benefit incidence of government transfers. The analy­
sis is based on household data from the RLMS and regional data 
from official sources in Russia. I trace the incidence of payment ar­
rears for pensions and child benefits, account for factors underlying 
the changes in cash benefits, estimate the propensities to consume 
corresponding to the various transfer types, and simulate poverty 
rates for counterfactual distributions of government transfers. The 
results of the analysis highlight the interplay between fiscal and polit­
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ical pressures, cash transfer levels, and poverty rate dynamics during 
this period of macroeconomic adjustment. The need for fiscal consol­
idation implied cuts in social expenditures, while political demands 
called for higher social benefits. The outcome was characterised by a 
combination of increases in benefit entitlements at the cost of greater 
benefit arrears (especially in fiscally weak regions), contractions in 
real benefit levels due to a lack of inflation indexing, and higher 
poverty. The changes in government transfer policies since 1994 ac­
counted for at least one seventh of the rise in poverty between 1994 
to 1998.
The analysis in the paper uses the Russian Longitudinal Moni­
toring Survey (RLMS). The results presented here are based on the 
four rounds (Round 5 to Round 8) of the second phase of the sur­
vey. Most of the analysis is based on a balanced panel of households 
represented in all four rounds. This panel contains 2250 households 
with 5579 individuals, which represents a reduction in size compared 
to the cross-section of about 40 percentage. The basic indicator of 
living standards is the welfare ratio, defined as the ratio of household 
expenditures to the poverty line.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2 looks at the 
incidence of pension and child benefit arrears, and presents the re­
gression analysis for the propensities to consume from these transfers. 
Section 5.3 describes and implements the decomposition technique. 
The final section concludes.
5.2 Consumption Estimation
5.2.1 Estim ation Procedure
This section outlines the strategy for identifying the propensities to 
consume from government transfers. It explains a range of practi­
cal issues, including the definition of payment arrears, measurement 
error, sample selection bias, the distinction between transitory and 
permanent income components, and the choice of the estimators.3
3 This econometric analysis owes much in approach and spirit to Case and 
Deaton (1998).
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Following Ravallion et al. (1995), I estimate the propensities to 
consume from government transfers by regressing household current 
expenditures on government transfers. The key parameter is the 
coefficient on government transfers. A value of unity implies that a 
marginal increase in government transfers leads to an equivalent rise 
in expenditures. The estimate may differ from unity, and may vary 
both by income source and household type. According to Friedman 
(1957), households smooth over income variations in order to keep 
consumption constant at the level of permanent income over their 
lifetime. In other words, the propensity to consume depends on 
whether income is permanent or transitory. Receipts from regular 
income sources are mostly consumed, and one-off incomes tend to be 
saved. The spending behaviour is also affected by the life expectancy 
(or discount rate). For example, abstracting from payment arrears, 
pensions accrue to the pensioner until the end of her lifetime. If 
the life expectancy of the household is similar to the life expectancy 
of the pensioners, or the allocation of pension income follows the 
non-altruistic preferences of the pensioner, pensions come close to a 
notion of permanent income. In contrast, the planning horizon of 
a household with children is likely to exceed the period for which 
the household is entitled to receive child benefits. Hence, the theory 
predicts that pensions are more closely linked with consumption than 
child benefits. In addition, the scope for endogenous reactions to 
compensate for variations in cash transfers varies across household 
types. For example, it may be easier for pensioners to take on a new 
job than for parents in regular employment who have to look after 
their children.
Recognising these features, I estimate separately the propensi­
ties to consume from pensions and from child benefits. The pension 
regressions refer to the subsamples of households with at least one 
eligible pensioner, and the regressions for child benefits are based on 
the subsample of households with children. To assess the impact of 
household composition, these estimates are compared to those ob­
tained from households receiving both pensions and child benefits. 
Investigating food expenditures rather than total consumption serves 
as sensitivity check. While the welfare implications of some forms of 
expenditures may be unclear, it is hard to argue that food expendi­
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tures do not increase household welfare, especially in the context of 
poverty alleviation.
The regressions include standard control variables for household 
needs and preferences, such as the number of children by age group, 
the number of elderly and age, gender, and educational attainment of 
the household head. The basic regression specification excludes other 
income than cash transfers as it controls for part of the endogenous 
response that is identified by the coefficient on the cash transfer 
variable. Subsequent regressions add income before cash transfers to 
the set of covariates to explore whether cash transfers axe treated in 
the same way as other income.
It may seem that measurement error is not a major concern. Pen­
sions and child benefits are supposedly regular monthly payments, 
which are likely to be reported correctly by the household. How­
ever, for the episode under consideration, arrears in payments were 
widespread. Reported amounts could reflect payments of fractions 
of government transfers. For pensions, Pension Fund data provides 
a cross-check on the dynamics of the pension arrears crisis as por­
trayed by the RLMS. For child benefits, I match reported receipts 
with potential entitlements, calculated from official benefit rules, and 
actual receipts. The analysis suggests that there is little evidence for 
payments of fractions of cash transfer entitlements.
Sample selection is present if unobserved household features or 
community characteristics affect both household expenditures and 
the likelihood of receiving a cash transfer. In this case, estimates 
of the propensity to consume for the group of households receiving 
cash transfers axe not unbiased estimates for the group of eligible 
households as a whole. I investigate two aspects. First, low take-up 
of cash transfers is an unlikely source for sample selection bias for 
the group of eligible households. Second, probit regressions axe used 
to identify the factors influencing the incidence of arrears in cash 
transfers. Controlling for these characteristics in the propensity to 
consume regressions, I cannot fully exclude the possibility of self­
section of households into arrears status. As a sensitivity check, the 
estimates obtained from the whole sample of eligible households axe 
compared with estimates from the subsample of those who received 
payments.
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The ultimate objective is to derive counter-factual poverty rates 
for different cash transfer regimes. These should be based on the 
propensities to consume from permanent rather than transitory in­
come flows. The standard procedure is to instrument cash transfers 
with variables that are correlated with permanent income compo­
nent but orthogonal to transitory income components. Plausible 
instruments are determinants of the incidence in payment arrears 
and household-level variables that proxy for benefit rules. However, 
household demographics not only determine benefit rules, but are 
also likely to affect household spending directly. Households with 
payment arrears offer a simple test for the specification, as their 
demographic characteristics are not collinear with cash benefits re­
ceived.
The instrumentation of income without cash benefits entails sep­
arate issues (Deaton 1997). A significant share of income and con­
sumption is accounted for by household or dacha production that 
is neither sold nor bought in the market. The value for home pro­
duction is included in both household income and expenditure, and 
any error in the calculation of this imputed value adds an error com­
ponent to both the income and expenditure variables. The posi­
tively correlated measurement error may overcompensate the stan­
dard attenuation bias caused by measurement error in income and 
lead overall to an upward bias in the estimated propensity to con­
sume. Income excluding home production can be used as instrument 
for other income. In addition, the permanent components of other 
income can be identified using labour market characteristics of the 
household head as instruments.
Exploiting the panel dimension of the RLMS, regressions are run 
both in levels and in changes. The level estimators ignore the panel 
dimension of the data set, but suffer less from certain types of atten­
uation biases through measurement error than first-differences esti­
mators. This issue is especially relevant for instrumenting changes 
in cash transfers, as instruments related to non-monetary household 
characteristics are typically fairly constant across rounds. However, 
the estimators based on first-differences are more robust to the omis­
sion of any time-invariant regressors, even if they are correlated to 
observable explanatory variables.
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5.2.2 Pensions 
The Pension System
The pension system originates from the Soviet period, when it was 
part of a comprehensive social insurance programme (Barr 1992).4 
At the end of 1996, the Pension Fund had 38 million beneficiaries 
(26 percent of the population), including 29 million Russians above 
retirement age (55 for women, 60 for men) and 3.8 million disability 
pensioners. People above retirement age qualify for normal old-age 
pensions after 25 years (20 years for women) of employment. Pen­
sions are an important income source for household with pensions, 
amounting to one third of expenditures (75 percent of the poverty 
line) in 1994 and one fifth of expenditures (50 percent of the poverty 
line) in 1998. The take-up of pensions amongst the old-age popu­
lation according to the RLMS is over 95 percent across the whole 
period. Pensions are eamings-related but subject to a low ceiling. 
They are fixed at 55 percent of the average wage earned either for 
the period of the last two years of employment, or for any period of 
60 working months in a row. Pensions are no higher than 75 percent 
of this average wage, or three times the minimum wage. The benefit 
levels are not indexed to inflation, however, the levels of minimum 
pensions and minimum wage are legislated by the Duma, and revised 
four times a year.5 Expenditures of the Pension Fund amounted to 
6.6 percent of GDP in 1998, which accounts for over three quarters 
of all social cash transfers (Table 5.1). Over four fifth of the pension­
ers draw old-age pensions, which are financed on pay-as-you-go basis 
by payroll taxes amounting to 29 percent of employee wages.6 The 
disability, military, and loss of provider pensions are co-financed by 
federal transfers, which amount to less than 10 percent of the Pension 
Fund’s overall expenditures.
4This section summarizes the main feature of the pension system as of the 
mid 1990s. More details, and an overview of recent reforms, are provided in 
Denisova, Gorban, and Yudaeva (1999).
5Since February 1998, pensioners can opt for a new system of pension calcu­
lation based on individual coefficients.
6The contribution is split into 28 percent and 1 percent between employer 
and employee.
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Table 5.1: Social cash transfers
1994
(1)
1995
(2)
1996
(3)
1997
(4)
1998
(5)
Budgetary Spending
As Percentage of GDP
Overall cash transfers 7.6 6.8 7.6 8.6 8.8
Social transfers 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.9 2.2
Child Benefits 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 na
Pensions 6.0 5.4 5.7 6.7 6.6
As Percentage of 1994
Overall cash transfers 100 76 79 92 87
Social transfers 100 78 98 101 96
Child Benefits 100 81 86 82 na
Pensions 100 76 74 89 85
Pension Entitlement Rules (Ruble; October of each year)
Average Pension Entitlements 1572 1342 1522 1446 1071
Minimum Pension 840 636 1046 927 622
Child Benefit Entitlement Rules (Ruble; October of each year)
Standard Up to 1.5 years 356 333 723 705 444
1.5 to 6 years 249 233 253 247 155
6 to 16 years 213 233 253 247 155
Single Parents 1.5 to 6 years 373 350 380 493 311
6 to 16 years 320 350 380 493 311
Soldier families 1.5 to 6 years 373 350 380 370 233
6 to 16 years 320 350 380 370 233
Poverty Rates
Head-Count total 12.4 17.4 17.1 33.0
SE 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.8
Poverty Gap total 3.8 5.2 5.6 10.9
SE 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7
FTG, a=2 total 1.7 2.3 2.7 5.2
SE 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7
Pension Receipt amongst Eligible Individuals
% 97 91 66 85
SE 0 1 3 1
Child Benefit Receipt amongst Eligible Families
% 66 55 38 20
SE 2 2 3 2
Source: MOF, Goskomstat.
Notes: The pension and child benefit entitlements refer to October of each year. Child benefits for students 
are paid until the age of 18 rather than 16.
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The Pension Fond is an extra-budgetary agency of the federal 
government. Its budget management is independent from those of 
the rest of the public sector. The system was traditionally admin­
istered centrally, but has been decentralized since transition. The 
Pension Fund consists of one federal department, 89 regional de­
partments (each with a separate agreement with the central fund), 
and 2342 local departments. Despite this decentralization, however, 
there is a uniform vertical structure throughout the regions. The 
Pension Fund is only in charge of collection pension contributions, 
while the identification of recipients and the pension payment is the 
responsibility of the Social Welfare Office.7 Payroll taxes are paid 
into the transit accounts of the Pension Fund at the local level, and 
then accumulated at the regional level. The regional branches of 
the Social Welfare Offices receive the funds and pass them down to 
their local accounts. The recipients collect the pension at post of­
fices, social welfare offices, the state-owned savings bank Sberbank, 
or receive payments through the delivery services of these institu­
tions (Kolesnik 1995). Regions that collect pension contributions in 
excess of their pension payments, transfer funds to the centre, which 
then redistributes those to regions whose collection falls short of 
pension entitlements. The transfer amounts are specified in separate 
agreements between each region and the Pension Fund.
Pension Arrears
The Pension Fund had at times difficulties in collecting sufficient 
revenues to cover pension obligations. The revenue crisis reflects 
poor compliance and financial difficulties of enterprises, as well as 
delays in contributions from the Ministry of Finance. Faced with 
funding shortfalls, the Pension Fund incurred arrears in payments. 
The RLMS contains information about pension receipts in the 30 
days preceding the interview (Table 5.1).8 The numbers suggest a
7Since 1995, a number of regions have adopted a system called United Pension 
System, in which the Pension Fund is responsible also for the identification of 
entitlements and payment of pensions.
8Kemel density estimates and scatter plots of actual versus entitlements to 
pension receipts suggest little evidence for the settlement of outstanding pension 
arrears or proportional adjustments in pension payments (Richter 2000).
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dramatic rise in pension arrears from about 3 percent in 1994 to 
over one third in 1996, before arrears dropped back to around 15 
percent in 1998. This evidence is consistent with data from the 
Pension Fund. The shortfall of Pension Fund revenues below plan 
rose from 8 percent in 1995 to 15 percent, or R22 trillion. In ad­
dition, federal transfer arrears increased from R2 trillion in 1994 to 
R3 trillion in 1995, and then rose to R14 trillion,-or 60 percent of 
the budgeted amounts, in 1996. Payment arrears to the Pension 
Fund increased from R23 trillion at the end of 1995 to R60 trillion 
at the end of 1996 and R88 trillion at the end of 1997. According 
to Pension Fund press releases quoted in Moscow Times, arrears in 
pension payments amounted to R8 trillion in September 1995, and 
increased from R7 trillion in July 1996 to R14 trillion in December 
1996. All arrears were paid off by July 1997, but non-payment re­
sumed again and reached a level of R30 trillion in September 1998. 
Pension arrears remained roughly constant until January 1999, after 
which they started to fall again.
What determines the rationing of pension payments? The de­
centralised pension collection and payment system suggests the ex­
istence of regional differences in pension arrears. Regions that face 
funding shortfalls might prioritise their own pensioners, and transfer 
only residual sums to the centre for redistribution to other locali­
ties. In this case, the incidence of pension arrears should reflect re­
gional differences in the pension contribution base and dependency 
ratios, and in the infrastructure for pension payments. There is in­
deed a large variation in pension arrears across regions. As shown 
in Table 5.2, pension axe higher in rural than in urban areas, and 
while at most 5 percent of pensioners suffered from pension arrears 
in the Metropolitan area (Moscow and St. Petersburg) in any of 
the rounds, the share in the Caucasian area reaches 55 percent in 
1996. Furthermore, regions that paid pensions had higher tax collec­
tion, higher government expenditures, lower shortfall of government 
spending compared to plan, and higher regional output than regions 
that had incurred arrears (Table 5.3).9 Pensioners suffering from ar-
9As the Pension Fund does not publish regional data on pension contribution 
collection and payment arrears, these variables are proxied with the oblast-level 
variables tax collection, tax arrears, government expenditure, government expen-
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________ Table 5.2: Regional incidence of pension receipt________
Receipt
% of Entitlement 
94 95 96 98 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall
% 97 91 66 85
SE 0 1 3 1
Settlement Type
Urban % 97 93 75 87
SE 0 1 5 2
Suburban Settlement % 97 92 69 87
SE 2 3 10 4
Rural % 95 86 46 79
SE 1 2 3 2
Geographical Regions
Metropolitan % 97 95 96 97
SE 1 3 1 3
Northern and North Western % 99 94 72 87
SE 0 3 8 5
Central and Central Black-Earth % 97 91 71 83
SE 1 2 5 3
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin % 96 92 63 89
SE 2 2 9 3
North Caucasian % 95 87 45 75
SE 1 3 7 5
Ural % 97 92 69 90
SE 1 3 11 2
Western Siberian % 97 80 55 76
SE 1 6 5 3
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern % 97 99 70 86
SE 1 1 6 4
Notes: The sample includes individuals eligible for pensions. The numbers show 
the means and standard errors of pension receipt by category during the last 
30 days.
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rears lived in communities with worse infrastructure for the delivery 
of pensions (welfare office, post office, and bank) than those without 
arrears. Regions with arrears had fewer persons in retirement age, 
suggesting that arrears cannot be explained by differences in pension 
burden across localities.
The discussion so far confirms the importance of regional fiscal 
and institutional endowments for pension payment. Beyond these 
factors, do personal and household characteristics affect the inci­
dence of pension arrears? For example, more educated and richer 
pensioners might be expected to better work the system and ensure 
a more regular payment of pensions than others. Table 5.4 compares 
characteristics of pensioners by arrears status. Arrears pensioners 
were younger and less well educated, and lived in households with 
more children, lower expenditures, lower income, and less assets than 
non-arrears pensioners.
The determinants of pension receipts are further examined in Ta­
ble 5.5, which shows the probability of pension receipt among pen­
sioners. The first regression presents probit estimates of the probabil­
ity to receive pensions, including as determinants household income 
(excluding pensions), demographic composition (including number 
of pensioners by type (old-age, disability, loss of provider, and mili- 
tary pensioners)), age, gender, employment history, educational at­
tainment, and indicator variables for each geographical regions and 
rounds (Table 5.4). Income has the expected sign but is insignif­
icant. The set of education variables is jointly insignificant. The 
results are broadly unchanged, when the variables listed in Table 5.3 
are included as proxies for the funding of pension payments.
The next two columns explore the impact of correction for mea­
surement error in income excluding pensions. Column 3 is a linear 
probability model, and Column 4 a linear probability model in which 
income excluding pensions is instrumented by labour force charac­
teristics of the household head. The F-statistic on the instruments 
equals 27. While the coefficients on the variables increase, income 
still remains insignificant at the 10 percent level.
diture arrears (defined as the short fall of actual spending compared to plan), 
output (GRP), all of which defined on a per-capita basis, and the number of 
old-age individuals.
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Table 5.3: Receipt of pension and child benefits by local character­
istics
Arrears
(1)
No Arrears
(2)
Pensions
Regional-Level Characteristics
Tax Collection Ruble 11839 18388
SE 678 1097
Tax Arrears Ruble 3793 4357
SE 329 487
Government Expenditures Ruble 11461 15779
SE 477 714
Government Expenditure Arrears Ruble 3896 2398
SE 444 321
Gross Regional Product Ruble 57696 77498
SE 2848 3358
Old-age Population 000 517 630
SE 25 35
Cluster-Level Characteristics
Welfare Office % 59 75
SE 5 3
Post Office % 90 92
SE 2 2
Bank % 86 89
SE 3 2
Child Benefits
Regional-Level Characteristics
Support for Families with Children Ruble 403 586
SE 15 26
Federal transfers Ruble 1554 1983
SE 90 113
Gross Regional Product Ruble 68769 82662
SE 4023 4154
Population under the age of 16 000 520 620
SE 20 32
Cluster-Level Characteristics
Welfare Office % 69 79
SE 4 3
Notes: In the top panel, the sample contains individuals eligible for pensions. The numbers 
show the means and standard errors of state- and cluster-level characteristics for arrears 
and non-arrears pensioners. In the bottom panel, the sample contains households eligible for 
child benefits. The numbers show the means and standard errors of state- and cluster-level 
characteristics for households with and without child benefit arrears.
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Table 5.4: Personal and household characteristics by pension arrears
status
No Arrears
(1)
Arrears
(2)
Houshold Members # 2.5 2.8
SE 0.1 0.1
Children # 0.3 0.4
SE 0.0 0.0
Pensioners # 1.6 1.6
SE 0.0 0.0
Expenditure R 8842 7664
SE 577 455
Income R 7438 4315
SE 469 327
Assets # 3.4 3.3
SE 0.0 0.1
Male % 30.8 29.6
SE 0.9 1.5
Age months 752.9 740.9
SE 3.6 6.1
Secondary Education? % 43.9 40.0
SE 1.6 2.2
Grade Completed in Secondary School mean 7.2 7.0
SE 0.1 0.2
Studied after School? % 55.5 49.9
SE 1.7 2.6
If S tudied after School:
Vocational Diploma? % 33.7 32.7
SE 1.4 2.8
Profess-Tech Diploma w/o Secondary Degree? % 11.8 10.9
SE 0.9 1.6
Profess-Tech Diploma with Secondary Degree? % 10.0 11.5
SE 0.8 1.4
Technical-Medical Diploma? % 33.0 31.7
SE 1.0 2.7
University Diploma? % 22.0 19.0
SE 2.0 2.0
Graduate Studies? % 0.4 0.8
SE 0.0 0.1
Ever worked? % 75.9 74.9
SE 1.2 1.6
If Ever Worked:
Year last worked % 8619 8686
SE 30 41
Years worked % 3619 3574
SE 28 39
Occupational Code for 1991 mean 2281 2559
SE 95 159
Occupational Code for 1985 mean 4061 4404
SE 129 184
Notes: iheliampleTonfalnsTibiviaualsefigiEJeTorpensions. ITtenumBersshowthe'means'andstandartTerrore' 
of personal and household characteristics for arrears and non-arrears pensioners.
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Table 5.5: Determinants of the probability to receive pensions
Probit Probit OLS IV Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income Excluding Pension Coef 5E-06 2E-06 7E-07 0.015 2E-06 6E-06
t-st 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.4 0.4 1.1
Pension in Round 5 Coef -6E-05
t-st -1.4
F-TESTS (Stats/Signif)
Education 1.2/.29 0.57/.75 0.32/.93 9.7/.00
Pensioner type 1.7/. 17 9.0/.00 1 .a/16 17.5/.00 8.7/.00 8.6/.00
Cluster and regional variables 2.5/.07 14/.00 29.2/.00 2.5/.06 0.9/.44
Income IV 26.5/.00
Number of Observations 6512 6512 6512 6512 6512 4225
for pensions. All regressions include indicator variables for pensioner type, rounds, and geographical regions, and the 
variables household size, number of children by age group, the numbers of pensioners by type, and age, gender, and 
the occupational code for 1985 and 1991 of the pensioner. The education variables in columns 1 to 4 are grade level 
completed in secondary school, vocational diploma, professional-technical diploma without secondary degree, 
professional-technical diploma with secondary degree, university diploma, and graduate diploma. The cluster- and 
oblast-level variables in columns 2 to 6 are the first nine variables listed in Table 5.3. Income excluding pension 
in Column 4 is instrumented on indicators for whether the head participates in the labour force, has a job, has wage 
arrears, and on the occupational code for the primary and secondary jobs of the household head.
The income loss of pensioners from arrears is related to the size 
of the pension. The last two regressions look for evidence whether 
the size of the pension matters for pension arrears. Potential pen­
sion receipts are proxied by actual pension receipts in 1994, and the 
sample is restricted to those pensioners who did not incur pension 
arrears in 1994.10 Educational attainment and employment history 
are dropped to avoid collinearity problems with the proxy for poten­
tial pension receipts. Column 6 shows that the coefficient on 1994 
pension receipts is insignificant and has the wrong sign. Income 
still remains insignificant at the 10 percent level. Overall, there 
is little systematic evidence that observable personal and household 
characteristics like income excluding pensions or education affect the 
probability of pension receipt.11
10The correlation coefficients of pension receipts amongst those receiving pen­
sions with Round 5 pension payments is 0.82 in Round 6, 0.72 in Round 7, and 
0.71 in Round 8.
11 Chapter 6 reports evidence for specific payment rules during the 1996 pension 
crisis, but income remains insignificant.
88 CHAPTER 5. POVERTY AND CASH TRANSFERS
Identification
The estimation of the propensity to consume from pensions faces 
an identification problem. If elderly people have differing tastes for 
household expenditures than working-age adults, then the number of 
pensioners should enter the regression in its own right. However, the 
number of pensioners should be an instrument for pension receipts, 
as it is an important predictor of pension income.12
Table 5.6 deals with this issue. The first regression shows the 
simplest case. Household expenditures are regressed on pension in­
come, household size, the number of children, and age, gender, and 
educational attainment of the household head, and regional dummy 
variables. The marginal propensity to consume from pension in­
come equals 0.45, and the coefficient is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The next column adds the numbers of pensioners by cate­
gory. Their coefficients are negative, and the F-test indicates that 
these variables are jointly significant. These estimates imply at face 
value that pensioners tend to spend less than working-age adults. 
However, the numbers of pensioners are a good predictor for pension 
income, and the coefficients may simply pick up the collinearity with 
pension income. Indeed, the propensity to consume increases to 0.55 
(Column 2). This interpretation is supported by the next regression, 
which presents the estimates for the sample of pensioners who did 
not receive any pensions. It provides a test on the direct effect of 
the numbers of pensioners on household expenditures. The numbers 
of pensioners are now jointly insignificant, although the number of 
old-age pensioners and the number of disability pensioners remain 
individually significant. Column 4 returns to the full sample and 
adds the number of male and female persons of the age 50 or over, 
as preferences should not change at the moment a person reaches 
pension-age and may differ by gender. The final column displays the 
choice of variables that I will use in the further regression analysis. 
The variables for the numbers of pensioners by category are dropped
12 Case and Deaton (1998) emphasis the identification problem in their analysis 
of the behavioural impact of social pensions in South Africa. The issue is less of 
a concern in this analysis, as both the regional variation in pension arrears and 
the employment history of pensioners are good additional predictors of pension 
income.
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from the regression which reduces the propensity to consume slightly 
from 0.51 to 0.49.
Estim ation
Column 1 of Table 5.7 summarises the key parameter estimates for 
the basic specification from a range of cross-sectional regressions on 
the sample of households with persons eligible to receive pensions. 
In all cases, household expenditure is regressed on income variables, 
while controlling for household size, the number of children by age 
category, the number of male and female persons of the age 50 or 
over, and age, gender, and educational attainment of the household 
head. The regressions vary in two respects. First, the income vari­
ables differ. Initially, only income from pension receipt is included 
(rows 1 and 2), before income excluding pensions is added (rows 3 
to 5). Second, the estimates of both OLS and IV regressions are 
presented. For the regression with pensions and other income as 
separate explanatory variables, the estimates from 3SLS regression 
axe shown. The results are now discussed in more detail.
Row 1 displays the coefficient on pension income from the basic 
regression already discussed above. The marginal propensity to con­
sume equals 0.49, and the coefficient is measured significantly. Row 
2 instruments pension income with the numbers of pensioners by 
type, a set of employment history variables of the household head, 
the average official pension level by oblast, and the set of cluster- and 
oblast-level variables used in the probit regressions in Section 5.2.2. 
The coefficient on pensions rises to 0.56, suggesting that the propen­
sity to consume from permanent income components is moderately 
higher than from transitory income components.
This result is investigated further by including other income into 
the regression. Other income in pensioner households is likely to be 
more transitory than pension receipts, and, following the permanent 
income hypothesis, one would expect a lower propensity to consume 
from other income. The results of the regression are shown in Row 
3. The OLS estimate for pensions equals at 0.53, and the coefficient 
on other income is 0.52. An F-test fails to reject the equality across 
the two coefficients. However, in view of the measurement problems
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Table 5.6: OLS regressions on household expenditures and covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coef 0.45 0.55 0.51 0.49
t-St 6.0 8.8 7.7 7.4
Coef 1644 1751 1845 1744 1808
t-st 11.2 10.8 4.6 10.7 10.8
Coef -306 -472 29 -551 -595
Pension
Household Size
Number of Children 0-1.5
Number of Children 1.6-6
Number of Children 6-16
Number of Old-Age Pensioners
Number of Disability Pensioners
Number of Loss of Provider Pensioners
Number of Military Pensioners
Number of Males 50+
Number of Females 50+
HH: Age 
HH: Male
HH: Grade completed in Secondary School 
HH: Vocational Diploma
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma w/o Secondary Degree 
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma with Secondary Degree 
HH: University Diploma 
HH: Graduate Diploma
t-st -0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.7
Coef -1444 -1606 -1317 -1555 -1669
t-st -3.2 -3.5 -1.3 -3.4 -3.6
Coef -788 -924 -1204 -980 -1066
t-st -3.3 -3.5 -1.9 -3.8 -3.9
Coef -674 -936 -511
t-st -3.1 -2.0 -1.8
Coef -752 -1490 -798
t-st -2.3 -1.5 -2.3
Coef -727 -586 -990
t-st -2.0 -0.6 -2.7
Coef -255 -941 -495
t-st -0.6 -0.8 -1.1
Coef 280 -212
t-st 0.8 -0.8
Coef -499 -709
t-st -1.7 -3.0
Coef -1.6 -1 0 -1 -1
t-st -2.3 -1.8 0.2 -1.4 -1.5
Coef 1051 1164 1921 1201 950
t-st 4.3 4.4 2.9 4.2 3.1
Coef 75 61 141 72 67
t-st 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.6
Coef 461 451 207 504 469
t-st 2.2 2.2 0.4 2.4 2.2
Coef 146 141 71 729 143
t-st 0.4 0.4 0.1 3.1 0.4
Coef 310 282 -233 269 264
t-st 1.2 1.1 -0.3 1.0 1.0
Coef 1578 1560 2902 1593 1561
t-st 5.9 5.9 3.6 6.0 5.9
Coef 559 545 -1359 584 523
t-st 0.4 0.4 -0.6 0.4 0.4
F-statistics for # of Pensioners (Stat/Signif) 4.4/.00 1.0/.4 2.0/. 1
F-statistics for # of Male & Females 50+ (Stat/Signif) 3.1/.05 4.5/.01
Number of Observations 5065 5065 752 5065 5065
"RolesTTCe dependent variable is household expenditures"^®"sample is res!nc!e<no households eligible tor 
pensions. All regressions include indicator variables for geographical regions and rounds. HH refer to household head.
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Table 5.7: Estimates of the propensity to consume from pensions
and other income
Level First Diff Level First Diff
Pens>=0 Pens>=0 Pens>0 Pens>0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pension (1) OLS Coef 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.52
t-st 7.4 7.8 4.2 3.8
(2) IV Coef 0.56 0.89 0.49 0.91
t-st 4.4 5.5 2.8 4.1
Pension/Other Income (3) OLS Coef .53Z.52 .58/.40 .61/.52 .53/.40
t-st 10.0/19.5 7.8/13.1 6.9/17.6 4.1/11.4
(4) IVCash Coef .52/.36 .60/.21 .57/. 37 .53/.22
t-st 9.5/12.5 7.9/8.2 6.2/11.6 4.0/7.3
(5) 3SLS Coef .74/.52 .83/.34 .71/. 56 .83/. 48
t-st 7.8/11.7 8.9/6.9 6.3/10.9 6.6/8.7
F- or Ch2-Tests on Equality of Pension and Other Income Coefficients (Stat/Signif)
(3) OLS 0.1/.83 4.6/.00 0.7/. 40 0.9/.34
(4) IVCash 5.4/.02 18.8/.00 3.6/.06 4.8/.00
(5) 3SLS 5.3/.02 20.4/.00 6.4/.00 6.0/.00
F- or Ch2-Tests on Significance of Instruments (Stat/Signif)
(2) Pension 121/.00 54/. 00 156/.00 116/.00
(4) Inccash 8750/.00 2716/.00 7814/.00 4199/.00
(5) Pension 3103/.00 2117/.00 1893/.00 2750/.00
(5) Income 266/.00 258/.00 269/.00 258/.00
Number of Observations 5065 4905 4313 4115
Notes: The dependent variable is household expenditures. Th<9 sample of the first two columns is restricted to all
households eligible for pensions, and the in last two columns to all households which received pensions payments. 
The estimates in columns 1 and 3 are for level regressions, and the coefficients in columns 2 and 4 for regressions 
in first-differences. All regressions contain the variables used in the regression of Column 4 in Table 5.6. In Row 2, 
pensions are instrumented on an indicator variables for whether the head has ever worked, the year of the head’s 
last employment, the head’s  occupational code for 1985 and 1991, the numbers of pensioners by type, the first nine 
cluster- and oblast-level variables listed in Table 5.3, and the average level of pension entitlements by oblast. In 
Row 4, other income is instrumented on other income excluding home production (“Inccash"). In Row 5, pensions 
are instrumented on the same variables as in Row 2. Other income is instrumented on indicators for whether the 
household head participates in the labour force, has a job, has wage arrears, and on the occupational code for the 
primary and secondary jobs of the household head.
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and endogeneity issues related to other income, the estimates are 
likely to be inconsistent. When other income is instrumented by 
other income excluding home production, the coefficient on pensions 
remains unchanged. The estimate on other income drops by almost 
one third, and the F-test rejects equality of the two coefficients at 
the 3 percent level. The result is confirmed when both pensions and 
other income are instrumented with the set of instruments of Row 2 
for pensions and labour market characteristics of the household head 
for income. The 3SLS estimates in Row 5 show that the coefficient 
for both pensions and income increase. The gap between the coef­
ficients widens and the F-statistic rejects equality. It is interesting 
to compare the coefficients for pensions in rows 1 and 2 with those 
in rows 3 and 5. Controlling for income has fit tie impact on the 
coefficient for pensions for the OLS estimates, but leads to a higher 
pension estimate in the 3SLS regression. This rise in the pension 
coefficient is consistent with the view that endogenous responses are 
important.
Column 2 presents the corresponding results of the fixed effects 
regression. The consistency of these estimates is not affected by the 
omission of time-invariant factors. The differences in the propensi­
ties to consume are larger than for the OLS estimates. The estimates 
on pensions are higher, and those on other income smaller. Once in­
strumented, the coefficient for pensions is not significantly different 
from unity, which is consistent with an interpretation that pensions 
are like permanent income. The F-tests reject equality of the coeffi­
cients on pensions and other income in all cases. However, the 3SLS 
estimate on pensions in Row 5 is now lower than the coefficient in 
Row 2, in contrast to the pattern from the cross-sectional estimates.
The last two columns investigate whether the main results sur­
vive once attention is restricted to the group of households actually 
receiving transfers. If sample selection is a major issue, one would 
expect these coefficients to deviate from the estimates obtained from 
the whole sample of eligible households. As there is no need to 
control for the regional variation in the probability of pension ar­
rears, the cluster and oblast-level variables are dropped from the set 
of instruments for pension payments. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
5.7 display the coefficients on pensions and income variables for the
5.2. CONSUMPTION ESTIMATION 93
OLS, IV, and 3SLS estimations on the subsample of benefit recipi­
ents. The coefficients display the same pattern as the corresponding 
estimates from Column 1. While the point estimates deviate some­
what, the differences to the estimates from the level regressions are 
not statistically significant. The F-statistics still reject the equality 
of the coefficients at the 10 percent level in Row 4 and Row 5.
5.2.3 Child Benefits 
The System  of Child Benefits
The current system of child benefits was introduced in 1991. Families 
are eligible for child benefits for each child under the age of 16, or 
under the age of 18 for students. The size of child benefits is linked to 
the minimum wage which is determined by the Russian Parliament, 
the Duma. Child benefits vary by age group, and are higher for single 
parents and families of serving soldiers (Table 5.1).13 In early 1994, 
the government moved the financing responsibility from the federal 
to regional budgets. In early 1998, the delivery of child benefits 
was transferred from the place of employment to local social welfare 
offices.14 Budget expenditures on monthly child benefit payments 
varied around 0.7 percent of GDP between 1994 to 1997. Child 
benefits are typically paid to the mother but parents have the right 
to choose the entitled person as long as both parents live with the 
child. In July 1998, child benefits became means-tested, restricting 
eligibility to families with average per capita income no more than 
twice the minimum subsistence level, but most regions delayed the 
implementation of these rules until 1999 (Klugman and Motivans 
1999).15
13Child benefits axe not adjusted for regional price differences.
14Unemployed eligible parents were even before 1998 paid by the local social 
protection office.
15Only 5 percent of the families eligible for child benefits in Round 7 and with 
children below the age of 15 stated that they are no longer eligible for child 
benefits in Round 8.
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Child Benefit Arrears
The difficulties of the government to collect revenues caused grave 
funding problems for child benefits. According to regional budgetary 
data from 1996, actual spending on child benefits fell 28 percent short 
of plan. The RLMS provides information about the eligibility status 
for child benefits of families with children, and the amounts eligi­
ble families received as child benefits in the 30 days preceding the 
interview. Analogous to the analysis of pensions, arrears of child 
benefits are defined as non-payment of child benefits over the last 
month. Amongst the families that received child benefits the re­
ported payments match closely to the amounts calculated on the 
basis of eligibility and benefit rules. The overall gap between re­
ported and calculated payments as a percent of reported payments 
is close to zero in all rounds. Reported payments tend to be higher 
for families with children under the age of 1.5 years, possibly due to 
the inclusion of other official cash transfers, like maternity benefits 
or parental leave benefits.16
Child benefit arrears affected already one third of eligible families 
in 1994, and the share increased in each round to reach 80 percent 
in 1998 (Table 5.1). What determines the pattern of arrears in child 
benefits? In contrast to the pension system, child benefits are fi­
nanced at the regional level without any redistribution of resources 
at the federal level. The variation in child benefit arrears at the local 
level grew from year to year (Table 5.8).17 By 1998, no more than 15 
percent of eligible families received child benefits anywhere outside 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. Regions differ widely in fiscal resources, 
and the large variation in child benefit arrears across regions mirrors 
these fiscal inequalities even more than for pensions (Table 5.3). At 
the state level, arrears are likely to be determined by the gap in 
planned and actual spending on child benefits. While data on actual 
spending on child benefits is available, I lack information on child
16In 1998, maternity benefits and payments for parental leave accounted for 
10 percent of the spending on public cash transfer programmes to families with 
children according to budget plan (Kuprianova 1998).
17The coefficient of variation across PSUs grew from 0.21 in Round 5 to 1.1 
in Round 8. The coefficient of variation across clusters rose frm 0.28 in Round 
5 to 1.3 in Round 8.
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benefit by plan. This variable is proxied with per-capita federal 
transfers, regional output (GRP), and the number of children. An 
indicator variable for welfare offices is also added. Unsurprisingly, 
child benefit arrears were lower in regions with higher spending on 
family support, higher federal transfers, higher GRP, and with wel­
fare offices. The incidence of arrears is lower in regions with more 
children.
Table 5.8: Regional incidence of child benefit receipt
Transfer Receipt a s  % of Entitlement 
1994 1995 1996 1998
Overall
% 66 55 38 20
SE 2 2 3 2
Settlement Type
Urban % 66 62 44 23
SE 3 3 4 3
Suburban Settlement % 73 51 47 15
SE 7 8 3 7
Rural % 64 40 21 15
SE 3 3 3 3
Geographical Regions
Metropolitan % 71 67 76 84
SE 2 2 5 1
Northern and North Western % 50 39 34 7
SE 6 8 9 2
Central and Central Black-Earth % 75 71 51 20
SE 7 6 11 5
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin % 72 53 39 7
SE 5 6 4 2
North Caucasian % 65 52 29 20
SE 3 4 4 7
Ural % 64 61 31 17
SE 4 3 7 4
Western Siberian % 64 44 40 12
SE 4 9 6 3
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern % 59 42 12 15
SE 4 4 2 4
Notes: The sam ple contains households eligible for child benefits. The numbers show  the m eans and standard 
errors of child benefit receipt during the last 30 days.
Table 5.9 provides summary statistics for household characteris­
tics, separating families by the status of child benefit arrears. House­
holds not receiving child benefits were more likely to live in rural 
areas, spent less and have lower income than households that were
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paid. There are no systematic differences in characteristics of the 
household head.
The determinants of child benefit receipts are examined closer in 
Table 5.10. Column 1 shows the probit estimates of the receipt of 
child benefits for eligible households on household income excluding 
child benefits controlling for household composition; age, gender, 
marital status and educational attainment of the household head; 
and indicator variables for each round. Income is significant at the 
1 percent level, and the educational variables are jointly significant 
at the 10 percent level. When regional spending variations on child 
benefits are controlled for using the four variables fisted in Table 
5.3 and indicator variables of whether other household members in­
curred wage arrears are added, both income and education become 
insignificant.
The next regression adds potential child benefits as explanatory 
variable, calculated according to the nation-wide benefit rules. It 
is significant at the 10 percent but has a negative sign, and income 
and education remain insignificant. Column 4 and Column 5 look at 
the impact of correcting for measurement error in household income. 
The same instruments for income are used as in the correspond­
ing regression for pension receipts. Income and education are still 
insignificant. Column 6 includes an indicator variable for arrears in 
previous rounds. It is highly significant, and negative. Again, income 
and education remain insignificant at the 10 percent level. The con­
clusion of this analysis mirrors the results from the investigation of 
pension arrears. There is little evidence that observable characteris­
tics like income or education matter for the receipt of child benefits, 
but the correlation of past and current arrears of child benefits could 
indicate that some families are better at collecting child benefits than 
others.
Identification
The estimation of the propensity to consume from child benefits is 
less straightforward than for pensions. First of all, child benefits are 
a much smaller part of household income than pensions. Even for 
families with children with child benefit arrears, they represented
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Table 5.9: Household characteristics by child benefit arrears status
No Arrears
(1)
Arrears
(2)
Houshold Members # 4.3 4.3
SE 0.1 0.1
Children under 1.5 years # 0.1 0.1
SE 0.0 0.0
Children 1.5 to 6 years # 0.5 0.5
SE 0.0 0.0
Children 6 to 16 years # 1.6 1.6
SE 0.0 0.0
Pensioners # 0.4 0.4
SE 0.0 0.0
Expenditure R 11443 10898
SE 544 642
Income R 9065 8016
SE 398 443
Assets # 3.9 4.0
SE 0.1 0.1
HH: Male % 88.0 89.8
SE 0.0 0.0
HH: Age months 459 460
SE 4 4
HH: Married? % 88.0 87.0
SE 1.0 1.0
HH: High School? % 84.0 82.0
SE 1.5 1.5
HH: Gradre? mean 9.5 9.5
SE 0.0 0.0
HH: Studied after School? % 86.0 88.0
SE 1.3 1.1
If Studied after School:
HH: Vocational Diploma? % 35.2 37.8
SE 2.2 2.3
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma w/o Secondary Degree? % 13.5 13.4
SE 1.0 1.1
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma with Secondary Degree? % 26.1 24.8
SE 1.7 1.4
HH: Technical-Medical Diploma? % 24.0 23.0
SE 2.0 2.0
HH: University Diploma? % 20.0 18.0
SE 2.2 1.7
HH: Graduate Diploma? % 0.5 0.5
SE 0.3 0.2
HH: Labour Force? % 93.0 92.0
SE 0.6 0.8
If in Labour Force:
HH:Has Job? % 94.0 93.0
SE 0.7 0.8
Notes: The sample contains households eligible for child benefits. The numbers show the means and standard errors 
ot personal and household characteristics tor households with and with child benefit arrears. HH refers to household 
head.
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Table 5.10: Determinants of the probability to receive child benefits
Probit Probit Probit OLS IV Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income Excluding Child Benefits Coef 1E-05 5E-06 4E-06 2E-06 4E-06 6E-06
t-st 3.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.6
Potential Child Benefits Coef -1E-06
t-st -1.7
Child Benefit Arrears, t-1 Coef -0.37
t-st -6.1
F-TESTS (Stat/Signif)
Education 1.9/.08 1.5/.18 1.5/. 18 1.4/.24 1.3/.26 0.94/.47
Cluster and Oblast level variables 12.6/.0012.7/.0016.1/.0012.5/.00 9.8/.00
Income IV 39.1/.00
Numbers of Pensioners 4.4/.00 1.0/.4
Numbers of Male 50+ and Females 50+ 4.5/.01
Number of Observations 3427 3427 3427 3427 3427 2538
All regressions include indicator variables for rounds and geographical regions, and the variables household size, numbers 
of children by age group, and numbers of old-age males and females. The education variables refer to the household 
head and are grade level completed in secondary school, vocational diploma, professional-technical diploma without 
secondary degree, professional-technical diploma with secondary degree, university diploma, and graduate diploma.
The cluster- and oblast-level variables in columns 2 to 6 are the variables listed in Table 5.3. Columns 2 to 6 also contain 
the head’s  spouse employment status and wage arrears status. Income excluding pensions is instrumented in Column 4 
on indicators or whether the household head participates in the labour force, has a job, has wage arrears, and on the 
occupational code for the primary and secondary jobs of the household head.
at their peak in 1996 just 15 percent of expenditures and 7 percent 
of the poverty line. The largest part of the variation in household 
expenditures is due to variations in other income components or 
changes in tastes and needs, rather than fluctuations in child bene­
fits. Second, the identification problem encountered for pensions is 
present again and even more difficult to deal with. Child benefits 
are a direct function of the number of children in a household. In 
contrast to pensions, they are fully formula driven, and do not de­
pend on any personal characteristics of household members. Yet, at 
the same time, the number of children has a direct influence on the 
expenditure pattern of the household. In effect, there are no ade­
quate instruments for child benefits, as it is difficult to exclude the 
number of children from the regression.
The identification problem is illustrated by the following regres­
sions. Table 5.11 shows OLS regression for eligible families of house­
hold expenditures on child benefits and the set of covariates used 
in the probit regressions of Table 5.10. Column 1 does exclude the 
number of children by age-group in the regression. The coefficient on
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Table 5.11: OLS regressions of household expenditures on child ben-
efits and covariates___________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child Benefits 
Household Size 
Number of Children 0 -1 .5  
Number of Children 1 .6 -6  
Number of Children 6 -1 6  
Number of Boys 0 -4  
Number of Girls 0 -4  
Number of Male Children 4-21 
Number of Female Children 4-21 
Number of Males 50+
Number of Females 50+
HH: Age 
HH: Male
HH: Grade completed in Secondary School 
HH: Vocational Diploma
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma w/o Secondary Degree 
HH: Profess-Tech Diploma with Secondary Degree 
HH: University Diploma 
HH: Graduate Diploma
Coef 0.45 0.74 0.68
t-st 1.5 2.5 2.3
Coef 1053 1899 1892 2160
t-st 5.1 6.9 6.0 6.9
Coef -1204 -234
t-st -2.1 -0.3
Coef -1699 -1406
t-st -4.0 -2.8
Coef -1574 -1226
t-st -5.5 -3.6
Coef -2029
t-st -3.5
Coef -1647
t-st -3.0
Coef -1302
t-st -3.4
Coef -1701
t-st -4.8
Coef 559 -94 52 -265
t-st 1.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.5
Coef 21 -777 -895 -1031
t-st 0.1 -2.0 -1.7 -2.3
Coef 4 2 1 3.0
t-st 2.5 1.5 0.5 1.9
Coef 2185 1447 1715 1298
t-st 5.0 3.2 3.5 2.6
Coef 393 380 335 348
t-st 3.3 3.1 2.3 2.8
Coef 431 460 547 413
t-st 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1
Coef -153 -82.2 62 -63
t-st -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
Coef -554 -462 -175 -584
t-st -1.5 -1.3 -0.4 -1.6
Coef 1975 2070 2378 1973
t-st 5.6 5.7 4.5 5.7
Coef 2612 2879 4457 2638
t-st 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.2
F-statistics for # of Children 0 -1 6  (Stat/Sign) 
F-statistics for # of Boys & Girls 0 - 4, 4 - 21 (Stat/Sign)
10.2/.00 5.1/.00
6 . 1/.00
Number of Observations 3414 3414 1554
Notes: The dependent variable is household expenditures. The sample is restricted to households eligible for child 
benefits. All regressions include indicator variables tor geographical regions and rounds.
HH refers to household head.
3414
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child benefits equals 0.33, and is measured imprecisely. In the next 
regression, the numbers of children by age group is added. The esti­
mate for child benefits increases to 0.61, and is significant at the 10 
percent level. The child demographic variables are individually and 
jointly significant, as shown by the t- and F-statistics, and have neg­
ative coefficients. Are the children variables simply significant due to 
their collinearity with child benefits, or has the presence of children 
a different impact on household expenditures than the presence of 
adults? Column restricts the sample to households with children that 
incurred arrears in child benefits. Again, the numbers of children are 
individually and jointly significant. Unsurprisingly, the implication 
is that it is necessary to control directly for the number of children 
in a household. Column 4 presents the basic specification. As child 
benefits are included as regressor, the age-group categories that enter 
the benefit rules are not used. Instead, I choose different age groups 
(the numbers of boys and girls under the 4 years of age, and the 
numbers of male and female children between 4 to 21 years of age) 
and exploit that child benefits do not vary between boys and girls.
Estimation
The coefficients for the income variables for the basic specification are 
shown in Column 1 of Table 5.12. I follow the same procedure as for 
pensions, but do not instrument for child benefits.18 The regressions 
control for the numbers of children by age category and gender, the 
numbers of male and female persons at the age 50 or over, and age, 
gender, and educational attainment of the household head.
The coefficient on child benefits in the basic specification equals 
0.68, estimated significantly at the 3 percent level. Once income ex­
cluding child benefits is added, the estimate drops to 0.29, and the 
coefficient on other income equals 0.44. The t-statistics indicate that 
only the estimate for other income is measured significantly. An F- 
test cannot reject the equality of the two estimates. Instrumenting 
other income by other income excluding household production re-
18Matching the approach for pensions, we restrict attention on eligible families. 
The qualitative results are unchanged if non-eligible households with children are 
included.
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Table 5.12: Estimates of the propensity to consume from child ben-
Level First-Diff Level First-Diff
ChBen>=0 ChBen>=0 ChBen>0 ChBen>0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child Benefits (1) OLS Coef 0.68 0.38 0.49 -0.46
t-st 2.3 1.7 1.1 -1.0
Child Benefits/Other Income (2) OLS Coef .29/.44 .23Z.29 .17/.44 -.56Z.25
t-st 1.2/15.4 1.2/9.3 .42/13.5 -1.3/7.1
(3) IVCash Coef .35Z.38 .29/. 18 .18/.43 -.53/. 18
t-st 1.4/12.3 1.4/5.5 .5/11.8 -1.2/4.7
F-Tests on Equality of Child Benefit and Other Income Coefficients (Stat/Signif)
(2) OLS 0.3/.58 0.2/.63 0.5/.51 3.5/.07
(3) IVCash 0.0/.92 0.0/.91 0.4/.53 2.6/.11
F-Tests/Ch2-Tests on Significance of Instruments (Stat/Signif)
(3) Inccash 11652/.00 5534/.00 9506/.00 5466/.00
Number of O bservations 3414 3304 1554 1196
households eligible tor child benefits, and in last two columns to all households which received child benefit payments. 
The estim ates in columns 1 and 3 are tor level regressions, and the coefficients in columns 2 and 4  tor regressions in 
first-differences. All regressions contain the vanables used in the regression of Column 4 in Table 5.11. In Row 3, other 
income is instrumented on other income excluding home production ("Inccash').
duces the gap between the estimates further. The point estimate for
I-----n, 1 1 1 If .11 . t
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5.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The regressions of Table 5.7 and Table 5.12 suggest three regular­
ities. First, the analysis confirms that the propensity to consume 
from transitory income components is higher than from permanent 
income components. This distinction is especially relevant in Russia, 
where households were exposed to large income variations. Second, 
the estimate for pensions is higher than for other forms of income 
received by pensioner households. Third, there is no evidence that 
the propensity to consume from child benefits differs from the one 
from other income in households with children.
The higher coefficient on pensions may seem surprising in view of 
the large incidence of pension arrears. However, pensions were still 
a more regular source of receipts than other incomes. Both wages 
and child benefits were subject to even greater and more persistent 
payment problems than pensions. The average incidence of wage ar­
rears according to the RLMS between 1994 and 1998 was 25 percent, 
and in all rounds at least one fifth of the work force incurred wage 
arrears. Furthermore, over half of the households with pensioners 
are one-generational, and less than one quarter of the pensioners live 
with children. As the discount rate of households with pensioners 
is likely to be higher than the discount rate of households with chil­
dren, pensions are closer to a notion of permanent income for pension 
households than similar income in households with children. Finally, 
the coefficient on pensions is generally less than unity, even when it 
is instrumented in order to capture the regular part in the pension 
payments. This section investigates the robustness of some of these 
results. I address the issue of lacking instruments for child benefits, 
consider the impact of changes in household types, and look at food 
expenditures only.
The regressions on child benefits did not instrument for child 
benefits due to identification problems. Table 5.13 imposes that the 
propensity to consume is identical for both cash transfers and other 
incomes, and instruments for total income using the full set of instru­
ments for cash benefits and other income. It shows the coefficients 
from the regressions on the samples of eligible households. Row 1 
gives the simple OLS estimate for levels and first-differences, and
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Row 2 shows the coefficient using income excluding home produc­
tion as instrument. The estimates axe similar to the coefficients on 
other income of the corresponding regressions in Table 5.7 and Table 
5.12, as other income represents the main part of household income. 
Row 3 presents the estimate from the full instrumentation of total 
income. The pattern is unchanged. Pensioner households have a 
larger propensity to consume than families with children due to the 
higher share of pension income.
Table 5.13: Estimates of the propensity to consume from total in­
come___________________
Level First-Differences
Pens>=0 ChBen>=0 Pens>=0 ChBen>=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Expenditures (1) OLS Coef 0.52 0.44 0.41 0.29
t-st 20.9 15.9 14.7 9.5
(2) IVCash Coef 0.37 0.37 0.26 0.18
t-st 14.5 12.6 11.5 5.7
(3) IV Coef 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.33
t-st 10.4 8.9 7.6 5.8
Food Expenditures (4) OLS Coef 0.42 0.28 0.35 0.22
t-st 17 12.8 12.9 9.4
(5) IVCash Coef 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.09
t-st 11.1 9.7 8.9 5.5
(6) IV Coef 0.51 0.31 0.49 0.29
t-st 10.4 6.3 8.9 5.1
F-Tests on Significance of Instruments for total income (Stat/Signif)
(2) (5) Inccash 7909/.00 11747/.00 2956/.00 4788.8
(3) (6) Income 12.5/.00 21.8 17.2/.00 20.5/.00
Number of Observations 5065 3414 4313 1196
estim ates in columns 1 and 2 are tor level regressions, and the coefficients in columns 3 and 4 for first-differences 
regressions. The sam ple in the first and third columns is restricted to all households eligible for pensions, and in the 
second and fourth columns to all households eligible for child benefits. The regressions in columns 1 and 3 contain the va­
riables used in the regression of Column 4 in Table 5.6, and total income is instrumented in Row 2 and Row 5 on income 
excluding pensions and home production (“Inccash"), and in Row 3 and Row 6 on the instruments for pensions and other 
income of the 3SLS regression in Row 5 of Table 5.7. The regression in columns 2 and 4 contain the variables used in the 
regression of Column 4 in Table 5.11, and total income is instrumented in Row 2 and Row 5 on income excluding child 
benefits and home production (“Inccash"), and in Row 3 and Row 6 on indicators for whether the household head
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two household types axe even larger than before.
If the variables on household composition do not fully capture the 
differences in household types, then the estimates of the propensity 
to consume may partly reflect the variation in household composition 
across household types. Household composition remains constant if 
households that are both eligible for pensions and child benefits are 
considered. Table 5.14 shows the OLS estimates of the propensities 
to consume for this subsample. The point estimate on pensions is at 
least twice as large as the one for child benefits, and up to twice as 
large for other income, while the coefficients for child benefits and 
other income are fairly close. However, the coefficients on child ben­
efits are measured with a large standard error, and the F-statistics 
cannot reject the equality of the estimates for pensions and child 
benefits. The estimates for spending on food expenditures display 
the same pattern, and once again the differences in the coefficients 
are larger.
5.3 Poverty Decomposition
5.3.1 M ethodology
Poverty rose from 12.4 percent in 1994 to 33 percent in 1998 (Table 
5.1). This section aims to quantify the impact of the changes in cash 
transfers on poverty. It extends an existing decomposition technique 
in order to identify the impact of changes in separate expenditure 
components on poverty (Ravallion and Datt 1991). The change in 
the welfare ratio is attributed to two components: the change due to 
variations in government cash transfers (T), and the change due to 
variations in expenditures excluding government cash transfers (E). 
T  is defined as the ratio of cash transfers to the poverty line, and E  
as the ratio of expenditures excluding cash transfers to the poverty 
line. The distribution of expenditures excluding cash transfers is 
calculated using the propensities to consume calculated for pensions 
and child benefits. Household composition is assumed to remain 
unchanged over the period.
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Table 5.14: Estimates of the propensity to consume for households
receiving both pensions and child benefits_____________________
Household Expenditures
Pensions/Child Benefits/Other Income (1) OLS Coef .81/.41/.54
t-st 4.6/1.1/11.9
(2) IVCash Coef .86/.3S/.43
Food Expenditures t-st 5.0/1.0/7.1
Pensions/Child Benefits/Other Income (3) OLS Coef .65/.21/.38
t-st 4.7/.6Z9.6
(4) IVCash Coef .74/.17/.21
t-st 5.1/.5/4.7
Household Expenditures: F-statistics on Equality of Coefficients (Stat/Signif)
Pensions/Child Benefits (1) OLS 0.9/.34
(2) IVCash 1.4/.24
Pensions/Other Income (1) OLS 2.3/. 13
(2) IVCash 3.2/.08
Child Benefits/Other Income (1) OLS 0.1/.72
(2) IVCash 0.3/.60
Food Expenditures: F-statistics on Equality of Coefficients (Stat/Signif)
Pensions/Child Benefits (3) OLS 1.3/.25
(4) IVCash 2.4/. 13
Pensions/Other Income (3) OLS 6.1/.02
(4) IVCash 11.3/.00
Child Benefits/Other Income (3) OLS 0.0/.90
(4) IVCash 0.0/.90
F-statistics on Instrument (Stat/Signif) (2) Inccash 1831/.00
Number of Observations 1049
Notes: The dependent variable in Row 1 and Row 2 is household expenditures, and in Row 3 and Row 4 
food expenditures. The estimates in rows 1 and 3 are for OLS regressions, and in rows 2 and 4 for 
instrumental variables regressions, where income excluding pensions and child benefits is instrumented 
on income excluding pensions, child benefits, and home production. The sample is restricted to all 
households eligible for both pensions and child benefits. All regressions contain the variables used in 
the regression of Column 4 in Table 5.11.
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Let poverty be measured by a function of the type
Pt =  P(lH,Dt) (5.1)
where /t* is the mean level of the welfare ratio, and Dt is the mean 
normalised distribution function of the welfare ratio at date t.19 Then
Dt = D f + D j
and
m =  n f  +  nf
where superscripts E  and T  are defined as above. Using t as reference 
period, the change in poverty rates between date t and t  +  1 can be 
decomposed into the following components:
Pt+1  -  Pt =
p i  i  -P t+p,%  i  -  Pt
T-Effect E-Effect
+ Pt+1 -  P i ,  -  Pt% + Pt (5.2)
Residual effect
where
P h  = P(pf + nf+v D f  + Dr+1)
and
p l \  =  P ( P t+ i  +  I t  i D f+ i  +  D f ) -
The T-effect is defined as the change in poverty rates due to the 
change in transfers +  /if, Dj+l ±  D j ,  fif+1 =  /if, Df+1 =  D f), 
and the ^-effect equals the change in poverty due to the change in 
expenditures excluding cash transfers ( / / ^  =  /if, Df+1 =  D j ,  /tf^  ^  
/if, Df+l ^  D f ). The residual measures the change in poverty not 
accounted for by those two effects. It is in general unequal to zero 
since poverty measures are not additively separable into expenditure 
components. Consider a pensioner household with expenditures of
19Equation 5.1 indicates that the decomposition applies only to poverty mea­
sures which can be fully characterised in terms of the mean level of the welfare 
ratio, and the mean normalised distribution function. The three members of the 
FGT class of poverty measures used in the analysis satisfy this condition.
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RIO above the poverty line, and assume an uniform propensity to 
consume of unity. If pensions drop by less than RIO, and nothing 
else changes, then the poverty indices remain unaffected. Equally, if 
other income falls less by RIO, then poverty remains the same under 
the ceteris paribus condition. However, if both pensions and other 
income drop by RIO, then poverty will increase. The residual effect 
is larger for poverty indices that are more sensitive to distribution 
of expenditures among the poor, as the separate and joint impacts 
of changes in expenditure components differ more. The residual has 
a natural interpretation, as it equals the effect of a change in the 
reference date on the decomposition.20 A standard procedure to 
eliminate the residual is to average the changes over the reference 
dates t and t +  1.
It is interesting to quantify the relative contribution of growth 
and redistribution effects of changes in government transfers to the 
changes in poverty rates. Following Ravallion and Datt (1991), the 
decomposition for transfers is defined as21
Transfer growth effect Transfer redistribution effect
+  (5-3)
V|| ■ I I v  ■ I I ✓
Transfer residual effect
where
C  =  ^  +  A i . A )
and
P™ =  P(vt,D? +  Dj+l).
Taking t as reference date, the transfer growth (redistribution) effect 
equals the change in Pt due to the change — fij (Dj+l — D j)
20For example, the T-effect with reference period t  +  1 is Pt+i -  i +  
g , D e , + D l )  =  Pt. i  — P^.-\, or the sum of the T- and residual effects with 
reference period t.
21 The decomposition for pre-government transfer expenditures E  is deter­
mined accordingly.
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while keeping fif and Dt (Df  and fit) constant. The transfer residual 
measures the change in poverty not accounted for by growth and re­
distribution components. It is unequal to zero whenever the changes 
in poverty due to changes in fit depend on the shape of the distrib­
ution function, and vice versa. In contrast to the residual effect in 
Equation 5.2, the transfer residual is not equal to changes in growth 
and redistribution effects due to the switching of reference periods.22 
The decomposition in growth and redistribution effects needs to be 
calculated separately for each relevant reference period.
The poverty rates for the decompositions are calculated using 
constructed distributions of welfare ratios for the panel of house­
holds represented in all four rounds. For example, the poverty rate 
P j R =  P(/i5, D R +  D j)  is based on the welfare ratio obtained by di­
viding transfers in Round 7 by their mean, multiplying them with the 
mean transfer level in Round 5, and adding to them pre-government 
transfer expenditures from Round 5.
5.3.2 R esults
What is the contribution of the changes in the government transfers 
to the rise in poverty rates from 1994 to 1998? The results are shown 
for both the level and fixed effects estimates of the propensities to 
consume. The regressions suggest that these sets of coefficients cover 
the range of possible propensities to consume from cash transfers. I 
use as propensities to consume from pensions the IV estimates for the 
case without other income (0.56 for OLS and 0.89 for fixed effects 
from Table 5.7). There are no corresponding estimates for child 
benefits, as child benefits could not be instrumented. Since there 
is no evidence that the propensity to consume from child benefits 
deviates from the one from other income, I take as coefficients the 
IV estimates from the regressions on total income (0.47 for OLS 
and 0.33 for fixed effects from Table 5.12). In any case, they are 
consistent with the range of OLS estimates in Row 1 of Table 5.15. 
These coefficients are also used for other government cash transfers
22For example, the transfer growth effect with reference period t  +  1 equals 
Pt +1 — P{ f i t +  Vt+i > Pt+i)» which is unequal to the sum of transfer growth and 
transfer residual effects with reference period t  — P ™ .
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________Table 5.15: Decomposition of changes in poverty________
Propensity to consume: Pen 0.89 ChBen 0.33 Pen 0.56 ChBen 0.47
abs % abs %
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Head-count
Actual 20.6 20.6
Changes in transfers 4.1 20 2.9 14
Growth 4.3 21 2.9 14
Redistribution 0.4 2 0.3 1
Rest -0.6 -3 -0.3 -1
Changes in expenditures 16.5 80 17.7 86
Growth 15.9 77 17.9 87
Redistribution 0.2 1 -0.7 -3
Rest 0.3 1 0.5 2
Poverty gap
Actual 7.2 7.2
Changes in transfers 2.4 33 1.7 24
Growth 2.1 29 1.4 19
Redistribution 0.5 7 0.4 6
Rest -0.2 -3 -0.1 -1
Changes in expenditures 4.8 67 5.5 76
Growth 5.1 71 5.9 82
Redistribution -0.3 -4 -0.4 -6
Rest -0.1 -1 0.0 0
FGT
Actual 3.5 3.5
Changes in transfers 2.4 69 1.2 34
Growth 1.4 40 0.9 26
Redistribution 0.9 26 0.4 11
Rest 0.0 0 -0.1 -3
Changes in expenditures 1.1 31 2.3 66
Growth 2.1 60 2.7 77
Redistribution -0.3 -9 -0.3 -9
Rest -0.7 -20 -0.2 -6
Notes: The changes in poverty between 1994 and 1998 are decomposed according to 
Equation 5.2 and Equation 5.3 in the text. The residual effect is eliminated by averaging over 
1994 and 1998.
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(unemployment benefits, apartment benefits, and fuel benefits).
The decomposition results for the changes from 1994 to 1998 are 
shown in Table 5.15, averaged over the reference dates 1994 and 1998. 
The changes in government transfers increase poverty according to 
all poverty statistics for both the OLS or fixed effects estimates. 
The quantitative effects vary by poverty statistic and reference pe­
riod, but at least 14 percent of the rise in poverty was due to the 
changes in cash transfer policy. Both the transfer growth and trans­
fer distribution effects increase poverty unambiguously. The transfer 
growth effect accounts for at least 60 percent of the change.23
5.4 Conclusion
This paper develops and applies a new approach for measuring the 
impact of government cash transfers on poverty alleviation that takes 
into account endogenous reactions and consumption smoothing of 
households. This approach is used to study changes in government 
cash transfer policies in Russia during 1994 and 1998. The main 
findings are as follows.
Standard incidence studies, which ignore consumption smooth­
ing, are likely to be misleading. Government transfers need to be 
assessed not only with regard to their targeting efficiency but also 
with respect to their impact on household consumption. The regres­
sion results show that the propensities to consume vary by income 
source and are typically less than unity. The coefficients increase 
when they are instrumented for income sources, implying that the 
propensities to consume are higher for permanent than for transitory 
income components. This distinction is especially important in the 
context of Russia, where households were exposed to large income 
shocks.
The cross-sectional regressions for pensions suggest that the mar­
ginal propensity to consume increases once other income is controlled
23Assuming a propensity to consume of unity, at least 27 percent of the rise 
in poverty is due to cash transfer changes, and at least two thirds of it is due to 
the transfer growth effect. Ignoring consumption smoothing leads hence to an 
overestimate of the impact of changes in government transfers on poverty.
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for. This pattern is consistent with the view that pensioner house­
holds substitute shortfalls in pensions with other sources of income. 
However, the result does not hold for fixed effects regressions, while 
the coefficients on child benefits are not measured precisely. The 
analysis of the channels of endogenous responses in the following 
chapters will confirm the importance of accounting for behavioural 
reactions.
Across income sources, the estimates for pensions are higher than 
those for child benefits and other incomes. This result is confirmed 
for food expenditures only and households that receive both pensions 
and child benefits. Pensions are a regular form of income, and were 
less subject to arrears than wages and child benefits. The coefficient 
on pensions is consistently less than unity. Once instrumented, the 
estimate on pensions in the fixed effects estimations is no longer 
statistically different from unity. This result is consistent with an 
interpretation that the regular part of pension payments is close to 
a notion of permanent income.
The impact of changes in government cash transfer policies on 
poverty is quantified with a decomposition technique. A part of the 
change in household expenditures is attributed to the changes in cash 
transfers using the estimates for the propensities to consume. The 
quantitative effects vary by poverty statistic and reference period, 
but at least one seventh of the rise in poverty between 1994 and 
1998 was due to the changes in cash transfer policy. Both changes 
in average transfer levels and the distribution of transfers increased 
poverty, and the transfer growth accounted for at least three fifth of 
the rise.
The changes in transfer entitlements and payment arrears during 
1994 and 1998 were a reflection of the economic and political dy­
namics. Pension entitlements fell in 1995 as part of a renewed effort 
to achieve fiscal consolidation. Political pressures in the run-up of 
the Presidential elections in Summer 1996 led to increases in cash 
transfer entitlements. They were non-affordable due to the ongo­
ing decline in tax revenues, and the lack of funds resulted in a rise 
of arrears. The substantial fiscal imbalances across regions led to a 
strong regional variation in the incidence of arrears both for pensions 
and child benefits. The rise in inflation after the financial crisis of
112 CHAPTER 5. POVERTY AND CASH TRANSFERS
August 1998, and the failure to index cash transfers for inflation, re­
duced benefit levels again. This contraction in real entitlement levels 
allowed the reduction in the incidence of payment arrears without 
higher budgetary spending.
Chapter 6 
The Elderly and Pension  
Arrears
6.1 Introduction
Throughout the world, households face income risks and volatility, 
for example due to job loss and unemployment, or unanticipated 
health shocks. 1 There has been a great deal of research on the abil­
ity to smooth consumption in the face of income fluctuations, and 
the mechanisms through which this is accomplished (Besley 1995 and 
Morduch 1999). An equally important concern is whether there are 
health consequences associated with imperfect consumption smooth­
ing and incomplete insurance (Strauss and Thomas 1995). Un­
derstanding the health consequences is important not only because 
health is an indicator of well-being in its own right, but also because 
of the potential for ‘vicious cycles’, wherein economic shocks lead to 
worse health, which in turn result in diminished earnings capacity or 
another income shock, such as job loss.
Ironically, in many parts of the world, public social insurance 
programs themselves are increasingly becoming sources of volatility 
at the household level. For example, many countries face concerns 
over the stability of their pension systems, especially due to popu­
lation aging, system financing or management. Further, there have
1This chapter is based on a joint paper with Robert T. Jensen.
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recently been several cases of pension crises (for example, Argentina, 
China, Poland and Russia), resulting either in extended periods of 
non-payment of benefits, or the erosion of entitlements to below sub­
sistence levels. This instability can be expected to directly affect the 
well-being of the elderly, who are typically highly dependent on pen­
sions as their largest, or only, source of income. This chapter focuses 
on the welfare and health consequences of the failure of the Russian 
pension system in 1996, and what strategies households employed to 
cope with the loss of income.
Prior to 1996, Russia’s generous state pension system was fairly 
stable. Pension fund revenues, collected primarily through payroll 
taxes, were broadly sufficient to cover outlays. However, poor eco­
nomic performance, weakened tax enforcement and a wave of tax 
amnesties and exemptions leading up to the Presidential elections in 
1996 resulted in a sharp decline in payroll tax collection, compromis­
ing the financial stability of the fund. As a result, approximately 14 
million of the 39 million pensioners underwent a sudden, prolonged 
period during which they did not receive any payments (‘in arrears’).
The chapter investigates two major themes. The first is whether 
the loss of the pension adversely affected health. Given the depen­
dency of the elderly on the pension system, one might expect that 
a pension failure would lead to worse health, especially because of 
the diminished ability to purchase the inputs into health (for ex­
ample, nutrition, medication and the use of medical services). In 
this spirit, this work adds to the growing literature concerned with 
the impacts of socioeconomic status on health (Fuchs 1993, Marmot 
1994, McIntyre 1997, and Smith and Kington 1997). An advantage 
over previous studies is that I exploit an exogenous income shock, so 
the direction of causality is clear, and directly examine the use of spe­
cific health inputs which could lead to changes in health outcomes. 
Other studies have found positive benefits of exogenous increases in 
income; for example, in a ‘reverse experiment’ of the present case, 
Case (2001) and Duflo (2000) find that increases in pensions in South 
Africa lead to improvements in health. For Russia specifically, this 
study also provides an important link for understanding the dra­
matic decline in health that followed economic transition and the 
subsequent economic decline. Russia experienced in the 1990’s one
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of the largest peacetime (non-epidemic) declines in health in hu­
man history (Bobak et al. 1999 and Brainerd and Varavikova 2001). 
While the health and economic crises have separately received con­
siderable attention from researchers, the links between the two are 
less well explored.
The second major theme of the chapter is the ability of house­
holds to respond to the loss of pension income. When an economic 
shock causes a decline in income, there are a variety of strategies that 
households can employ to maintain consumption, including changes 
in labour supply, adjustments to the stock of savings, credit and bor­
rowing, or relying on private cash transfers from family and friends.
The sudden collapse of the pension system in 1996 implied that 
about 30 percent of the pensioners had to make ends meet with­
out pension receipts. A ‘before-after’ comparison of economic and 
health outcomes of these pensioners in 1995 and 1996 would attribute 
any changes arising from other factors also to pension arrears. By 
contrast, comparing the ‘before-after’ differences for the group of 
pensioners falling into arrears in 1996 to those of a similar group 
of pensioners remaining without arrears in 1996 purges the impact 
estimates from changes due to other factors, as long a they affected 
both groups equally. The essence of the empirical strategy is to com­
pare the outcome variables of interest (health and nutrition, labour 
supply, etc.) for households who were not paid their pensions with 
suitable ‘control’ or comparison groups of pensioner households that 
were. The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the pen­
sion crisis, the arrears and non-arrears groups would not have experi­
enced different changes in factors that would have affected economic 
and health outcomes. While it is not possible to verify this assump­
tion, the 1994 RLMS rounds presents an opportunity to conduct a 
’pre-test’ to investigate whether treatment and control group evolved 
similarly from 1994 to 1995.
The strategy relies on two sources of variation in the incidence 
of pension arrears to identify the effects: the variation of pension 
arrears across regions (donor versus debtor regions) and within re­
gions (pension priority criteria). The first is created by the regionally 
decentralized structure of the pension system. Each of Russia’s 89 
administrative states or oblasts are independently responsible for
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collecting taxes and making payments to pensioners. Since no given 
state has an exact match between receipts and entitlements, the sys­
tem relies on the redistribution of surplus revenues from states with 
a high tax base relative to pension entitlements to those with a low 
tax base relative to pension entitlements. When payroll tax collec­
tion declined for both ‘debtor’ and ‘donor’ regions, the fiscally weak 
regions had lower revenues of their own and received reduced sur­
pluses from the donors. Accordingly, while nearly all pensioners in 
wealthier regions continued to be paid, between one third and one 
half of pensioners in debtor regions experienced arrears. I also ex­
ploit variation within debtor regions created by program rules which 
establish priorities for which pensioners should be paid in the event 
of revenue shortfall.
These two sources of variation lead to two control groups. Com­
paring arrears pensioners with non-arrears pensioners in debtor re­
gions only ensures that the impact estimates are not biased due to 
factors that changed for debtor regions relative to donor regions, such 
as economic conditions or the health system. Comparing arrears pen­
sioners in debtor regions with non-arrears pensioners in donor regions 
who share the same characteristics reveals whether these character­
istics lead as such to a change in outcomes, irrespective of pension 
arrears.
The analysis shows that the pension crisis had a large impact 
on living standards, with income declining by one third for arrears 
households, and poverty rates tripling to over 50 percent. There was 
also a significant decline in the purchase of inputs into health; daily 
intake of both calories and protein declined on average by 1 0  percent 
per person, and the use of medication and visits to doctors declined 
as well. Finally, men in arrears households were 5 percent more likely 
to die in the two years following the crisis, an increase in mortality 
risk comparable to being a smoker. These dramatic consequences 
arise despite the fact that households were able to respond in ways 
that mitigated the impacts of the shock. Households were able to re­
place on average approximately 2 0  percent of the lost pension income 
through increased working hours, asset sales, and borrowing. They 
also reduced substantially private transfers to other individuals.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2
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discusses the pension crisis of 1996 in detail, since they form an 
important part of the identification strategy for the empirical analy­
sis. Section 6.3 examines the impact of pension arrears on living 
standards and poverty. Section 6.4 discusses the empirical strategy, 
identification issues and presents the results of the effects of the pen­
sion on health inputs and outcomes. Section 6.5 tests for evidence 
of coping mechanisms and Section 6 . 6  concludes.
6.2 The 1996 Pension Crisis
The pension system has already been described in Section 5.2.2, so I 
will emphasis only a few characteristics which are important to the 
origins of the 1996 crisis. In 1995, the Pension Fund had 38 mil­
lion beneficiaries (26 percent of the population), with total outlays 
amounting to 5.7 percent of GDP. Eligibility is not affected by cur­
rent employment status. As a result, nearly 98 percent of individuals 
age-qualified for the pension reported receiving a pension prior to the 
crisis. The average pension was Rl,700 (PPP$712) in 1996, which 
was just below the mean per capita household income among all 
Russians. The system is largely decentralized but there is a uniform 
‘vertical’ structure throughout the regions. The funds obtained by 
the centre from approximately 15 ‘donor’ regions, which have a large 
payroll tax base relative to pension entitlements, are redistributed 
in order to finance pension payments in 74 ‘debtor’ regions. Column 
1 of Table 6.1 shows estimates of regional ‘self sufficiency’, i.e., the 
ratio of payroll tax receipts to total benefit entitlements, with donor 
regions characterized by ratios above 100. 2  The data of the Russian 
Pension Fund confirm that many districts collect revenues fax short 
of needs, while a few regions like Moscow City have surpluses.
Before 1996, Pension Fund revenues were just sufficient to meet 
entitlements, with no excess funds to ensure future payments. In 
1996, a significant funding crisis developed. The crisis was caused 
in part by a sudden decline in economic output due to an uncertain 
political climate created by the impending presidential elections. 3
2It includes only regions covered by the RLMS.
Enterprises and investors postponed decisions while awaiting the outcome of
118 CHAPTER 6. THE ELDERLY AND PENSION ARREARS
Thus, there was a large reduction of the tax base, especially for the 
payroll taxes financing the pension system. Payroll tax revenues also 
fell because of a series of tax exemptions and amnesties throughout 
major sectors of the economy, granted in the run-up of the elections. 
Tax collection shortfalls were exacerbated by the emergence of non­
monetary forms of settling tax obligations (for example, barter or 
payment in goods) that could not be transferred across regions.
The decline in payroll tax revenues and use of non-monetary 
forms of tax settlement led to a breakdown in the redistributive 
system from donor to debtor regions. Table 6.1 shows that between 
1995 and 1996, pension offices in most regions experienced a decline 
in their tax revenues relative to entitlements. Donor regions used 
their receipts to fund their own pension payments, and the residual 
sums transferred for redistribution to other regions were insufficient 
to prevent sharp increases in pension arrears in debtor regions. While 
there are no official data on arrears, press releases of the Russian 
pension fund in the Moscow Times report national arrears of R14 
trillion by December 1996. The RLMS provides estimates of arrears 
at aggregated geographic levels. Table 6.2 presents the percentage 
of pensioners who report not receiving a pension. Overall arrears 
increased from approximately 9 percent at the end of 1995 to 34 
percent in 1996. Variation across the eight geographical groupings 
is considerable. Not surprisingly, regions such as the Metropolitan 
area, which includes primarily the donor districts of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, had only minimal pension arrears, with very little 
change between the two periods. However, all other areas had large 
increases, and between 28 and 55 percent of pensioners in arrears in 
1996.
When it became clear that revenues would fall short of the amount 
needed to make payments to all pensioners, the central pension fund 
adopted guidelines suggesting priority be given to first paying pen­
sioners with entitlements less than the minimum subsistence level, 
followed by non-working and single pensioners, since these groups
elections in July. The uncertainty was caused in part by the poor performance 
of pro-government parties in parliamentary elections in late 1995. Polls showed 
president Yeltsin trailing his Communist opponent in the elections, including 
single-digit approval ratings.
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Table 6.1: Pension district revenues as a percentage of district pen- 
sion entitlements___________________________________________
Oblast 1995
(1)
1996
(2)
Aimisky Krai 49.4 44.3
Amursky oblast 117.9 87.1
Chelyabinsk oblast 81.3 77.2
Chuvashskaya Republic 61.4 51.2
Kabudino-Balkar Republic 42.3 35.9
Kaluzhsk oblast 66.2 63
Komi Republic 144.1 106.5
Krasnodar Krai 66.5 64.2
Krasnoyar Krai 132.3 86.7
Kurgan oblast 56.6 49.5
Leningrad oblast 61.8 85.9
Lipetsk oblast 66.2 72.8
Moscow 153.7 178.7
Moscow oblast 77.8 80.9
Nizhegorod oblast 73.1 87.6
Orenburg oblast 74 63.5
Penzenskaya oblast 47.1 45.2
Penn oblast 93.3 87.9
Primorsk1 Krai 134.5 110.6
Rostov oblast 61.7 52.4
Saratov oblast 57.4 51.5
Smolensk oblast 54.9 54.1
St. Petersburg City 92.4 100.1
Stayropolsky Krai 59 55.9
Tambov oblast 43.4 37.1
Tatarstan Republic 93.7 75.7
Tomsk oblast 110.9 98.8
Tulsk oblast 50.9 47.8
Chanty-mansl AO 506.5 624.2
Yamalo-Nenetsky AO 820.6 940.6
Tversk oblast 55.7 51.7
Udmurtia Republic 71.3 67.4
Volgograd oblast 75.1 71.6
Source: Pension Fund of Russia.
Notes: Net donors in 1995 are shown in bold italics.
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Table 6 .2 : Incidence of pension arrears by region (share of pensioners 
reporting not receiving a pension)____________________________
1995
(1)
1996
(2)
National 9 34
Geographic Regions
Metropolitan 6 4
Northern and North Western 6 28
Central and Central Black-Earth 9 29
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin 8 38
North Caucasian 13 55
Ural 9 31
Western Siberian 20 45
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern 1 30
Notes: The sample includes individuals eligible for pensions. 
The numbers show the percentage of pensioners not receiving 
pensions during the last 30 days.
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were perceived to be the ‘most vulnerable’. However, as the system 
is decentralized, in addition to these two criteria some regions also 
chose to prioritise very old or disabled pensioners. 4  Regional author­
ities typically applied pre-crisis attributes in determining priority; 
thus it is unlikely that individuals engaged in behaviour intended to 
increase their likelihood of payment (i.e., changes in labour supply 
or marital status).
The incidence of pension arrears across and within regions is fur­
ther explored in Table 6.3. It estimates probit regressions for the 
probability of pension receipt (among pensioners) in 1996 (marginal 
effects reported). Column 1  regresses pension receipt on the self- 
sufficiency ratio in the oblast of residence. The effect is positive and 
statistically significant, confirming that the arrears crisis was con- 
centrated in areas with low pension fund revenues and dependence 
on redistribution. Column 2 adds indicators for the various priority 
characteristics for payment during the crisis. In accord with the rules 
suggested by the pension fund, pensioners with the lowest pensions 
were 5 percent more likely to be paid, and single pensioners were 
10 percent more likely to be paid. The set of priority criteria are 
jointly statistically significant, with an F-statistic of 12.8. Column 
3 adds a set of individual and household characteristics aside from 
the official priority criteria. There is little evidence that they affect 
the probability of pension receipt, once the priority characteristics 
are controlled for. In particular, pre-crisis non-pension income is not 
statistically significant, consistent with a lack of means testing in 
determining arrears.
Column 4 to Column 6  restrict the sample to only those pen­
sioners living in debtor regions. Even conditional on residing in a 
debtor region, the coefficient on the sufficiency ratio shows that be­
ing in a region that is less dependent on redistribution makes it more 
likely that an individual was paid. The priority variables are jointly 
significant, as lower pension benefits and being single made it more 
likely that an individual was paid. Again, household characteristics 
other than the priority characteristics are neither individually nor 
jointly significant. Overall, the regressions confirm that the collapse
4 Only Orenburg oblast reduced payment to all pensioners rather than paying 
some in full and others nothing.
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Table 6.3: Determinants of pension receipt in 1996
Full p en s io n e r g roup D ebtor reg io n s only
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L ocal/regional c h a ra c te ris tic s
Sufficiency ratio Coef 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008
z-s t 5.3 10.7 5.3 9.2 9.9 9.4
Paym ent priority
Low pre-crisis pension? Coef 0.054 0.067 0.095 0.130
z-s t 1.2 1.9 1.7 2.2
Single? Coef 0.097 0.093 0.099 0.076
z-s t 2.8 2.0 2.4 1.7
Elderly? Coef 0.053 0.062 0.24 0.200
z-s t 0.7 0.1 1.9 1.6
Working? Coef -0.033 -0.022 -0.067 -0.068
z-s t -0.9 -0.6 -1.5 -1.5
Disabled? Coef 0.127 0.115 0.023 0.011
z-s t 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.1
individual an d  h o u seh o ld  c h a rac te ris tic s
Income without pension Coef
z-st
2E-06
1.1
4E-07
1.4
Household size (#) Coef
z-s t
-0.012
-1.1
-0.007
-0.5
Members aged 0-15 (#) Coef
z-s t
0.012
0.5
-0.015
-0.5
Male? Coef
z-s t
0.025
1.2
0.044
1.4
Education (years) Coef
z-s t
0.003
1.3
0.003
1.0
F-test priority rules 12.8 8.5 15.7 13.5
Log likelihood -1146 -1170 -1139 -955 -1002 -938
Observations (#) 2066 2066 2066 1627 1627 1627
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator variable of whether the household is receiving pen- 
sions. The sample is restricted to elderly eligible for old-age pensions. The coefficients are 
marginal effects of probit regressions.
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of the redistributive system accounts for the incidence of pension 
arrears, and within debtor regions, specific indicators determined 
which pensioners were paid. Furthermore, household and individual 
characteristics aside from the specified priority characteristics did 
not affect the probability of pension receipt.
6.3 Economic Impact
The dramatic impact of the pension crisis on living standards can 
be seen in the bottom panel of Table 6.4. I separate the pensioner 
household sample into three groups: households that were in ar­
rears; all pensioner households not in arrears; and the subset of non- 
arrears pensioner households living in debtor regions. The latter split 
is designed to reduce some of the heterogeneity among non-arrears 
pensioners, by distinguishing those who live in wealthier regions. 
Poverty was high even before the crisis, with over 20 percent of all 
three groups living below the official poverty fine. 5  The share of to­
tal expenditures devoted to food is nearly two thirds. This budget 
share is itself often used as an indicator of living standards, and in 
the present case also demonstrates that food consumption is likely to 
suffer when households lose a large source of income like the pension.
Households are very dependent on the pension; before the cri­
sis, the average income share of the pension was over 40 percent 
for all groups. Thus, not surprisingly, the crisis had a large impact 
on household welfare. Household income declined on average by 
Rl,815 (24 percent) for the arrears group, whereas the income of the 
other pensioner groups increased slightly. The poverty rate increased 
to over 50 percent among arrears households, and dropped among 
non-arrears households. Figure 6.1 provides non-parametric (kernel) 
density estimates for (log) income per capita for the arrears and non- 
arrears (debtor and donor regions combined) pensioner households. 6
5Further analyses of poverty in Russia include Mroz and Popkin (1995), Klug- 
man and Braithwaite (1995) and Lokshin and Popkin (1999).
6The four graphs of Figure 6.1 display kernel density estimates of log income 
per capita. The graph in the top left-hand side corner shows log income per 
capita in 1995 and 1996 for households with pension arrears. The graph on the 
top right shows log income per capita in 1995 and 1996 for households without
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Table 6.4: Summary statistics of members of pensioner households 
by pension arrears status______________________________________
Arrears N on-arrears N on-arrears
1995
(1)
1996
(2)
1995
(3)
1996
(4)
1995
(5)
1996
(6)
Individual characteristics
Male? Coef 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Education (years) Coef 7.8 7.9 8.7 8.8 8.4 8.5
SE 0.22 0 21 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12
Currently employed? Coef 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.33
SE 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Wage arrears (%) Coef 0.08 0.1 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Dem ographic charac te ristics
Household size (#) Coef 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4
SE 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.04
Household contains only pensioners? Coef 0.29 0.3 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.33
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pensioners in household (#) Coef 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3
SE 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Members aged 0-15 (#) Coef 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.61
SE 0 07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Econom ic characteristics
Income (R) Coef 7620 5805 7231 7726 7130 7439
SE 218 263 192 189 257 216
Pension income (R) Coef 2434 0 2389 2460 2312 2620
SE 60 0 50 58 262 71
Share of expenditure on food (%) Coef 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.66
SE 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01
Poverty headcount (%) Coef 0.17 0.54 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.18
SE 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
1995. Colum ns 1 an d  2 refer to households not receiving all pension  entitlem ents during the last 30 days in 1996. 
Colum ns 3 and  4 refer to  househo lds receiving all pension entitlem ents during the last 30 days  in 1996. C olum ns 5 
and 6  refer to  the  subsam p le  of colum ns 3 and 4 covering debtor regions only. The num bers show  m e an s  and  
standard  errors of personal and  household characteristics by arrea rs category.
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The right-hand graphs present the differences between the estimated 
densities. The vertical line represents the (log) poverty line. Overall, 
pension arrears caused a large shift of mass in the density, especially 
from the middle of the pre-crisis distribution into the lower end. Ar­
rears lead to a large reduction in households just above the poverty 
line and a large increase in the percentage below that line. There 
is also a large increase in the dispersion of incomes, since prior to 
the crisis pensions accounted for a large fraction of total household 
income, and there was not a great deal of variation in pension lev­
els. The estimated density for the non-arrears group changed only 
slightly over this period, with more mass in the density significantly 
above the poverty line and less just above and below the fine. Thus, 
the loss of the pension had a dramatic impact on living standards; 
however, below I show that households were able to respond in ways 
that somewhat reduced the loss.
6.4 Health Impact
Aside from living standards, one concern with the loss of income 
is possible health implications. Following a standard ‘demand for 
health’ framework (Grossman 1972), reduced income may lead to 
lower purchases of all goods, including health (or the inputs into 
health). Rather than explicitly modelling the production process, I 
first trace changes in the use of health inputs (daily intake of calories 
and protein, and use of medical services and medicines), and then 
examine the reduced-form effects of pension loss on health outcomes 
(functional limitations, chest pains, and mortality).
pension arrears. The graph on the top left shows log income per capita in 1995 
and 1996 for households with pension arrears. The graph on the top left shows 
the difference between 1996 and 1995 log income per capita for households with 
pension arrears. The graph on the bottom left shows the difference between 1996 
and 1995 log income per capita for households without pension arrears.
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Figure 6.1: Per capita income densities
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6 .4 .1  E s t im a t io n
As before, changes in the various health-related variables (inputs and 
outcomes) for the group of pensioners who went into arrears are com­
pared to those who continued to be paid. This relies on the variation 
in pension arrears across regions (created by the decentralized fund­
ing structure) and within regions (created by the pension priority 
criteria). In order to isolate the impact of the loss of income on the 
health measures, the identifying assumption is that in the absence 
of the crisis, the arrears and non-arrears groups would not have ex­
perienced differential change with regard to the variables of interest, 
and that aside from the pension nothing else that could affect health 
changed differentially for these two groups. Momentarily deferring 
discussion of this assumption, Table 6.5 presents the essence of the 
basic strategy. It shows the average daily caloric intake for men liv­
ing in arrears and non-arrears pension households. All individuals 
completed a personal, 24-hour individual recall of food intake, which 
was then converted into calorie and protein intake using standard 
food-calorie conversion charts. Using the panel element of the data, 
households are categorized by whether they were in arrears in 1996;
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so for instance the data for the ‘arrears group’ in 1995 is average 
daily caloric intake in 1995 among men living in households that 
received a pension that year but were in arrears in 1996.
Panel A shows that prior to the crisis, individuals living in house­
holds that would later go into arrears consumed on average 80 calo­
ries more per day than individuals who continued to be paid in both 
periods. However, there is a striking change in 1996, where aver­
age daily caloric intake of the arrears group declines by 243 calories. 
The non-arrears households declined as well, but only by 22 calories. 
There could be a common factor that lead to some of the decline for 
both groups, such as the normal declining needs with age, relative 
price changes, or expectations. 7  Overall, the arrears group declined 
by 2 2 1  calories more per day than the non-arrears group, 1 0  percent 
of the original intake, which is the estimate of the impact of the loss 
of pension income, under the identifying assumption.
More detail on the changes in caloric intake can be seen by exam­
ining the distributions of caloric intake rather than just the means. 
Figure 6.2 shows kernel estimates of the density of (log) caloric intake 
for the arrears and non-arrears groups before and after the crisis. 8  
The diagrams in the second column show the differences in the esti­
mated densities, and the figure in the third column shows the differ-
7The control group could have reduced caloric intake in anticipation of being 
affected by the crisis. The survey asked respondents whether they expect their 
financial situation to get better or worse in the next 12 months (1 to 5 scale), 
and whether they anticipate having difficulties in having enough money to meet 
basic needs in the next 12 months. While many non-arrears pensioners felt things 
would get worse, equally as many felt the same way prior to the crisis. Thus, 
any adjustment in response to expectations would have been the same before 
and after the crisis.
8The four graphs of Figure 6.2 display kernel density estimates of log caloric 
intake of male individuals. The graph in the top left-hand side comer shows log 
caloric intake in 1995 and 1996 for households with pension arrears. The graph 
on the top right shows log caloric intake in 1995 and 1996 for households without 
pension arrears. The graph on the top left shows log caloric intake in 1995 and 
1996 for households with pension arrears. The graph on the top left shows the 
difference between 1996 and 1995 log caloric intake for households with pension 
arrears. The graph on the bottom left shows the difference between 1996 and 
1995 log caloric intake for households without pension arrears.
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Table 6.5: Dally caloric intake of male members of households with
pensioners
1995
(1)
1996
(2)
Difference
(3)
A. Full Sample of pensioners
Arrears pensioners Coef 2213 1970 -243
(treatment) SE 48 38
Non-arrears pensioners Coef 2133 2111 -22
(control) SE 33 33
Difference Coef 80 -141 -221
SE 51
B. Debtor regions only
Arrears pensioners Coef 2213 1970 -243
(treatment) SE 52 31
Non-arrears pensioners Coef 2147 2130 -17
(control) SE 43 37
Difference Coef 66 -160 -226
SE 44
C. High vs. low probability arrears groups in donor regions
Arrears pensioners Coef 2179 2186 7
(treatment) SE 52 47
Non-arrears pensioners Coef 1969 1953 -16
(control) SE 31 42
Difference Coef 210 -233 23
SE 48
Panel A includes as sample the male members of pensioner households receiving all 
pension entitlements during the last 30 days in 1995. Panel B includes the subsample of 
Panel A covering debtor regions only. In Panel A and B, the arrears or treatment group 
refers to households not receiving all pension entitlements during the last 30 days in 
1996; and the non-arrears or control group refers to households receiving all eligible 
pensions during the last 30 days in 1996. Panel C includes the subsample of Panel A 
covering donor regions only. The arrears group refers to households with similar 
characteristics as arrears households in debtor regions; and the non-arrears group 
to households with similar characteristics a s non-arrears households in debtor regions. 
The numbers show means and standard errors of caloric intake.
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Figure 6.2: Caloric intake densities
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ence in the differences. These figures demonstrate that there was an 
extremely large change in the distribution of caloric intake for the 
arrears group, with a large shift in mass from the middle and upper 
part of the pre-crisis distribution to the lower part. The vertical line 
represents the recommended (log) 2,000 calories per day. While ex­
act caloric requirements vary across individuals by gender, age and 
level of physical activity, one can see that for any threshold around 
2,000 calories, there is a substantial increase in the fraction of indi­
viduals in the arrears group not meeting that requirement after the 
crisis, with a much smaller change for the non-arrears group. The 
differential change for the two groups is large and striking.
In order to control for differences in other covariates relevant to 
health Difference-In-Differences (DID) regressions of the form are 
estimated:9
Alternatively, I could to regress changes in the outcome variables on changes 
in pension receipt, or add individual fixed-effects directly to Equation 6.1. Re­
sults for these alternate specifications are reported below, but are nearly iden-
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hit =  < * 0  +  * * 1  * 1996 +  ot2 * A +  cea # A *  1996 +  /? * +  un
(6.1)
where t =  1995,1996, i — 1,..., N, ha is the health related variable 
of interest, A is an indicator for whether a pensioner was in arrears, 
1996 indicates the observation is from after the crisis, and X  is a vec­
tor of individual and household characteristics thought to affect the 
health measure. The effect of arrears is captured by the interaction 
term 0 :3 , which identifies the treatment effect of Equation ??. There 
may be concerns that areas with high arrears, which were driven by 
reductions in payroll tax contributions, experienced other changes, 
for example a decline in public funding for health care. In order to 
focus on within region variation in pension receipt, I add region and 
region * 1996 indicators to the regression. For health-related inde­
pendent variables, I use intake of calories and protein, two of the 
most important nutrients; whether the person was currently taking 
medication (conditional on having a chronic condition prior to the 
crisis); whether the individual visited a doctor in the previous month 
for a check-up; an index of functional limitations; self-report of chest 
pains; and whether the individual died by the time of a follow-up 
survey two years after the crisis. I restrict the sample to pensioner 
households, and in order to isolate the impact of the pension cri­
sis in 1996, I drop households that incurred pension arrears in 1995 
(though there were few of them, and their exclusion does not affect 
the results appreciably). The sample includes all individuals living in 
households with a pensioner in order to capture the effects of arrears 
on the entire household.
6.4.2 Identification
The primary interest is in isolating the effects of the loss of pension 
income on nutritional status and health. By comparing the change 
in caloric intake for arrears pensioners relative to non-arrears pen­
sioners, I control for economy-wide changes (declines in the health
tical; thus, for the purpose of highlighting the identifying assumption, the DID 
framework is used.
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system, pollution and the quality of environment, price changes or 
other macroeconomic shocks) that affected all individuals, or all in­
dividuals living with pensioners. However, assignment of arrears 
is correlated with living in a debtor region and having certain at­
tributes, such as a higher pre-crisis pension level, having a job, or 
being married. A key part of the identifying assumption is that the 
factors determining the assignment of arrears should not in them­
selves be correlated with changes in the outcomes of interest, so that 
in the absence of the crisis, the arrears and non-arrears groups would 
not have changed differentially.
The first concern is whether other factors changed for debtor re­
gions that would have an independent effect on the health variables, 
especially changes in economic conditions or the health system. This 
issue is treated in Panel B of Table 6.5, where I restrict the sample of 
non-arrears pensioners to only those living in debtor regions. Rela­
tive to the full control group, the initial level of caloric intake of this 
group is closer to the arrears pensioner group. However, the decline 
in caloric intake is nearly identical for both control groups, and the 
overall differential change between the arrears and control groups is 
very similar, supportive of the identifying assumption.
It is also possible to explore whether, within debtor regions, the 
characteristics associated with going into pension arrears are on their 
own correlated with declining caloric intake . 1 0  I use probit estimates 
of the determinants of pension arrears for individuals living in debtor 
regions (as in Table 6.3) to fit probabilities of arrears among pension­
ers living in donor regions. Thus, one way to view this exercise is that 
if there was concern that assignment of pension arrears was corre­
lated with characteristics which would have lead to a greater decline 
in caloric intake even without the loss of the pension, then even 
donor regions should see the same relative decline in caloric intake 
among those pensioners with similar characteristics as the arrears 
group. Panel C of Table 6.5 shows that there was no such relative
10Of course, households that went into arrears were chosen because they were 
seen to be more robust and less vulnerable (higher pension, employed, unmar­
ried) and thus one might expect that this group would have had a smaller 
decline in caloric intake had the crisis not occurred, and the estimates would 
be understated.
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decline in donor regions for individuals with high and low probability 
of arrears, again supportive of the identifying assumption.11
Figure 6.3: Trends of caloric intake among pensioners
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While it is not possible to observe the true counterfactual, one 
can merge the 1995-96 panel data with data from an earlier round 
of the survey (collected one year before the data used above). This 
provide a composite ‘ pre-test’ of the identifying assumption that in 
the absence of the arrears crisis the paths of caloric intake would 
have been ‘parallel’ for the various groups. Figure 6.3 reveals that 
the paths of changes were very similar for the three groups in the 
pre-crisis rounds. Just as striking is the magnitude of the drop for 
the arrears group following the crisis, which stands out from previous 
changes, and makes it more convincing that the pension crisis caused 
the decline in caloric intake.12
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Another aspect of the identifying assumption is that there may 
have been other factors within debtor regions that changed differ­
entially for arrears and non-arrears households. The most natural 
candidate is whether additional social spending or assistance was 
also lost to arrears individuals, or whether arrears households were 
targeted for additional benefits or programs. While records from the 
social welfare offices do not show any evidence of such changes, 1 3  
I can also approach the issue using the RLMS. Table 6 . 6  reports 
whether households received any transfers or benefits from the gov­
ernment (cash transfers, fuel or apartment benefits, or subsidized 
medication or visits to the doctor) or private charities. The likeli­
hood of receiving the various benefits was fairly similar for arrears 
and non-arrears pensioner households in both periods. The only pro­
gram with a large percentage of participants and moderate change 
over this period was the public payment of medical insurance premi­
ums. However, the increase was the same for all pensioner groups. 
Overall, there is no evidence that there were any differential changes 
in other programs that could explain the results.
A final concern is whether individuals changed residence in re­
sponse to the arrears problem, in particular relocating from high- 
to low-arrears regions in order to receive payments. However, offi­
cial statistics reveal that mobility is extremely low (Chudinovskikh 
1998), especially due to a number of substantial administrative, le­
gal, economic and practical impediments. 1 4  To the extent that move­
ment occurred at all, official or unofficial, it would not have enabled 
pensioners to increase their likelihood of receiving a pension, since
13There were some small-scale programs targeted towards all pensioners, re­
gardless of arrears status, in some regions. However, most were implemented 
after the time of our survey, and provided only modest benefits, for example free 
transportation on city buses and trains.
14There are several reasons for lack of mobility. First, many pensioners live 
in housing belonging to their past or current employer, or in housing they own 
as, result of privatization; in either case, free or low-cost housing is often tied to 
the region of past employment. Furthermore, there is a shortage of housing in 
major metropolitan (low-arrears) areas. Second, many regions restrict migration 
through an official registration system. Third, individuals may receive in-kind 
benefits from past employers, which may be lost with a change of residence. 
Finally, the crisis was too sudden to have led to widespread migration, at least 
at the time of the survey.
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Table 6.6: Pension arrears and public and private assistance
Arrears Non-arrears Non-arrears 
pensioners debtor regions
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Get fuel benefits? Coef 0.018 0.024 0.008 0.01 0.01 0.007
SE 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Get apartment benefits? Coef 0.043 0.048 0.083 0.116 0.082 0.104
SE 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008
Get stipend? Coef 0.052 0.023 0.044 0.038 0.046 0.039
SE 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
Medical insurance paid by government? Coef 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.442 0.36 0.43
SE 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013
Eligible for medicine discount? Coef 0.061 0.056 0.092 0.105 0.082 0.089
SE 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007
Assistance from private organization? Coef 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.023
SE 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
Notes: The sam ple Includes pensioner households receiving all pension entitlements during the last 30 days in 1995. 
Colum ns 1 and 2 refer to households not receiving all pension entitlements during the last 30 days in 1996.
Colum ns 3 and 4 refer to households receiving all pension entitlements during the last 30 days in 1996. Colum ns 5 
and 6 refer to the subsam ple of colum ns 3 and 4 covering debtor regions only. The num bers show  m eans and 
standard  errors of the receipt of public and private assistance  by arrears category.
payment is tied to original region of residence. Thus, selective mi­
gration is not an important concern for the empirical analysis, nor 
an important strategy for coping with the crisis.
6 .4 .3  R e g r e ss io n  R e s u lts
The summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 6.4. 
The most notable differences across groups are consistent with the 
payment priority rules, namely that arrears households are larerer on
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household size may work to the advantage of the elderly if younger 
household members are able to earn more when the pension income 
declines (akin to the ‘added worker’ effect).
__________Table 6.7: Regressions of men’s caloric intake__________
Debtor reg ions only
OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE IV FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (0 W (9)
Pension arrears*1996 Coef -239 -226 -228 -222 -227 -224 -221
SE 74 77 76 80 84 83 59
Pension arrears Coef 145 144 146 -258 146 146 147 -215
SE 64 64 64 53 71 72 72 80
1996 Coef 30.1 21.5 29.6 27.5 21.2 27.3
SE 46 45 46 56 56 56
Household size (#) Coef 32.7 24.4 24.1 27.2 56.5 39.1 38.1 26.9 28.1
SE 27 26 26 35 30 29 29 37 37
Members aged 0-15 (#) Coef 1.07 17.5 16 -49.4 -11.4 -12.8
SE 51 49 48 58 57 56
Age Coef 1.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.9 2.7
SE 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4
Education (years) Coef 34.8 32.6 32.1 32.9 32.7 32.4
SE 4.6 4.7 4.6 6.0 5.9 5.8
Employed? Coef 198 184 236 49 192 161 215 -3.0 -5.9
SE 49 53 56 88 57 58 63 98 104
Income without pension Coef 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02
SE 0.19 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.32 0.38
Wage arrears? Coef -167 -46.2 -178 -101 -120
SE 75.7 18.1 80.5 92.4 96.8
Urban Coef -31.8 -21.3 -27.3 -41.5 -28.1 -35.2
SE 59 56 54 63 60 60
Constant Coef 1485 1376 1390 37.2 1450 1352 1376 1221 1243
SE 112 116 117 127 143 145 146 161 164
Observations (#) 1958 1958 1958 1958 1532 1532 1532 1532 1532
househo lds. In Colum n 9, pension  a rrea rs  a re  instrum ented using the  p erson 's  attributes relevant for the paym ent 
priority a s  listed in Table 6.3.
Table 6.7 shows the regression results for caloric intake of men; 
for all specifications, standard errors are corrected for clustering at 
the region * year level. Column 1 mirrors the strategy in Panel A 
of Table 6.5 and Equation 6.1, using the total sample of pensioners, 
and includes as explanatory variables the individual’s age, education 
and employment status, as well as household demographic charac­
teristics. Pension arrears were associated on average with a reduced 
caloric intake of 239 calories for the arrears group relative to the
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control group, again representing approximately 1 0  percent of the 
pre-crisis intake. The estimate is very close to the tabular results 
in the previous section, suggesting that the assignment of pension 
arrears was uncorrelated with other characteristics of the household 
which might affect caloric intake. The decline in caloric intake is large 
from a nutritional perspective. The change in body weight depends 
on the amount of energy consumed (calories) versus the amount of 
energy expended (activity). Assuming that male pensioners expend 
the same amount of energy as before the crisis, the lowering of caloric 
intake translates into weight loss. If the reduction of daily caloric 
intake of 239 calories continues over an entire month, it would result 
in weight loss of around two pounds per month.
Column 2  adds non-pension income as determinant, excluded 
from the original regression because of concerns over endogeneity. 
As would be expected, higher non-pension income is correlated with 
higher caloric intake. However, inclusion of this income has little 
effect on the coefficient on pension arrears . 1 5
Column 3 adds an indicator for whether anyone in the household 
was in arrears on wage payments from their employers. Since eco­
nomic transition in 1992, Russian firms have frequently experienced 
difficulties in paying wages, leaving workers in arrears on wage pay­
ments. There may be concern that wage arrears are more likely to 
occur in areas with high pension arrears (since firms that had difficul­
ties paying wages are likely to also have had difficulty paying payroll 
taxes). Therefore I include an indicator for whether any workers in 
the household were not paid wages in the previous month (I also 
included a ‘stock of arrears’ variable, the total amount of wages 
owed, with similar results). As expected, wage arrears themselves 
are associated with a substantially reduced caloric intake, nearly 
three-quarters as large as for the pension. However, the effect of 
pension arrears is unchanged. Column 4 performs regressions where 
the change in caloric intake is regressed on whether the individual 
went into pension arrears between 1995 and 1996, and changes in 
all other individual and household characteristics. This specification
15In an additional specification, instrumenting for income using various demo­
graphic characteristics of the household head, and occupation and industry if 
employed, yields similar results.
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has the advantage of eliminating unobservable, fixed differences. The 
results are nearly identical to the DID regressions.
Column 5 through Column 8  present similar regressions, where 
the sample is restricted to debtor regions. The estimated effects, 
and nearly all other coefficients, are largely unchanged using this 
restricted control group, consistent with the tabular results earlier 
and with the conclusion that region-specific shocks or changes did 
not cause the sharp change in caloric intake for the pension arrears 
group. This also suggests that changes in other un-observable re­
gional attributes are unlikely to explain the results, since they would 
affect non-arrears pensioners (and non-pensioners aged 50 and above) 
as much as arrears pensioners. 1 6
Finally, a remaining concern is that households who went into 
arrears also lost or received other benefits; for example, while Table 
6 . 6  showed that there was little change in other benefits for arrears 
and non-arrears groups, there may be attributes of households that 
received pensions that also made them more or less likely to gain or 
lose other benefits, especially those provided by employers. 1 7  One 
way to treat this concern is to instrument for being an arrears pen­
sioner, using the payment priority criteria. This approach relies on 
the assumption that in the absence of arrears, high and low priority 
households would have experienced similar changes in caloric intake 
(Panel C of Table 6.5 showed that at least for donor regions, where 
there were no arrears, this was the case). Column 9 of Table 6.7 
presents results from the change-on-change specification for house­
holds in debtor regions only, where pension arrears is instrumented 
using the person’s relevant attributes that affect priority of pension 
receipt. The results are similar to those in the other specifications.
Overall, the estimated effects for men’s caloric intake are ex­
tremely robust across specifications and control groups. Therefore, 
for the remainder of the results, I apply only the specification in col-
16I also estimated regressions for non-pensioner households using a dummy 
variable for living in a debtor region. Across all specifications, the coefficients 
for debtor are small and not statistically significant, suggesting there was no dif­
ferential change in unmeasured health-related factors for non-pension households 
in debtor versus donor regions.
17For example, more powerful firms may provide more benefits and ensure 
their pensioners are paid.
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limn 3, which includes income and wage arrears (results for the other 
health measures were similarly robust). Table 6 . 8  presents the esti­
mated effects of the pension (<2 3 ) on the other health-input variables 
of interest. The impacts of the crisis are smaller for women than 
men, with pension arrears associated with a decline of 163 calories 
on average. However, average male caloric intake is around 2100, 
whereas for women it is around 1800, so as a percentage of original 
intake, the results are fairly similar. 1 8  For both men and women, 
daily intake of protein declines by about 4 to 5 grams per person. 
These declines represent a reduction of 5 to 10 percent of the orig­
inal levels. The recommended daily allowance (RDA) of protein is 
about 1 gram per kilogram of weight, or about 65 to 70 grams for 
men and 50 for women. 1 9  Following the crisis, the rate of protein 
deficiency among arrears pensioners increased by 7 percentage points 
for men and 4 percentage points for women, while the rate among 
non-arrears pensioners was unchanged.
The next three rows of the table show that the use of medical 
services was also slightly reduced for the arrears households relative 
to the non-arrears households. For the use of medication, I focus 
on individuals with chronic health conditions (heart attack, stroke, 
diabetes) who were taking medication prior to the crisis. Men and 
women were 4 to 5 percent less likely to report taking medications 
after the crisis, though the effect is only statistically significant for 
men. Since these conditions are chronic, and the decline in income 
would not be expected to improve them, this result suggests that
18Other studies have found that income has differential labor supply or health 
effects by gender of the individual and/or the recipient (Duflo 2001 and Betrand 
et al. 2000). This may arise because households do not share resources equally, 
with allocations instead affected perhaps by bargaining power within the house­
hold. In this context, the effects of changes in any individual’s income on their 
own health or that of other household members may differ by gender. To explore 
this issue, I add g en d er * a r re a r s  * y e a r  interactions to Equation 6.1, still esti­
mating the regressions separately by the respondent’s gender. I find that both 
men and women have slightly lower reductions in health inputs and outcomes 
for female pensions (since they are slightly lower), but there is no significant 
interaction between the gender of the individual and gender of the pensioner, in 
contrast to the other studies.
19The RDAs are established by the Food and Nutrition Board of the US Na­
tional Academy of Science (www.nal.usda.gov/fiiic).
6.4. HEALTH IMPACT 139
Table 6 .8 : Pension arrears and health inputs and outcomes
Dependent variable
Men
(1)
Women
(2)
Caloric lntake(kcal/day) Coef -228 -163
z-st 76.3 73.2
Protein Intake (g/day) Coef -4.3 -4.7
z-st 1.8 1.8
Take medication in last 7 days? Coef -0.045 -0.041
(if chronic condition and taking before crisis) z-st 0.025 0.034
Had check-up in past 3 months? Coef -0.05 -0.02
z-st 0.027 0.015
Doctor public, if saw doctor? Coef 0.09 0.06
z-st 0.022 0.044
ADL Coef 1.4 0.13
z-st 0.78 0.42
Chest pain? Coef 0.079 -0.002
z-st 0.044 0.032
Observations (#) 1958 2054
Notes: The numbers are coefficients and standard errors of the treatment effect from 
the DID regression as described in the text. For Take medication', 'Had check=up\ 'Doctor 
public', and 'Chest pain', the coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions.
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the loss of income causes some individuals to forgo medications they 
would otherwise use. Regarding preventative care, pension arrears 
decreased the likelihood of seeing a doctor for a check-up or physical 
within the past year by around 5 percent for men, with little change 
for women. Finally, among those individuals who visited a doctor in 
the previous month, arrears pensioners were more likely to go to a 
public facility, where the fees are lower, rather than a private doctor. 
The common perception is that the latter are dramatically preferred. 
The observed switch to the former is another form of adjustment in 
the face of lost pension income.
The decline in nutrition and use of health services and medica­
tion could lead to worse health and increased mortality rates, espe­
cially among the elderly. While the specific contributions of these 
various health inputs cannot be untangled, I investigate in reduced- 
form whether the crisis lead to changes in health. As indicators of 
health status, I examine whether the person has experienced chest 
pains (an indicator of potential heart problems, the leading cause of 
adult mortality) and construct an index of physical limitations which 
broadly represents health status. For the latter, respondents aged 
55 and older were asked to report their ability to perform various 
activities of daily living (ADL’s) (for example, walking 1 kilometre, 
or climbing a flight of stairs) on a 1 to 5 scale from ‘Not at all diffi­
cult’ to ‘Cannot do it.’20 The index sums the scores of 10 different 
activities and ranges from 10 to 50. The mean value of the index 
is 20.6 for men and 24.6 for women. I follow the same empirical 
strategy as before, but include as additional regressions the initial 
values (1995) for various health related factors (obesity, whether an 
individual smokes, the number of years the person has smoked, and 
alcohol consumption). The bottom rows of Table 6.8 present the 
results. For men, going into arrears is associated with an increase in 
physical limitations (statistically significant at the 10 percent level);
20Possible responses were: 1. Not at all difficult; 2. Slightly difficult; 3. 
Somewhat difficult; 4. Very difficult, but possible; 5. Cannot do it. Activities 
were: walk across a room; walk 200 meters; walk 1 kilometer; run 1 kilometer; 
sit for 2 hours; stand up after sitting; climb one flight of stairs; climb several 
flights of stairs; lift and carry a weight of about 5 kilograms; squat, crouch or 
kneel.
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the increase of 1.4 on the ADL scale represents about a 7 percent 
worsening over the mean functional limitation before the crisis. The 
likelihood of reporting chest pains also increases for men by 7 percent 
(again statistically significant at the 10 percent level). By contrast, 
for women, both results are small and not statistically significant. 
This result is consistent with the finding that women do not reduce 
as much the use of medicines or health services when they lose their 
pension, and also supports other research which finds that health 
and mortality worsened more dramatically for men than women in 
Russia, despite exposure to similar health risks (Shkolnikov, Comia, 
Leon, and Mesle 1998).
Finally, I explore whether the pension arrears had an impact on 
mortality, merging the 1995-96 panel with RLMS data collected 2 
years after the arrears crisis. Table 6.9 presents results (marginal 
effects) from probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 
whether the individual died in those two years. In addition to the 
regressors above, I also include initial values of the ADL index and 
whether the person had previously experienced chest pains. Pension 
arrears increased the likelihood that the individual died within the 
next two years by nearly 6 percent for men, an effect comparable 
to being a smoker. The coefficient just fails to be significant at the 
5 percent level. For women, the effect is smaller, and not statis­
tically significant. The differential mortality results are again con­
sistent with previous studies showing that male mortality increased 
more than female mortality during this time. The signs of most of 
the predictors of mortality are in accord with expectations, though 
few are statistically significant. The ADL index, smoking and years 
smoked (for men) are all correlated with an increased likelihood of 
mortality.21
21 Since mortality may be correlated with attributes that determine pension 
arrears, I compare mortality rates in alternate regressions for pensioners in donor 
regions who would have high and low probability of being arrears if they lived 
in debtor regions. There are no significant difference in the likelihood of death.
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_____________Table 6.9: Determinants of mortality_____________
Men Women
(!) (2)
Pension arrears Coef 0.058 0.01
SE 0.030 0.01
Age (years) Coef 0.004 0.001
SE 0.002 0.004
Obese? Coef 0.021 0.014
SE 0.026 0.077
Has experienced chest pain? Coef 0.018 0.001
SE 0.020 0.006
ADL Index Coef 0.013 0.0063
SE 0.004 0.0028
Smoker? Coef 0.065 0.001
SE 0.029 0.021
Smoking (years) Coef 0.0012 -0.008
SE 0.0007 0.016
Drinks alcohol? Coef 0.001 -0.001
SE 0.021 0.006
Household income Coef 0.022 -0.003
SE 0.034 0.0021
Observations (#) 642 1240
Notes: Marginal effects r^om probit regressions, where the dependent 
variable is whether individual died between 1996 and 1998 surveys. 
Sample is restricted to individuals over 50 years of age, in households 
with at least one pensioner.
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6.5 Coping Strategies
As stated earlier, there are several ways households may respond 
to counteract the adverse effects of an income shock, for example 
changes by adjusting labour supply, savings or assets, or through 
private transfers from family or friends. Beyond their importance for 
understanding how households cope with income shocks, the mag­
nitude of such private behavioural responses is important for the 
design and reform of social programs. If public programs largely 
crowd out private support activities, the net value of public safety 
nets and programs is reduced (Jensen 1999).
Table 6.10 explores the various mechanisms households may use 
to cope. It presents both mean values for the variables of interest 
(columns 1 to 4), as well as coefficients from DID regressions similar 
to those above (Column 5), where I control for other household and 
individual characteristics. In almost all cases, the regression results 
mimic the changes in means, so I only discuss the latter.
6.5.1 Labour Supply
Following the standard labour supply model where an individual has 
preferences over consumption and leisure, one would predict that a 
decline in income should lead to a decrease in the demand for leisure, 
and thus an increase in labour supply. For example, Betrand et al. 
(2000) find that a large increase in pensions to elderly South Africans 
lead to a large decline in labour supply among prime-aged adult 
men living with the pensioners. Since the assignment of pension ar­
rears was based on pre-crisis characteristics, and in the absence of 
a means test, there should be no negative work incentives created 
by the pension. Provided that household members share income in 
any way, the decline in pension income could affect the labour sup­
ply of non-pensioners living with pensioners as well as the pensioners 
themselves. Table 6.10 reveals that in both periods a slightly greater 
percent of households in arrears have an individual employed, where 
I include both formal and informal sector employment. However, 
there was little change in employment rates for either group, indi­
cating that the households who went into arrears did not compensate
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Table 6.10: Coping mechanisms
Arrears Non-arrears Coef
Dependent variable
1995
(1)
1996
(2)
1995
(3)
1996
(4)
a 3
(5)
Em ploym ent s ta tu s
Anyone working in household? Coef 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.60 -0.006
SE 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Hours worked per week (>0) Coef 65.4 71.8 68.3 68.6 5.9
(total, all household members) SE 0.81 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3
Monthly wage earnings Coef 2710 2905 3135 3080 250
SE 200 204 110 102 110
S ales and  borrow ing
Sold jewelry or property? Coef 0.085 0.160 0.088 0.090 0.430
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13
Amount sold if sold (R) Coef 717 1052 498 650 192
SE 199 131 50 104 41
Borrowed money in past 30 days? Coef 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.15
SE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Amount borrowed if borrowed (R) Coef 300 369 403 382 108
SE 37.1 34.5 54.2 53.7 91
Private tran sfe rs
Received transfers? Coef 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.15 -0.1
SE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08
Amount received if received (R) Coef 399 422 288 303 18
SE 244 129 95 71 12
Given transfers? Coef 0.26 0.18 0.25 0.21 -0.21
SE 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06
Amount sent if given (R) Coef 610 392 493 399 125
SE 213 115 128 119 43
N otes: T h e  n u m b e rs  a re  coeffic ien ts  a n d  s ta n d a rd  erro rs  of th e  tre a tm e n t e ffec t from  th e  DID re g re s s io n  
a s  d e s c r ib e d  in th e  tex t. O th e r re g re s s o rs  in th e  reg re s s io n  a re : #  h o u se h o ld  m e m b e rs , #  ch ild ren , #  elderly , 
h o u se h o ld  in c o m e exc lud ing  p en s io n , a n d  region  ind ica to rs. F or probit re g re s s io n s , m arg inal effec ts , 
e v a lu a te d  a t  th e  s a m p le  m e a n , a re  repo rted .
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by getting jobs. This may have been due to the inability to obtain 
employment, rather than the desire to work. Employment rates were 
in general declining during this period, and in this context re-entry 
into the labour market may not have been feasible.22 However, con­
sistent with expectations, conditional on having a job before the cri­
sis, total household labour supply (in all activities, by all members) 
increased by almost 6 hours per week more for arrears households rel­
ative to non-arrears households. The result was a relative increase in 
monthly wages of R250 for pension arrears households, representing 
over 10 percent of the average lost pension income. The magnitude 
of the response is even more striking since this is the effect for all 
households; the average household with a worker actually increased 
wage earnings by R350 (16 percent of lost pension income), while 
the 35 percent of households without a worker had no adjustment.
These results suggest there may be an important difference in 
the effects of arrears for different household types. For example, 
compared to households with only elderly persons, households with 
more members or workers may not only be less dependent on the 
pension as a share of total household income, but may also be more 
able to increase labour supply in response to the income loss. Table 
6.11 shows the estimated effects of the pension on health, where the 
sample is split by whether the household contains only elderly per­
sons (pensioners and spouses) or is an ‘extended’ household (contains 
younger members, such as adult children of pensioners). I restrict 
the sample to persons aged 50 and older to avoid comparing a sam­
ple of elderly persons to a sample with some non-elderly persons. 
There are noticeable differences in the effects of arrears; caloric in­
take declines by 35-40 calories more for men and women living only 
with elderly persons. The differential effects on the use of medical 
services and medication and most of the other health measures are 
also smaller. The largest differential health effect is that men living 
with only other elderly persons had almost twice as large a decline in 
the ability to perform the various ADL’s. These results suggest the
22The survey asked individuals whether they are looking for work. There was a 
slightly larger increase in the percentage looking for work for those who went into 
arrears. However, looking for work itself reflects perceptions that employment is 
available, as in the ‘discouraged worker’ effect.
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extended family can play a protective role in the presence of income 
shocks.
Table 6.11: Pension arrears and health inputs and outcomes by 
household structure___________________________________________
Extended households Elderly only
Men Women Men Women 
Dependent variable_________________________ £1]_______ (2)_________ (3)_______ (4)
Caloric lntake(kcal/day) Coef -213 -151 -251 -185
SE 97.9 81.2 86.9 75.2
Protein Intake (g/day) Coef -4.2 -4.6 -4.5 -4.8
SE 2.13 2.2 2.0 1.9
Take medication in last 7 days? Coef -0.045 -0.041 -0.046 0.041
(if chronic condition and taking before crisis) SE 0.032 0.039 0.029 0.034
Had check-up in past 3 months? Coef -0.045 -0.01 -0.046 -0.02
SE 0.037 0.021 0.031 0.017
Doctor public, if saw doctor? Coef 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
SE 0.033 0.051 0.028 0.045
ADL Coef 0.83 0.08 1.6 0.28
SE 0.60 0.32 0.55 0.37
Chest pain? Coef 0.078 -0.002 0.081 -0.002
SE 0.048 0.041 0.046 0.035
Observations (#) 507 723 801 881
Notes: The num bers are coefficients and standard errors of the treatm ent effect from the DID regression a s  described 
in the text. For T a k e  medication', 'Had check=up‘, 'Doctor public', and 'C hest pain', the coefficients a re  marginal 
effects from probit regressions.
6.5.2 Sales and Borrowing
When faced with an income shock, the permanent income and life­
cycle theories of consumption both predict that households should 
spend out of savings, or if they have no savings, should borrow on 
credit markets. How much they obtain through either source will 
of course depend on whether the shock is viewed as transitory or 
permanent. For a transitory negative shock, households should dis­
save/borrow, enough to bring current consumption up to permanent 
income, which will be the old permanent income minus the income 
shock divided by the number of expected periods of life remaining. 
For a permanent shock, the household revises downward the estimate 
of permanent income to a greater extent, and thus dissaves/borrows
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the difference between this new, lower threshold and current income. 
Thus, shocks perceived to be permanent should be met with a smaller 
reduction in savings than transitory shocks.
There are numerous difficulties in measuring a household’s stock 
of wealth. Wealth can take many forms; in Russia, very few house­
holds keep money in banks because of years of high inflation and 
concern for bank failures. Furthermore, financial markets were still 
young at this time, and inaccessible to most households. Many Rus­
sians thus hold US dollars, durable goods, jewellery, and housing as 
wealth. The lack of savings instruments and investment opportuni­
ties may have exacerbated the impact of the crisis, as most wealth 
was fairly illiquid, and the elderly had few options for saving or fi­
nancing their retirement.
Households in the survey were asked to report sales of durable 
goods, and assets such as jewellery, currency, bonds, stocks, and 
other financial assets. Table 6.10 reveals that the percentage of 
households engaging in sales of these assets increased dramatically 
for the arrears group, from 8.5 percent before the crisis to 16 per­
cent after the crisis, with little change for the non-arrears group. 
In regressions, the result is statistically significant, indicating that 
households who went into arrears were significantly more likely to 
engage in asset sales. The total income generated from these sales 
increased by approximately R350 between 1995 and 1996, though 
the increase relative to the non-arrears group was R192. While ex­
pectations are difficult to measure, in the period following the crisis 
nearly 60 percent of pensioners in arrears report that they do not 
expect things to get better in the next 12 months, suggesting a belief 
that the shock was more permanent. Households responded to the 
perception of the permanence of the shock in ways that are broadly 
consistent with the life-cycle model; asset sales by those arrears pen­
sioners who perceive the shock to be permanent (think things will 
either stay the same as at present or get worse in the next 12 months) 
are less frequent and in smaller amounts on average than those who 
expect things to improve. The latter group increased asset sales by 
R500, compared to R150 for the former.
Households also engaged in significant borrowing (mostly from 
family, friends and neighbours, rather than formal credit markets)
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in response to arrears. The percentage of households in arrears who 
borrowed money in the previous month increased from 12 percent to 
19 percent, while there was little change for the non-arrears group. 
The average sale value also increased, though the increase relative to 
the non-arrears group is not statistically significant.
6.5.3 Private Transfers
Private transfers from family and friends, aside from loans, are an­
other common mechanism through which households may cope with 
income shocks. Altruistically-linked households, where non-coresident 
members have utility functions that contain the consumption of the 
other members, should share income (Becker 1974). Briefly, if an 
individual i is utility interdependent with another individual —i, as 
in U(Ci, C-i) =  Ui[Vi(Ci), V-i(C-i)\, the first-order conditions for 
utility maximisation require that the (weighted) marginal utilities 
of consumption of the two parties be equal. This in turn will imply 
that a decline in income of one party should be met with increases in 
transfers received from the other, or reduced transfers sent to others. 
Several authors have explored the relationship between household in­
come and the level of private transfers received.23
Table 6.10 shows that private transfers are extremely widespread 
in Russia, with 30 to 40 percent of households with pensioners either 
sending, receiving or both. More than twice as many households 
with pensioners sent remittances as received. Over this time period 
the incidence of receipt of private transfers increased among all pen­
sioners, with no differential improvement for the arrears pensioners 
in terms of receipt or levels. However, pension arrears households 
reduced their private transfers to other households much more dra­
matically than non-arrears households. Almost one third less arrears 
households sent transfers after the crisis relative to before the crisis, 
(compared to a 15 percent reduction among non-arrears pensioners),
23Altonji et al. (1991), Altonji et al. (1992), Cox (1987), Cox and Jimenez 
(1990), and Jensen (1999). Using RLMS data firm before the crisis, Cox et al. 
(1997) find that private transfers are widespread. They simulate that an income 
loss of R l, such as from pension reduction, could result in an increase of R0.23 
in private transfers.
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the difference between this new, lower threshold and current income. 
Thus, shocks perceived to be permanent should be met with a smaller 
reduction in savings than transitory shocks.
There are numerous difficulties in measuring a household’s stock 
of wealth. Wealth can take many forms; in Russia, very few house­
holds keep money in banks because of years of high inflation and 
concern for bank failures. Furthermore, financial markets were still 
young at this time, and inaccessible to most households. Many Rus­
sians thus hold US dollars, durable goods, jewellery, and housing as 
wealth. The lack of savings instruments and investment opportuni­
ties may have exacerbated the impact of the crisis, as most wealth 
was fairly illiquid, and the elderly had few options for saving or fi­
nancing their retirement.
Households in the survey were asked to report sales of durable 
goods, and assets such as jewellery, currency, bonds, stocks, and 
other financial assets. Table 6.10 reveals that the percentage of 
households engaging in sales of these assets increased dramatically 
for the arrears group, from 8.5 percent before the crisis to 16 per­
cent after the crisis, with little change for the non-arrears group. 
In regressions, the result is statistically significant, indicating that 
households who went into arrears were significantly more likely to 
engage in asset sales. The total income generated from these sales 
increased by approximately R350 between 1995 and 1996, though 
the increase relative to the non-arrears group was R192. While ex­
pectations are difficult to measure, in the period following the crisis 
nearly 60 percent of pensioners in arrears report that they do not 
expect things to get better in the next 12 months, suggesting a belief 
that the shock was more permanent. Households responded to the 
perception of the permanence of the shock in ways that are broadly 
consistent with the life-cycle model; asset sales by those arrears pen­
sioners who perceive the shock to be permanent (think things will 
either stay the same as at present or get worse in the next 12 months) 
are less frequent and in smaller amounts on average than those who 
expect things to improve. The latter group increased asset sales by 
R500, compared to R150 for the former.
Households also engaged in significant borrowing (mostly from 
family, friends and neighbours, rather than formal credit markets)
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in response to arrears. The percentage of households in arrears who 
borrowed money in the previous month increased from 12 percent to 
19 percent, while there was little change for the non-arrears group. 
The average sale value also increased, though the increase relative to 
the non-arrears group is not statistically significant.
6.5.3 Private Transfers
Private transfers from family and friends, aside from loans, are an­
other common mechanism through which households may cope with 
income shocks. Altruistically-finked households, where non-coresident 
members have utility functions that contain the consumption of the 
other members, should share income (Becker 1974). Briefly, if an 
individual i is utility interdependent with another individual —z, as 
in U(Ci,C-i) =  Ui[Vi(Ci), V-i(C-i)\, the first-order conditions for 
utility maximisation require that the (weighted) marginal utilities 
of consumption of the two parties be equal. This in turn will imply 
that a decline in income of one party should be met with increases in 
transfers received from the other, or reduced transfers sent to others. 
Several authors have explored the relationship between household in­
come and the level of private transfers received.23
Table 6.10 shows that private transfers are extremely widespread 
in Russia, with 30 to 40 percent of households with pensioners either 
sending, receiving or both. More than twice as many households 
with pensioners sent remittances as received. Over this time period 
the incidence of receipt of private transfers increased among all pen­
sioners, with no differential improvement for the arrears pensioners 
in terms of receipt or levels. However, pension arrears households 
reduced their private transfers to other households much more dra­
matically than non-arrears households. Almost one third less arrears 
households sent transfers after the crisis relative to before the crisis, 
(compared to a 15 percent reduction among non-arrears pensioners),
23Altonji et al. (1991), Altonji et al. (1992), Cox (1987), Cox and Jimenez 
(1990), and Jensen (1999). Using RLMS data firm before the crisis, Cox'et al. 
(1997) find that private transfers are widespread. They simulate that an income 
loss of R l, such as from pension reduction, could result in an increase of R0.23 
in private transfers.
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and the amount sent conditional on sending was 125 less relative to 
the non-arrears group, accounting for 5 percent of the lost pension 
income for those households that sent remittances. This suggests not 
only that individuals share income even when not co-resident, but 
also that the effects of the pension crisis are felt outside of pension 
households, since pensioners support others.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter argues that Russia’s financially unstable pension sys­
tem, characterized by irregular payments and adjustments in pension 
levels, took a large toll on the financial and physical well-being of the 
elderly and their dependents. While there were significant adverse 
consequences of pension loss, households responded to the income 
shock in rational ways that are consistent with economic theory. Be­
tween increased hours of work and sale of assets, households replaced 
on average almost 20 percent of the lost pension income. In the ab­
sence of such adjustments, the impacts on health most likely would 
have been worse. However, households where the pensioner is not 
able to work, or where there are no other co-resident members who 
can work, and where there are few assets, are likely to be hurt more 
by the loss of an income source.
CHAPTER 6. THE ELDERLY AND PENSION ARREARS
Chapter 7 
The Elderly and Wage 
Arrears
7.1 Introduction
A growing empirical literature investigates the connection between 
health outcomes and economic status. Studies on industrialized 
countries find evidence for a health gradient, linking high socioe­
conomic status to good health and low mortality, across gender and 
age groups (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973, Marmot and Wilkinson 1999 
and Wilkinson 1996). However, the bulk of these studies is based 
on cross-sectional analysis and fails to identify exogenous sources of 
variation in household income.1 In a standard household produc­
tion model, income and health (or in a dynamic context, assets and 
health) are jointly determined (Strauss and Thomas 1995). This in­
terdependency makes it difficult to pin down a causal relationship be­
tween economic and health status, and invalidates predictions about 
the effects of additional economic resources on health outcomes. For 
example, higher income enables individuals to purchase more of good 
health, yet good health enables people to earn more income.
Disentangling the two-way interaction between health and eco­
nomic status is especially complicated for the elderly (Smith 1998
1A number of papers have looked at the impact of rainfall variation, a covari- 
ate shock, on consumption (Paxson 1992), child health (Hoddinott and Kinsey 
2001) and murder rates (Miguel 2003).
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and Smith and Kington 1997). Contemporaneous feedback from 
health to economic status may be considered unlikely at old age, 
as pension receipts are not related to current health status. How­
ever, health outcomes at old age are influenced by the entire history 
of current and past health inputs and behaviours. Health conditions 
in middle age could, by reducing earnings, lower retirement income. 
As health status during middle and old age is closely linked, any 
positive association of pensions and current health could just reflect 
better health at pre-retirement age. Smith (1998) argues that the 
correlation between health and current-period income of the elderly 
population in the US mostly reflects causation from health to socioe­
conomic status, as health shocks dominate economic shocks. This 
could also explain why the differences in mortality across socioeco­
nomic groups tend to decline in old age relative to late middle age 
(Deaton and Paxson 1998).
However, elderly often live together and share resources with 
wage earners. Shocks to wage income are likely to affect not just 
the welfare of the working age, but also other household members, 
including the elderly. This chapter explores the impact of the wage 
arrears crisis on old age health in Russia during the mid-1990s, when 
about one third of household with elderly suffered from non-payment 
of wages.2 Just like many countries of the former Soviet Union, Rus­
sia’s economic transition was marked by a sharp and persistent rise 
in wage arrears. According to official data, they first became more 
common in 1994, rose sharply in 1996 and peaked in 1998, before 
declining rapidly after a large macroeconomic adjustment. While 
temporary wage arrears are common in developed market economies 
for small start-up companies or bankrupt firms, wage arrears in Rus­
sia were widespread in many sectors, regions and organizations, and 
persisted over a number of years (Earle and Sabirianova 1999). Wage 
arrears reduced not just the living standards of employees, but also 
of their dependents and cohabitants (Desai and Idson 1998).
The life expectancy of the Russian population is one of the lowest 
in Europe. In 1998, male life expectancy amounted to 61.4 years in
2StiUman and Thomas (2002) study the same period and country as this 
paper, looking at the impact of income flucations, instrumented with the oil 
price, on nutritional status.
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1998, and female life expectancy to 73.3 years, which is 4 years lower 
for women and 7 years lower for men than the average in western and 
central Europe. At the age of 65, Russian men expect to live another 
11.4 years and Russian women another 15.3, about 4 years shorter 
than their counterparts in western and central Europe (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2002). Low health status is not just 
a legacy of the Soviet period, but also reflects an unprecedented up­
swing in morbidity and mortality rates in the early 1990s. Infectious 
and parasitic diseases have increased, as have prevalence rates of hy­
pertension, tied to a rise in cardiovascular diseases especially for the 
group of working age male (Shkolnikov et al. 1998).
This chapter applies matching techniques to assess the impact of 
wage arrears on the elderly in arrears households. This method devi­
ates from Desai and Idson (1998) who apply cross-sectional regression 
with wage arrears as indicator variable on the right-hand side. As 
explained in Section 2.5, matching has important advantages over 
regression estimation. As a non-parametric technique, it does not 
rely on a specific functional form and accounts for heterogeneity in 
the treatment effect. It identifies the impact of wage arrears on the 
elderly with wage arrears. Each arrears elderly is matched only to 
those non-arrears elderly who are similar in terms of observable char­
acteristics. Imposing the common support between treatment and 
control groups ensures that the impact estimates are obtained only 
for those sets of observables where such similar control units exist.
The key identifying assumption is that arrears assignment is not 
dependent on unobservables, so that once arrears and non-arrears 
elderly are matched along observables, any difference in outcome 
variables derives from the wage arrears treatment. By drawing on 
firm and regional characteristics, the matching procedure ensures 
that arrears and non-arrears households are placed in a common 
economic and geographic environment. Furthermore, arrears elderly 
are matched to non-arrears elderly only within the same gender- 
year-age group category. Balancing tests show that the treatment 
and control groups are well aligned along key characteristics. The 
robustness of the main findings to alternative weighting schemes is 
confirmed.
One common concern is that the selection into wage arrears may
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depend on unobservable fixed effects, such as unobserved productiv­
ity or geographic characteristics. One way to address this problem 
is to combine matching estimation with difference-in-differences es­
timation. However, in contrast to pensions, the wage arrears crisis 
affected a significant proportion of the labour force from 1994 to 
1998, and relatively few households change wage arrears status from 
one round to the next. For the sample analysed in this chapter, 
difference-in-differences matching is based on only 30 percent of the 
number of impact estimates compared to cross-sectional matching.
This analysis exploits the fact that most elderly either work them­
selves or live together with wage earners. Applying matching esti­
mations to a nationally-represent at ive data set, the study shows that 
old age health status declines significantly as a result of wage arrears. 
I employ two safeguards to prevent contamination of the estimates 
by feedback from health to economic status. The non-payment of 
wages is related to occupational, sectorial and regional character­
istics rather than to the health status of employees. More impor­
tantly, the bulk of the elderly does not work themselves and depends 
on wages earned by other household members.3 In addition, wage 
arrears could reflect a general economic decline in certain regions 
which could affect health through many different channels, includ­
ing pension arrears, worsening in the access and quality of health 
services, deterioration in environmental conditions, and behavioural 
risk factors like smoking and drinking. I exploit a rich data set to 
conclude that these factors contribute little to the decline in old age 
health status.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the data set, lays out the estimation strategy, explains the 
choice of the sample, and explores key identification issues. Section 
7.3 turns to the impact of wage arrears on the elderly living in arrears 
households. It discusses the effects on economic well-being, including 
coping mechanisms, and health status, covering utilization of health
3Duflo (2000) investigates also the link between household resources received 
by one household member on health outcomes of other members. She studies the 
impact of the sudden expansion of the old age pension program to the non-white 
population in South Africa on the anthropometric status for children living with 
a pension recipient.
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service, health behaviour, nutrition, cognitive functions, activities 
of daily living, chest pains, self-rated health, and survival between 
survey rounds. Section 7.4 scrutinizes the main findings with regard 
to subsamples, wage arrears definitions, and estimation techniques. 
The final section concludes.
7.2 Methodology
7.2.1 W age Arrears
Wage arrears represent wage entitlements of workers that enterprises 
fail to pay in time. After the system of secure regulated life-time 
employment collapsed in the early 1990s, wage arrears first became 
a problem in 1993-94. According to Goskomstat data, they in­
creased tenfold in real terms between spring 1993 and summer 1994. 
From September 1995 until October 1998, the stock of real wage 
arrears further increased, before it finally declined with the recov­
ery in the economy after a large macroeconomic adjustment (Figure 
7.1).4 Measuring wage arrears requires clarifying the definition of 
jobs and wages. The RLMS distinguishes three types of occupation 
(primary, secondary, and informal). About two thirds of the working 
age population are in regular employment. Of those, only 3 percent 
have secondary jobs. In addition, slightly less than 10 percent work 
also in informal jobs. Since multiple job holdings are rare, and in­
formation on wage arrears from informal employment is missing, the 
analysis concentrates on primary jobs. Ideally, I would like to cal­
culate the net present value of wage arrears based on the cash flow 
of wage payments and wage entitlements over a longer period. How­
ever, the RLMS provides information only on whether a worker is 
owed wages, and the amount of wage payments during the last 30 
days. Depending on the periodicity of wage payments, some workers 
may not have received any salary during the last 30 days but not 
be owed any wages, while others may have accumulated wage claims 
in the past but received wages more recently. I define wage arrears
4Figure 7.1 shows the stock of real wage arrears from January 1993 to De­
cember 2001 according to the Goskomstat enterprise survey. December 1997 is 
set equal to 100.
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as the joint incidence of outstanding wage claims and the absence 
of wage payments during the last 30 days. This concept combines 
the absence of recent wage receipts with outstanding entitlements to 
wages. I will return to this definition in Section 7.4.2.
Figure 7.1: Amount of outstanding real wage arrears (December 
1997=100)
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Using this concept of wage arrears, the non-payment crisis af­
fected on average one fifth of the labour force. The share of em­
ployees with wage arrears rose from 15 percent in 1994, to 18 per­
cent in 1995, and peaked at 26 percent in 1996 before declining to 
21 percent in 1998.5 The literature has advanced different inter­
pretations of this striking phenomenon. Layard and Richter (1995) 
interpret wage arrears as a way to reduce wage costs without resort­
ing to more costly layoffs in face of a general structural economic 
adjustment,6 while Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) view them as a
5According to the latest rounds of the RLMS, wage arrears have dropped to 
9 percent in 2000 and 7 percent in 2001.
6Social services provided by enterprises, employees’ stakes in privatized en-
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ploy by enterprises to extract government subsidies. Clarke (1998) 
emphasizes the widespread occurrence of liquidity constraints and 
barter arrangements. In a similar vein, Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999) 
point out that wage arrears are only one element of a wider arrears 
crisis with fiscal origins, involving payment and tax arrears. En­
terprise managers prefer buying high-yielding short-term treasury 
bonds to paying wages or taxes. Lehmann et al. (1999) underline 
that enterprises get away more easily with not paying wages if work­
ers have little outside options in the local labour market. Earle and 
Sabirianova (1999) develop this argument further, claiming that lo­
cal labour market characteristics account for the persistence of wage 
arrears over several years. In their view, local network externalities 
imply a positive relationship between the employees’ quitting prob­
ability and the incidence of wage arrears in other local firms. Once 
the labour market has settled in this ‘bad’ equilibrium, wage arrears 
perpetuate themselves and last over long periods.
These explanations have in common that wage arrears are tied 
primarily to the features other than worker characteristics. The de­
tailed investigations of wage arrears by (Earle and Sabirianova 1999) 
and Lehmann et al. (1999) confirm this finding.7 Table 7.1 repro­
duces some of these results, drawing on the sample of worker during 
1994 to 1998. It shows random effects logit regressions of wage ar­
rears on gender, age group, educational attainment, occupational 
code, ownership shares, job tenure, foreign or government owner­
ship, round and state indicators. Wage arrears are associated with 
personal characteristics, like male gender, low skills, long tenure, and 
low ownership stake, but the bulk of the explanatory power comes
terprises, and the leverage of enterprises, as monopsonists in the labour market 
of one-company towns, on local and federal authorities are reasons for preferring 
wage to employment adjustments.
7 (Lehmann and Wadsworth 2002) analyse the contribution of wage arrears 
to the wage distribution and wage inequality, drawing on the 1994, 1996, and 
1998 rounds of the RLMS. Using seven alternative methods, ranging from re­
gression estimation to propensity score matching, they find that conventional 
measures of earnings dispersion would be one fifth to one third lower in the ab­
sence of arrears. They also find that the parameters of the counterfactual (ie 
no-arrears) wage distributions are very similar to the parameters of the observed 
wage distributions of non-arrears workers.
158 CHAPTER 7. THE ELDERLY AND WAGE ARREARS
from regional, year, and firm characteristics.8 They are highest in 
state firms, and decline with private and foreign ownership. Wage 
arrears are also more prevalent in regions with low economic activity, 
high government spending, low tax revenues and high tax arrears, 
and higher in rural than urban areas. Adding indicator variables for 
lagged wage arrears reveals strong persistence. Past wage arrears 
increase the probability of current wage arrears by 12 to 14 percent 
(Column 5 to Column 8). Wage arrears are not the result of low 
health status. In Column 7 to Column 10, I include the lagged val­
ues of two health indicators for the prime-age adults (health problem 
during the last month and self-rated health status). Both variables 
are insignificant, and subjective health status has the wrong sign. 
For the last regression, the sample is restricted to the working el­
derly, and again the lagged health indicators (functional limitations 
and chest pain) are insignificant.
7.2.2 Sample
The sample includes all individuals, aged 55 years or older, from 
the four rounds from 1994 to 1998 of the RLMS. It provides 4625 
observations of elderly who live in a household with at least one 
worker, of which 2815 are women. In these families, close to one 
in two members are 55 years or older, about a quarter of which are 
working themselves. The analysis focuses on the health status of 
elderly for three reasons. First, in view of the changing pathways 
between economic and health status over the lifetime (Smith and 
Kington 1997), it is useful to concentrate on one particular age group. 
Second, about four fifth of the population aged 55 years or older are 
not in a regular employment. The vast majority of individuals active 
in the labour market retire at pension age (55 years for women, 60 
years for men), unless they are forced into early retirement due to 
poor health or bad job prospects. By defining 55 years as the cut-off 
age, the bulk of the elderly’s income comes from pensions or wage 
income of working-age household members. The health status of the
8Information on enterprise size is available for about 70 percent of the workers. 
Including this variable, the incidence of wage arrears increases with the number 
of employees, while other results remain unchanged.
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Table 7.1: Worker random effects logit regressions of wage arrears
“ Coe? z Coe? z Coe? z Coe? z Coe? z Coe? z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Wage arrears (t-1) 0.932 14.2 0.721 8.0
Wage arrears (t-2) 0.416 4.2
Any health problem last month (t-1)? 0.041 0.7
Self-rated health (t-1) -0.007 -02
ADL (t-1) -0.017 -1.1
Chest pain (t-1) 0.115 0.6
Male 0.201 4.5 0.151 2.5 0.103 12 0.174 2.9 0.167 2.7 0.371 1.8
Age (months) 0.0002 1.1 0.0003 1.3 0.0003 1.0 0.0003 1.4 0.0004 1.4 -0.0014 -0.7
Education (years) -0.024 -2.8 -0.009 -0.8 -0.014 -0.9 -0.011 -1.0 -0.011 -1.0 0.007 02
Tenure (months) 0.0007 3.3 0.0003 1.0 0.0000 -0.1 0.0004 1.4 0.0004 1.4 0.0008 12
Occupational code 0.00004 3.6 0.00004 2.8 0.00001 0.6 0.00004 32 0.00004 3 2 0.00006 12
Emloyee's ownership (%) -0.049 -1.3 -0.083 -1.5 -0.092 -1.1 -0.075 -1.4 -0.075 -1.4 -0.534 -2.0
Enterprise ownership (Fully public as omitted category):
Some public -0.239 -3.5 -0.259 -2.7 -0.285 -22 -0.266 -2.8 -0.264 -2.8 0.280 0.9
Fully private -0.331 -5.9 -0.347 -42 -0.448 -4.1 -0.372 -4.7 -0.372 -4.7 -0.067 -02
State-level (Ruble per capita):
Gross regional product 0.00000 -2.3 0.0000 -22 0.0000 -3.2 0.0000 -2.4 0.0000 -2.4 0.0000 -0.3
Government expenditure 0.00004 4.6 0.00002 1.6 0.00002 1.4 0.00003 2.1 0.00003 2.1 0.00001 0.3
Total tax revenues 0.0000 -0.8 0.0000 -1.0 0.00000 -0.1 0.0000 -1.0 0.0000 -1.0 0.0000 -1.0
Regional tax revenues -0.0001 -42 0.0000 -1.4 0.00001 0.3 -0.0001 -1.9 -0.0001 -1.9 -0.0001 -0.6
Total tax arrears 0.00001 1.0 0.00006 2.2 0.00008 2.5 0.00006 2.4 0.00006 2.3 0.00007 0.9
Regional tax arrears 0.00008 2.1 0.0000 -0.1 -0.0001 -1.2 0.00000 0.0 0.00000 0.0 0.0000 0.1
Public enterprises closed? 0.05834 12 0.11179 1.7 0.28793 3.1 0.14313 22 0.14241 2.1 0.31118 1.4
Survey year (1994 as omitted category):
1995 -0.147 -2.1 0.478 4.0 0.395 3.4 0.397 3.4 -0.473 -1.8
1996 0.370 4.6 0.888 7.8 0.870 6.3 0.826 7.4 0.824 7.4
1998 -0.344 -3.4 -0.6437 -1.7
Settlement type (Urban as omitted category):
Suburban 0.387 4.7 0.469 42 0.467 3.1 0.534 4.8 0.531 4.8 1.112 2.7
Rural 0.362 6.6 0.308 4.0 0.351 3.3 0.379 5.1 0.378 5.1 0.506 1.8
Regions (Moscow and St. Petersburg):
Northern and North Western 0.201 12 0.045 0.2 -0.134 •0.4 0.039 02 0.043 0.2 -0.614 -0.8
Central and Central Black-Earth 0.035 02 -0.085 -0.4 -0.018 -0.1 -0.109 -0.5 -0.111 -0.5 -0.542 -0.9
Volga-Vaytski and Volga Basin 0.558 3.7 0.483 2.1 0.578 1.9 0.534 2.4 0.531 2.4 -0212 -0.3
North Caucasian 0.133 0.8 0.070 0.3 0.401 12 0.048 02 0.047 02 -0.763 -1.1
Ural 0.031 02 -0.079 -0.3 0.021 0.1 -0.102 •0.5 -0.104 -0.5 -0.437 -0.7
Western Siberian 0.296 1.8 0.093 0.4 -0.169 •0.5 0.162 0.7 0.160 0.7 -0.074 -0.1
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern 0.307 1.9 0.184 0.8 0.261 0.8 0.208 0.9 0.209 0.9 -0.581 -0.8
Constant -1.3 -4.8 -2.0 -5.9 -1.8 -3.9 -1.7 -5.3 -1.7 -4.9 0.3 02
Observations (#) 15595 7811 3886 7811 7811
Log likelihood______________________ -7277________ -3772 -2000_________-3870 -3870
N ol«s The dependent variable Is an Indicator variable o! w age a rrears The sam ple  Includes all w orkers with primary jobs from 1994 to 1998
922
-436
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elderly has therefore little impact on household wage income, which 
suggests that wage arrears may affect health outcomes, but not the 
other way around.9 Finally, as discussed in the next section, the 
RLMS provides reliable objective measures of the elderly’s health 
status.
7.2.3 Old Age Health
The analysis characterizes old age health in terms of inputs and 
outputs. Health inputs include intakes of food, calories, protein, 
and multivitamines, the use of medical services and medicine, and 
health behaviour.10 Calories provide the energy required to maintain 
human life. A well-balanced diet is much more than adequate energy 
intake, as protein, vitamins, and minerals are essential for ensuring 
a healthy life at old age. Caloric needs decline with age due to 
the drop in metabolic rate and the decrease in physical activity. By 
contrast, the elderly still need nearly the same amounts of important 
nutrients. The nutrient intakes are measured with a personal, 24- 
hour individual recall of food consumption, converted by researchers 
at the University of North Carolina using specifically developed food 
conversion charts. Individuals also recorded any separate intake of 
food supplements during the last 7 days.
Measures of the usage of medical services include coverage by 
medical insurance, health treatments and prescriptions in response 
to a health problem during the last month, and preventive health 
care, like check-ups, during the last year. Health behaviour refers to 
alcohol drinking and smoking, and physical exercise through walking.
The medical literature has linked malnutrition to an impairment
9While male retirement age is 60 years, I retain men aged 55 to 59 years in 
the sample for three reasons. Almost one in four men in this age bracket are 
already in retirement. In view of the low male life expectancy, including this 
subgroup almost doubles the size of the male sample from 937 to 1810. Finally, 
applying the same age-brackets for men and women makes the two samples 
more comparable with regard to age. In any case, the main findings hold also 
for men aged 60 years or older. As discussed in Section 7.4.1, the main results 
are confirmed if the sample is restricted to non-working elderly only.
10Jensen (2002) studies the link between socioeconomic status, nutrition, and 
health among the elderly using mainly the 1995 round of the RLMS.
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of cognitive functions (Kaplan et al. 2001). Wage arrears may also 
lead to psychosocial stress which negatively affects endocrine and im­
munological processes, and in turn the performance of the brain.11 
While it is not possible to separate these influences with this data 
and approach, I can derive the reduced-form impact of wage arrears 
on cognitive functions using two indicators.12 The questionnaire in­
cludes an explicit memory test which measures how much of new 
information the elderly are able to recall both immediately and de­
layed after some interval of time. The interviewer reads out ten 
words, and then asks the elderly to reproduce as many words as she 
can remember. After five minutes, the elderly are asked again to 
recall these words. This world list test gives rise a percent retained 
score, which measures the amount of information recalled after some 
time. It lies between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that the elderly re­
membered all 10 words both times. Such memory scores have been 
found be a good detector of dementia among the elderly (Schmand 
et al. 1997). In another explicit test of cognitive functions, the old 
age are asked to perform five consecutive algebraic subtractions.13 
The subtraction score equals to the integer values of 0 to 5, with 0 
indicating that the respondent gives the wrong answer at the first 
subtraction, and 5 that she gives five correct responses.
Health outcomes cover functional limitations, chest pain, memory 
scores, mortality and self-reported health status. Functional limita­
tions are measured by a summary score of the activities of daily living 
(ADL), already introduced in Section 6.4.3. The index is normalized 
between 0 and 1, and a higher value indicates more functional limita­
tions. It gives proximate descriptions of the severity of health status
11 The hypothesis is similar to the one advanced by Wilkinson (1996) that 
societal-level inequality has a direct impact on health through induced stress. 
Sapolsky (1993) shows that low-ranking male baboons have higher levels of glu­
cocorticoids, apparently as a reaction to the chronic stress they experience by 
their low status. Jensen (2001) finds that individuals who are more concerned 
about job loss have higher blood pressure and are more likely to be reporting 
chest pains and other health problems.
12The RLMS included these questions only from 1995 onwards.
13The questions states ’’Tell me, please, what is the result of one hundred 
minus seven?”, and then continues four times with this question: ’’And now 
subtract seven from this number one more time. What is the result?”.
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and the level of assistance by others required (Wolfson 2002). The 
elderly also report the incidence of chest pains during the last 12 
months. While chest pains, associated with heaviness, pressure, or 
discomfort in the chest, may have many causes, it is an important 
indicator for a potential heart condition among the elderly, a leading 
cause of mortality. I also investigate the impact of wage arrears on 
the ADL scores and survival rates in the next round.
Self-reported health is measured by a categorical variable on 
health status, ranging from very good, good, average, to bad and 
very bad. About one third of the elderly ranked their health to be 
bad or very bad, and less than one in ten as good or very good. 
As is well known, differences in perceptions and reporting biases 
may compromise the comparability of subjective health measures for 
different population subgroups. For example, subpopulations with 
lower expectations for health, such as the elderly, or with less health 
knowledge, such as those with low socioeconomic status, may actu­
ally report themselves in better health compared to observed health 
status.14 Nevertheless, such bias is less of a concern for assessing 
changes in health in response to an income shock among comparable 
subgroups. Furthermore, research shows the self-reported health is 
related to subsequent functional limitations and mortality (Deaton 
and Paxson 1998).
Overall, these indicators on nutrition, memory, health status and 
mortality, together with measures on health service utilization and 
health behaviour, provide a rich data source to explore the impact 
of wage arrears on old age health.
7.2.4 Estim ation
The estimation strategy relies on two sources of variation in the inci­
dence of wage arrears to identify the effects of non-payment of wages 
on old age health. First, there are large regional differences in wage 
arrears incidence. Non-payment of wages became systemic in some
14Sadana et al. (2002) compare age-standaxized estimates for self-reported 
health across 46 countries for people aged 65 years and older. Russia ranks as 
the fifth lowest country. However, the authors conclude that the cross-population 
comparability of the data is limited.
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regions, yet remained rare in others. While the bulk of the workers 
received wages in well-off states, the majority of workers incurred 
payment arrears in weak states. For example, out of the 32 states 
covered by the RLMS, 13 states, accounting for over two fifth of the 
workers, had wage arrears consistently below the national average. 
Second, within regions, the likelihood of incurring wage arrears var­
ied by demographic, occupational and enterprise characteristics of 
workers.
The impact of wage arrears on old age health is identified with 
propensity score matching. The basic idea of the estimation strat­
egy is to compare old age health of the elderly in households with 
wage arrears to suitable comparison elderly living in worker house­
holds without wage arrears. I use propensity scores of the probability 
of incurring wage arrears to group arrears and non-arrears observa­
tions. The identifying assumption is that there would have been 
no differences in old-age health for arrears and non-arrears house­
holds in the absence of wage arrears. The method does not require 
a structural model of wage arrears, and allows me to estimate the 
mean impacts for different population subgroups. The estimator can 
be implemented non-parametrically. The procedure removes bias in 
estimating treatment effects due to observable heterogeneity.
With wage arrears as the treatment variable, the first step in­
volves specifying the equation determining the selection into arrears 
and non-arrears status. In the generic model outlined in Chapter 
2, this corresponds to estimating Equation 2.5. The results were 
already presented in Table 7.1. Next, wage arrears are aggregated 
to the level of households. Households with wage arrears are those 
families where at least one member incurred wage arrears. Out of 
the sample of 4625 observations, 1295 are ‘arrears elderly’, 759 of 
whom are women. The propensity score for each observation is cal­
culated as predicted value of the household-level equivalent of the 
logit regression of wage arrears for workers. With more than nine 
in ten households having at most two workers, the characteristics 
of up to two workers per household are included separately. While 
household wages and income as endogenous variables cannot be in­
cluded, I add standard determinants of household resources and a 
range of individual, household and state characteristics as possible
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proxies for otherwise omitted variables. They include gender, age, 
and education of non-working elderly; household size and household 
composition; economic determinants like asset ownership, housing 
characteristics, and land use and livestock holding; and state-level 
information on government expenditures, tax revenues, tax arrears, 
and gross regional product. The model is run separately for each 
year. As shown in Table 7.2, the results broadly reflect the findings 
of the regression on the incidence of wage arrears in Table 7.1.
The estimated propensity scores are then applied to construct the 
matched samples. To ensure observations come from the same gen­
der, survey round, and age group, I split the elderly into a young (be­
low 65 years of age) and old (65 years and older) subsample, and then 
match arrears elderly to non-arrears elderly within the same gender- 
year-age group category. I use spline-smoothing, which involves fit­
ting a cubic spline of the propensity score to the outcome variable 
for the control group. Before matching, the propensity scores of 
the arrears elderly is about 0.18 points higher than for non-arrears 
elderly.15 After matching, the average propensity scores across the 
two groups almost coincide.16 FVom the initial sample, 37 out of the 
1295 treated observations cannot be matched. The matched treated 
observations comprise 734 old age women and 524 old age men.
Matching leads to close similarity across the groups. The density 
functions after matching almost coincide over the entire support (fig­
ures 7.2 and 7.3), and there are no significant differences in the mean 
values of key independent variables after matching (Table 7.3).17 Fi­
nally, per capita household income of the treatment elderly in the 
matched subsample for DIDM is one percent higher than the one of 
control elderly in the pre-intervention period.
15The estimated propensity scores for male elderly with and without wage 
arrears are, respectively, 0.414 (standard error of 0.206) and 0.241 (standard 
error of 0.160). For female elderly, the corresponding numbers are 0.406 (0.199) 
and 0.226 (0.157).
16The propensity score for both arrears and non-arrears old age men is 0.405 
(0.20), and for arrears and non-arrears old age women 0.390 (0.184).
17”Level” refers to the arrears outcome and ’’impact” to the estimated differ­
ence between the arrears and non-arrears outcome.
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Table 7.2: Household logit regression of wage arrears incidence
1994
Coef
1995
Coef
1996
Coef
1998
Coef
Demographics: H ousehold size (#) 0.006 0.0 -0.143 -1.1 -0.024 -0.2 0.163 1.2
M em bers aged 0-17 (#) 0.228 1.4 -0.043 -0.2 -0.153 -0.9 0.078 0.4
M em bers aged 18-59 (#) 0.164 1.3 0.233 1.8 -0.166 -1.4 -0.074 -0.6
Working? -0.197 -0.2 0.462 0.5 -0.650 -0.7 0.299 0.3
If not working: Male? 0.028 0.1 0.229 0.9 0.024 0.1 0.197 0.8
Age (months) 0.000 0.3 0.001 0.6 -0.001 -0.6 0.000 0.1
Education (years) -0.033 -1.1 -0.012 -0.4 ■0.013 -0.5 0.018 0.7
Housing: Living sp ace  (sq meter) -0.013 -2.0 0.008 1.4 0.005 1.0 0.009 1.4
Central heating? 0.215 0.7 -0.628 -1.7 -0.203 -0.7 0.165 0.5
Central w ater supply? 0.321 1.1 0.964 3.2 -0.055 -0.2 0.362 1.2
Hot w ater supply? -0.609 -2.8 0.395 1.6 0.434 1.9 0.497 2.0
M etered gas  or electric stove? 0.320 1.2 -0.657 -2.5 -0.579 -3.4 -0.149 -0.5
Central sew erage? 0.086 02 0.065 0.2 -0.102 -0.3 -0.789 -2.3
A sset index -0.128 -1.7 -0.276 -3.6 0.001 0.0 -0.236 •32
Agriculture: Land u se? -0.253 -12 0.569 2.6 -0.121 -0.6 0.252 1.1
Amount of land (sotkas) 0.020 3.4 -0.001 -1.3 -0.001 -0.5 0.000 0.0
Livestock? 0.199 0.8 0.473 1.9 0.406 1.7 -0.635 -2.4
First worker: Male? 0.301 1.6 0.313 1.7 0.163 1.0 0.344 1.8
Age (months) 0.000 0.4 -0.001 -0.8 -0.001 -2.3 0.001 1.0
Education (years) -0.078 -2.6 0.006 0.2 -0.003 -0.1 -0.009 -0.3
Tenure (months) 0.001 1.3 0.001 0.9 0.001 1.4 0.000 -0.1
Occupational code 0.0000 -1.0 0.0000 1.3 0.0000 0.2 0.0001 1.6
Em loyee's ownership (%) -0.196 -1.3 -0.361 -1.9 0.023 0.2 0.149 1.0
Enterprise ownership (Fully public a s  omitted category)): 
Som e public? -0.003 0.0 -0.641 -2.3 0.480 2.5 0.315 1.2
Fully private? -0.082 -0.3 -0.962 -3.2 -0.050 -0.2 -0.590 -2.0
Second worker: Another worker? 1.512 1.8 -1.542 -1.7 -1.735 -2.3 -1.332 -1.4
Male? -0.161 -0.6 0.540 2.0 0.055 0.2 1.289 4.3
Age (months) 0.002 2.2 0.002 1.9 0.000 0.1 0.001 1.6
Education (years) 0.061 1.5 -0.100 -2.3 -0.040 -1.2 -0.049 -1.1
Tenure (months) 0.001 0.8 -0.002 -1.7 0.000 -0.3 0.000 0.2
Occupational code 0.0001 1.2 -0.0001 -1.4 0.0000 -0.7 -0.0001 -2.2
Em loyee's ownership (%) 0.479 2.2 -0.065 -0.4 -0.082 -0.4 -0.416 -2.4
Enterprise ownership (Fully public a s  omitted category)): 
Som e public? 0.194 0.7 -0.201 -0.7 0.158 0.6 -0.576 -1.8
Fully private? -0.269 -0.8 0.059 0.2 0.705 2.1 -0.013 0.0
State-level: G overnm ent expenditure 0.0001 3.8 0.0001 1.7 0.00005 1.3 0.0000 -0.5
(Ruble per capita) Regional tax revenues -0.0001 -1.9 0.0004 3.4 -0.0002 -2.4 -0.0001 -1.6
Regional tax arrears 0.0004 1.2 -0.0019 -3.6 0.0000 -0.1 0.0004 3.1
Total tax revenues 0.0000 -0.7 -0.0002 -5.8 0.00002 1.1 0.0000 -0.3
Total tax arrears -0.0001 -0.7 0.0009 4.1 0.0001 0.8 0.0000 ■02
G ross regional product 0.0000 -1.0 0.00000 -0.6 0.00000 0.6 0.00001 0.4
Settlem ent type (Urban a s  omitted category): 
Suburban 0.290 0.8 1.086 2.8 0.807 2.4 1.158 3.1
Rural -0.031 -0.1 0.006 0.0 -0.048 -0.2 0.353 12
Constant -1.8 -1.2 -0.4 -0.2 2.7 2.0 -1.2 -0.8
O bservations (#) 
Log likelihood
1257
-600
1173
-532
1155
-666
1040
-523
with ekterty Iron 1994 to 1998.
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Figure 7.2: Densities of propensity scores for old age men after 
matching
Male elderly with arrears * Male elderly wilhout arrears
2 “
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Propensity score
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Figure 7.3: Densities of propensity scores for old age women after 
matching
Fem ale elderly with arrears * Fem ale eldelry without arrears
2 “
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Propensity score
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Table 7.3: Comparison of mean values of selected variables after 
matching
________Men___________   Women______
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef
(1)
t-st
(2)
Coef
(3)
SE
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-st
(6)
Coef
(7)
SE
(8)
Household size (#) 0.005 0.1 3.61 0.08 -0.037 -0.7 3.66 0.06
Working? -0.005 -0.3 0.65 0.02 -0.008 -0.5 0.27 0.02
Age (months) -1 -0.5 741 4 1 0.3 791 4
Education (years) -0.20 -1.2 9.5 0.15 0.08 0.5 8.0 0.16
Assets (0-6) 0.003 0.0 3.61 0.05 0.007 0.2 3.54 0.05
Urban -0.007 -0.4 0.380 0.02 0.008 0.5 0.388 0.02
Land (sotkas) 0.797 0.3 13.8 2.1 0.599 0.3 14.3 1.7
Livestock? -0.023 -1.0 0.393 0.02 0.018 1.3 0.407 0.02
Total tax revenues 573 1.0 17137 625 -482 -1.1 15907 430
Total tax arrears 300 1.3 4316 284 -166 -1.1 3868 189
GRP 1656 1.2 73146 1754 -1284 -1.1 70142 1243
Observations (#) 1810 2815
Notes: Elderly in arrears households are com pared with elderly in non-arrears households
according to spline-smoothing matching, based on the propensity scores derived trom the logit 
regressions ot T able 7.2.
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7.2.5 Caloric Intake o f Old Age W omen
It is useful to compare alternative estimation approaches for one spe­
cific example. The following discussion looks at the impact of wage 
arrears on the caloric intake of old age women. Table 7.4 presents 
impact estimates of non-parametric matching estimations, and Table
7.5 shows findings from parametric regression analysis.
Elderly in Worker Households
Aligning arrears elderly to non-arrears elderly of households with 
workers according to the observable characteristics listed in Table 
7.2 suggests that calories fell by 87 kcal, or about 6  percent of the 
non-arrears level (Panel A, Column 4 of Table 7.4). The differences in 
nutrition could reflect differences in economic endowments between 
arrears and non-arrears groups unrelated to wage arrears. This can 
be further explored by drawing on the longitudinal dimension of the 
data set. Panel B includes the old age women with both current 
and lagged observations. Female elderly are matched with regard to 
the same characteristics lagged by one period, in addition to lagged 
nutrition and health measures (caloric intake, functional limitations, 
obesity, chest pain, smoking and drinking). While caloric intake was 
almost identical in t-1, the wage arrears group consumed about 85 
calories less than the non-arrears group in t.
However, the persistence of wage arrears implies that already in 
t - 1  wage arrears elderly had a higher incidence of nonpayments of 
wages than the control group (Column 7 of Table 7.4). Panel C 
limits the sample to two groups: households without wage arrears 
in both periods (control group) and households without wage ar­
rears in t-1 and wage arrears in t. This corresponds to the DIDM 
estimator. As for Panel B, the groups are matched according to 
the pre-intervention characteristics, including nutrition and health 
variables. The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the 
arrears crisis the paths of caloric intake would have been the same 
for the two groups. The control group had lower caloric intake in t-1 
and higher caloric intake in t, raising the impact estimate to -135 
calories.
Panel D uses female elderly represented in three consecutive rounds
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Table 7.4: Wage arrears and caloric intake of old age women
Caloric Intake Wage Arrears Caloric Intake Wage Arrears
# t-2 t-1 t Diff. t-2 t-1 t * t-2 t-1 t Diff. t-2 t-1 t
0 ) (2) (3) w (5) (6) P) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Control group Worker households Non-worker households
A. Matching
W age arrears 734 1441 1 690 1427 1
No wage arrears 2056 1528 1053 1508
Difference -87 1 -81 1
B. Matching t-1
W age arrears 401 1501
(3.8)
1471 0.45 1 374 1297
(3.7)
1124 0.41 1
No w age arrears 997 1496 1556 0.28 401 1323 1176 0
Difference 5 -85 0.17 1 -26 -52 0.41 1
C. DID Matching
W age arrears 221 1543
(2.6)
1460 -83 0 1 227 1419
(2.4)
1110 -309 0 1
No wage arrears 801 1496 1548 52 0 396 1322 1140 -182 0
Difference 47 -88 -135 0 1 97 -30 -127 0 1
D. DID Matching
W age arrears
t-2
103 1478 1608 1483
(2.8)
-125 0 0 1 92 1530 1565 1462
(2.9)
-103 0 0 1
No wage arrears 388 1464 1629 1582 -47 0 0 231 1534 1492 1476 -16 0 0
Difference 13 -21 99 -79
11.1)
0 0 1 -4 73 -14 -87
(1.2)
0 0 1
Notes: [he calonc intake ol old age women in arrears households is compared with the one of otd age women in non-arrears
households according to spine-smoothing matching, based on the propensity scores derived trom the logrt regressions ol Table 7.2.
In columns 1 to 8, the control group are households with workers without arrears. In columns 9 to 16, the control group »  households 
matching based on without workers. Panel A applies cross-sectional matching based on characteristics at time t; Panel U applies 
cross-sectional characteristics at time t-1; Panel C applies DID matching based on characteristics at tme t-1; and Panel D applies DID 
matching based on characteristics at time t-2.
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to conduct a pre-test of the identifying assumption of the last esti­
mation. The treatment group is composed of elderly women without 
wage arrears in t - 2  and t- 1 , and wage arrears in t; and the control 
group of elderly women without wage arrears in the three periods, 
matched on the standard characteristics in t - 1  in addition to nutri­
tion and health variables in t - 1  and t-2 . Caloric intake increased for 
both groups from t - 2  to t- 1 , and then dropped sharply from t - 1  to t 
for the treatment group, and only moderately for the control group. 
This excess reduction of caloric intake is indicative of the impact of 
wage arrears.
Elderly in Non-Worker Households
The discussion so far concentrated on worker households, as only 
those could directly have been affected by wage arrears. Yet, about 
two in five elderly live in households without workers. While wage 
arrears affected only some worker households, there might have been 
other labor market specific shocks, such as job losses or falling wages, 
that affected worker households in general. Furthermore, the non­
arrears group in worker household could be contaminated by the 
arrears crisis through substitution and equilibrium wage effects. For 
example, workers in non-arrears households might have been affected 
by job losses if enterprises would have cut costs not by wage ar­
rears but by shedding labor. Comparing impact estimates across the 
worker and non-worker control group provides a simple test for the 
net effect of such influences.
There are important differences among elderly in worker and non­
worker households that have to be balanced through matching. In 
particular, elderly in non-worker households are on average about
3.5 years older, have 1.5 years less education, and have 1.5 fewer 
co-members than elderly in worker households. Since these elderly 
reside in non-worker families, I replace the worker-specific charac­
teristics of Table 7.2 with age, gender, and education characteristics 
of the working-age members in the non-worker households. Next, 
I predict the propensity score of the elderly living in non-worker 
households based on the estimated logit regressions of elderly liv­
ing in worker households, and use the propensity score to match
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the elderly living in non-worker households to wage arrears elderly. 
The results are shown in columns 10 to 16 of Table 7.4. The im­
pact estimates are broadly similar to those using worker households 
as control group, suggesting that the non-arrears elderly in worker 
households were subject to similar economic environment as elderly 
in non-worker households, or that the alternative labor market fac­
tors cancel each other out.
Regression Analysis
The matching estimator can be integrated in a parametric set-up. 
This allows the researcher to identify the impact of treatment on 
the treated over the whole support of X . In the linear specification 
Hu — Xu(3 +  otLAit +  uiti where u as error term uncorrelated to X, 
the coefficient ax, on A gives the impact of wage arrears. In order to 
focus on the within-region variation in wage receipts, the regressions 
include region and region*year indicators. The first estimation in­
cludes only basic non-income regressors, and the second adds asset 
variables. As shown in columns 1  and 2  of Table 7.5, the random- 
effects model suggests a statistically significant and negative impact 
of wage arrears on caloric intake of old age women for the sample of 
worker households.
The next estimation extends this framework to the Difference-In- 
Differences setting, where the sample is restricted to female elderly 
in worker households without arrears in both periods (the control 
group with Ai =  0 ), or arrears only in the post-intervention period 
7 =  1 (the treatment group with A* =  1). Then Hu =  Xu(3 +  
A i  +  It +  o tL o A i  * It +  u, where clld , the interaction term between 
arrears and post-intervention period, captures the arrears impact. 
The point impact estimate of wage arrears is slightly higher then 
before and statistically significant.
The last estimation regresses the change in caloric intake on 
whether female elderly went into wage arrears from pre- to post 
intervention period, and changes in all other characteristics. This 
procedure eliminates unobservable, fixed differences. The impact es­
timate is similar than before and statistically significant.
The final four regressions pursue a slightly different specification.
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Table 7.5: Regressions of caloric intake of old age women
RE RE DID FE RE IV-RE FE IV-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5) (6) (?) (8)
W age arrears -65
-2.5
-67
-2.6
-82
-1.6
-79
-2.0
Household income (per capita) 0.013
2.4
0.072
2.5
0.005
0.5
0.131
1.8
Demographics: Household size (#) 34 6 17 -126 9 28 -130 -25
1.4 0.3 0.7 -2.0 0.4 1.1 -2.0 -0.3
Members aged 0-17 (#) -36 -20 -52 112 -18 -10 113 38
-1.3 -0.7 -1.5 1.4 -0.6 -0.4 1.4 0.4
Members aged 18-59 (#) -20 -14 -12 122 -16 -24 127 49
-0.8 -0.6 -0.5 2.0 -0.7 -1.0 2.1 0.6
Working? 17 27 -4 -48 18 -14 -50 -79
0.5 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -0.9
Age (months) -0.98 -0.97 -0.92 2 -0.98 -1.02 2.40 1.38
-6.8 -6.8 -4.9 0.8 -6.9 -7.1 0.8 0.4
Education (years) 9.6 8.0 10.6 -32 7.6 5.0 -30.6 -29.6
2.9 2.3 2.6 -2.4 2.2 1.4 -2.3 -2.0
Housing: Living space (sq meter) 3 2 -1 3 2 -1 -2
2.8 1.7 -0.4 2.7 2.4 -0.4 -0.9
Central heating? -62 -7 -189 -58 -50 -189 -210
-1.1 -0.1 -1.9 -1.1 -0.9 -1.9 -2.0
Central water supply? 12 47 133 7 -3 113 110
0.3 0.8 1.3 0.2 -0.1 1.2 1.0
Hot water supply? 30 68 155 23 -2 149 81
0.8 1.6 1.8 0.6 0.0 1.7 0.8
Metered gas or electric stove? -3 16 43 2 5 52 101
-0.1 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.2
Central sewerage? -18.5 -92 -258 -19 -16 -252 -315
-0.3 -1.3 -1.6 -0.3 -0.3 -1.6 -1.8
Asset index 24 8 4 22 6 8 17
2.1 0.6 0.2 1.9 0.4 0.3 0.6
Agriculture: Land use? 7 21 -75 3 6 -83 -92
0.2 0.6 -1.0 0.1 0.2 -1.1 -1.2
Amount of land (sotkas) 0.29 0.14 0 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.17
3.4 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.7 2.2 1.5
Livestock? 92 75 101 87 77 103 78
2.3 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.9 1.2 0.8
Settlement type (Urban omitted category):
Suburban -34
-0.5
-115
-1.7
-214
-2.4
-124
-1.8
-109
-1.6
Rural 71
2.1
-33
-0.7
47
0.8
-37
-0.8
-42
-0.9
Year (1994 as omitted category):
1995 -56 -59 163 -48 -10 57
-0.6 -0.7 1.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.4
1996 -148 -147 -7 57 -145 -107 -78
-1.6 -1.6 -0.1 0.4 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6
1998 -5 -15 306 -68 8 122
Treatment group -14
-0.3
Post-intervention -5
-0.2
Observations (#) 2805 2805 2034 2805 2805 2805 2805 2805
^STegressIoosTnclude indicators for regTon^n!neg!on, yeaMn!erac!ion?l^ i^ a m p l^ ^ « s tr ic te d  to old age women in 
worker households. In Column 3, wage arrears represent the interaction of treatment group and post-intervention dummies. 
In columns 6 and 8, household income is instrumented by the wage arrears indicator.
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The idea is to identify the impact of wage arrears on caloric intake by 
capturing the variation in household income due to wage arrears. Per 
capita household income is included both directly and instrumented 
by the wage arrears indicator. In the non-instrumented version, it 
is significant in the random effects specification but insignificant in 
the fixed effects regression. Once instrumented, the coefficient is 
significant in both specifications. As shown later, wage arrears lead 
to a reduction in per capita household wages by about R900. This 
suggests a reduction of around 65 calories for the IV random effects 
regression, similar to the findings of the first two columns, and of 
around 118 calories for the IV fixed effects regression, slightly higher 
than the previous estimates.
7.2.6 A lternative M atching Functions
Table 7.6 compares the impact of wage arrears on key variables 
for cross-sectional spline smoothing matching to three other match­
ing estimations. To eliminate the impact of differential regional 
trends, one set of estimates refers to spline smoothing matching 
where treated observations are matched only to observations within 
the same state. The other two procedures are Epanechnikov kernel 
matching, which weighs control elderly according to the Epanech­
nikov function, and nearest neighbour matching, where each treated 
observation is paired with the control observation with the closest 
propensity score.
The main results are confirmed by three alternative matching 
procedures. Columns 3 and 4 refer to spline smoothing matching 
where treated elderly are matched only to elderly who reside in the 
same state. The number of matched elderly drops from 524 to 274 
for men, and from 734 to 513 for women. The estimated impacts on 
wages, caloric intake, and ADL scores are larger. With the exception 
of the female calorie coefficient, the significance of the coefficients 
is lower due to smaller sample size. The Epanechnikov approach 
(Columns 5 and 6 ) retains slightly fewer treatment observations than 
spline smoothing, and the findings are very similar. The nearest 
neighbour method (Columns 7 and 8 ) allows only matches where the 
difference in the propensity score is no larger than the absolute value
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Table 7.6: Wage arrears, wage income, caloric intake, and functional 
limitations: Matching technique
Spline sm oothing Epane- Neareast
Any state Same state chnikov Neighbor
• Coef
<1)
t-St
(2)
Coef
(3)
t-st
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-st
(6)
Coef
(7)
t-st
(8)
Old-age men
Wage per capita 
Caloric intake 
ADL
-968
-91
0.018
-20
-2.2
2.2
-1072
-92
0.031
-9
-1.6
2.0
-943
-76
0.018
-18
-2.0
1.9
-997
-94
0.016
-9.2
-1.5
1.1
Matched observations (#) 524 274 513 378
Old-age women
Wage per capita 
Caloric intake 
ADL
-896
-81
0.010
-23
-3.6
1.2
-932
-115
0.012
-17
-3.9
0.6
-925
-81
0.013
-29
-3.3
1.6
-913
-91
0.002
-12
-2.5
0.1
Matched observations (#) 734 513 729 658
Notes. Elderly in arrears households are compared with elderly in non-arrears households 
according to alternative cross-sectional matching techniques, based on the propensity scores  
derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. Columns 1 and 2 apply spline smoothing matching; 
columns 3 and 4 apply spline smoothing matching, where arrears elderly are matched to non­
arrears elderly only within the sam e state ('oblast'); columns 5 and 6 apply Epanechnikov 
matching; and columns 7 and 8 apply Neareast-Neighbor matching.
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of 0.01, which reduces the number of matched treated men to 378, 
and matched treated women to 658. Again, the impact estimates are 
comparable to the spline smoothing method.
7.2.7 Identification  
Selective Migration
Workers may seek to relocate from high- to low-arrears regions in 
search of a better job. Table 7.7 shows impact estimates of wage 
arrears on moving, attrition, and job tenure for workers living in 
households with elderly, based on the logit regressions of Table 7.1. 
Overall, about 18 percent of the workers drop out of the survey in 
the next round. About one third of them moved away, and for the 
bulk of the others the cause of the attrition is missing. 1 8  For missing 
observation and relocation, the dropout rate of workers with wage 
arrears is no higher than for those without wage arrears. Turning 
to job changes since end 1993, the beginning of the wage arrears 
crisis, more than two thirds of the workers were employed in their 
current job already before 1994. The job mobility of workers with 
wage arrears is no higher than those without wage arrears. This 
suggests that selective job switching and migration are not important 
concerns for the empirical analysis.
A number of factors can explain why selective job switching and 
migration are not important concerns for the empirical analysis. 1 9  
Why do workers not quit to take up employment at other firms? 
As mentioned above, workers in depressed areas often lack outside 
options and face high mobility costs. In addition, access to social 
services and other fringe benefits provided by the enterprise are at 
risk when changing jobs. Furthermore, in view of the general lack 
of contract enforcement, workers may fear to lose any chance to 
recover their back-wages owed when they quit the enterprise. Finally, 
resettlement is costly, both financially (about 19 in 20 elderly own 
the apartment they live in) and socially (local network of relatives,
18Information on individuals missing from the previous survey round is pro­
vided by the remaining household members. If the entire household drops out 
of the survey, then no information on the cause for attrition is available.
19They mirror those of Chapter 6.4.2.
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 Table 7.7: Wage arrears, worker attrition and job tenure
Men Women
Coef t-st Coef t-st 
_____________________________ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Moved away (t+1)? 0.011 0.8 -0.006 -0.5
Missing observation (t+1)? 0.010 0.7 -0.012 -1.1
Job tenure since end 1993? 0.015 0.8 -0.027 -1.1
Observations (#) 2556 2507
Notes: Workers with wage arrears in households with elderly are 
compared to workers without wage arrears in households with elderly 
according to spline-smoothing matching, based on the propensity 
scores derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. The coefficients 
are impact estimates of wage arrears on workers with wage arrears.
friends, and colleagues), and many households may simply not be 
able to cover the moving expenses (Andrienko and Guriev 2002).20 
These reasons are likely to be especially applicable to wage earners 
in households with elderly, as they are typically themselves either
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that trigger a rise in morbidity and mortality. First, the match­
ing procedure accounts for regional and fiscal factors ensuring that 
arrears households are paired with non-arrears households from sim­
ilar areas. Second, I study the impact of measures directly to see 
whether they can account for a lower health status of arrears elderly. 
The most obvious issue is whether additional social spending and 
pension were lost to arrears households. The RLMS reports on a 
number of such programs. As shown in the top part of Table 7.7, 
the differences in outlays between arrears and non-arrears elderly are 
too small to be economically important. The total effect on govern­
ment benefits is statistically insignificant and amounts to no more 
than one percent of household income.
Pollu tion  A further possible cause for the worsening in old-age 
health is pollution of the environment. More than two thirds of the 
Russian population five in areas affected by air pollution at levels 
that exceed health and safety standards. While as a result of the 
decline in industrial production levels of air pollution declined from 
stationary sources, the rise in the number of motor vehicles led to 
worse air quality in towns with heavy traffic. Approximately one 
third of the samples taken from piped water supplies do not meet 
hygiene standards in terms of chemical indicators (Ministry of Health 
1999).
While there is no objective information on exposure to pollution, 
the RLMS asked the elderly to assess changes in a range of envi­
ronmental factors, as shown in the bottom part of Table 7.8. The 
focus is on exploring whether the treatment elderly, compared to the 
control group, experienced an environmental deterioration that may 
have contributed to worse health outcomes. There was widespread 
concern about environmental pollution. Almost six in ten elderly at­
tributed a chronic illness of a family member to bad environmental 
conditions in their neighbourhood. In the twelve months preceding 
the survey, about one in five elderly felt that garbage collection de­
teriorated, compared to three in ten for air quality, and almost four 
in ten for water quality. About one third used a new method for 
cleaning drinking water, and one in sixteen for cleaning air. Four 
in ten elderly would be willing to pay higher taxes for clean air or
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Table 7.8: Wage arrears, government transfers and self-rated envi­
ronment_____________________________________________________
Men W om en
Coef t-st Coef t-st
(1) (2) (3) W
G o v ern m en t tra n s fe rs  (per cap ita )
All benefits 12 0.4 -16 -0.7
Pensions 23 0.8 -5 -0.2
Unemployment benefits 0 -0.1 -2 -3.7
Child benefits 0 0.0 -8 -2.8
Fuel benefits -6 -3.9 2 1.1
Apartment benefits -2 -1.2 -3 -3.3
Grants -3 -1.9 -2 -1.2
E n v ironm en t
Family member ill due to pollution? -0.059 -1.8 -0.031 -1.1
Worse garbage collection -0.010 -0.5 -0.027 -1.4
Worse air quality -0.012 -0.5 0.041 2.1
New method for cleaning air? 0.010 0.9 -0.017 -2.1
Worse water quality 0.006 0.3 -0.007 -0.4
New method for cleaning drinking water? -0.016 -0.7 -0.018 -1.0
Willing to pay tax for clean air or water? -0.029 -1.3 -0.029 -1.7
Observations (#) 1810 2815
N otes: T he elderly in arrears h o u seh o ld s  are com p ared  to th e  elderly in non-arrears 
h o u se h o ld s  accord ing to sp lin e-sm ooth in g  m atch ing, b a s e d  on  th e propensity  
s c o r e s  derived from th e  logit r eg re ss io n s  of T ab le  7 .2 . T h e  sa m p le  is restricted to  
w orker h o u seh o ld s . T he co effic ien ts  are im pact e s t im a te s  of w a g e  arrears on  the  
elderly in arrears h o u seh o ld s .
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water in return.
Compared to the control group, the elderly in wage arrears house­
holds believe that environmental conditions have either improved, or 
changed little over the 12 months preceding the survey. The only ex­
ception is air pollution, which is rated by old age women in the treat­
ment group as about 2  percent worse than by those in the control 
group. However, this deterioration did not lead arrears households 
to adopt new methods for cleaning air, suggesting that air pollu­
tion may not have worsened severely. Furthermore, the incidence of 
chronic diseases of family members due to pollution is lower than 
among non-arrears families. Finally, the arrears elderly were less 
willing to pay the government for clean air or water. This could re­
flect either a more positive evaluation of environmental conditions, 
or a reduction in demand for clean air and water due to lower house­
hold income. Overall, based on these assessments, the arrears elderly 
were not exposed to systematically higher pollution.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Economic Impact
The wage arrears crisis had a dramatic effect on living standards. Ta­
ble 7.9 displays components of per capita household income of old age 
men and women with wage arrears and the impact on the treatment 
group as identified by matching estimation. Arrears households are 
estimated to have lost about R900 to R1,000 per capita (PPP$360 
to PPP$400), or two thirds of the wage income, and over one third 
of household income. Income poverty more than doubled, implying 
that over four in ten arrears elderly had not enough resources to 
cover basic food and non-food needs. The reduction of household 
income in absolute terms was only 2  percent lower than the wage 
loss, suggesting that households were not able to compensate for re­
duced wage receipts from other sources. Turning to other sources of 
household income, as already discussed, government transfers hardly 
changed. While income from home production increased moderately, 
about two thirds of these gains were wiped out through a decline 
in financial income. Even though the absolute levels of wages and
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household income declined slightly less for women than men, the rel­
ative drop was slightly larger, and more women fell into poverty as 
they were economically less well off. Female elderly also suffered a 
larger reduction in financial income, but managed to increase home 
production about three and a half times as much as male elderly.
Table 7.9: Wage arrears and living standards (Ruble per capita)
__________ Men__________  _________ W omen_________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE 
______________________ W (2) (3)____(4) (5) (6) (7)____(8)__
Wages -968 -20 571 45 -898 -25 441 28
Government transfers 12 0.4 728 36 -16 -0.7 699 22
Home production 21 0.4 493 59 92 2.3 461 40
Financial income -12 -1.1 20 9 -63 -6.0 16 6
Income -947 -10 1813 85 -884 -14 1617 64
Income poverty (%) 0.218 10 0.416 0.020 0.254 14 0.477 0.019
Observations (#) 1810 2815
Notes: The elderly in arrears households are com pared to the elderly in non-arrears 
hou sehold s according to spline-sm oothing matching, b ased  on the propensity scores  
derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. The sam ple is restricted to worker 
households. The coefficients in colum ns 1 and 5 are the impact estim ates of w age arrears 
on the elderly in arrears households. The coefficients in colum ns 3  and 7 are the level 
estim ates for the elderly in arrears households.
7.3.2 Coping Strategies
The previous discussion suggests that households were not successful 
in mitigating the impact of wage arrears through generating income 
through other channels. Table 7.10 takes a closer look at three types 
of responses, namely labour supply, sales and borrowing, and private 
transfers. Male elderly compensated no more than 12 percent, and
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female elderly 9 percent of the wage reduction. Taking into account 
the changes in other income sources (government transfers, home 
production and financial income), the net resource loss equalled 86 
percent of the wage shocks for men and 90 percent for women.
Table 7.10: Wage arrears and household coping strategies
_________Men__________  Women_______
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Incom e with private transfers,
s a le s  and borrow ing (per capita) -831 -9.8 1873 72 -805 -12 1758 54
Em ploym ent (per worker)
Jobs (#) -0.05 -3.3 1.1289 0.01 -0.01 -1.0 1.131 0.01
Hours worked last month -9.5 -3.0 157 3 -4.0 -1.3 160 2
Hours spent working last week -3.4 -3.8 42 0.8 -1.8 -2.4 42 0.8
Private transfers
Private transfers given? -0.12 -5.4 0 .4828 0.022 -0.06 -3.2 0.465 0.018
Transfers given if given (per capita) -67 -0.8 660 78 4 0.1 585 79
Private transfers received? -0.02 -1.7 0 .0992 0.014 -0.02 -2.0 0.121 0.011
Transfers received if received (per capita) -5 0.0 624 180 -91 -0.6 545 138
Net transfers received (per capita) 80 1.7 -262 53 -9 -0.2 -202 37
S a le s  and borrowing
Sold jewelry or property? 0.010 0.9 0.3 0.021 0.005 0.5 0.317 0.016
Borrowing? 0.057 3.4 0.1851 0.017 0.050 3.1 0.205 0.013
Unpaid rent or utility bills? 0.065 3.5 0 .2252 0.016 0.057 3.8 0.236 0.016
Sales, borrowing, unpaid bills (per capita) 36 1.0 321 39 88 2.4 344 34
Observations (#) 1810 2815
Notes: The elderly in arrears households are compared to the elderly in non-arrears households according to spline- 
smoothing matching, based on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. The sample is 
restricted to worker households. The coefficients in columns 1 and 5 are the impact estimates of wage arrears on the 
elderly in arrears households. The coefficients in columns 3 and 7 are the level estimates lor the elderly in arrears 
households.
Labour Supply
Standard labour supply theory predicts that a decline in income 
should lead to a reduction in the demand for leisure and thus an 
increase in labour supply. To the extent that wage income is shared 
among household members, the wage arrears shock could affect labour 
supply of all adult members of the treatment household. In arrears 
families almost every other member is employed, and each worker
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holds about 1 . 1  formal or informal jobs. The top part of Table 7.10 
shows that total number of job holdings per worker actually declined 
in arrears households relative to non-arrears households. The drop in 
job holdings led to a reduction in the total number of hours worked 
per worker during the last month and last week (from the time use 
section of the RLMS) . 2 1  The impact was larger on male arrears el­
derly, with a per worker reduction of 0.05 jobs, and 2.5 to 3.5 week 
hours worked, compared to 0 . 0 1  jobs, and 1  to 2  week hours for 
female arrears elderly.
However, the lack of a labour supply response is likely to be 
related to the dire job market situation rather than an unwillingness 
to find jobs. Unemployment rates were close to 10 percent, and 
workers shared a pessimistic assessment of the job market. About 
two in three workers were concerned about losing their job, and seven 
in ten workers said it was ’’absolutely uncertain” or ’’fairly uncertain” 
that they would find another job in case of job loss, while only 16 
percent believed it is ’’absolutely certain” or ’’fairly certain”.
Private Transfers
If members of different households care about each others consump­
tion, a decline in income of one family should trigger an increase 
in transfers received from other households. Private transfers were 
widespread. Almost six in ten elderly lived in households that receive 
or give transfers. The vast majority of transfers occurred among fam- 
ily members and friends. Transfers given and received amounted to 
about one fifth of household income for participating families. The 
elderly gave more than they receive, so the net effect was a redistrib­
ution of income of about 1 0  percent of the elderly’s income, in many 
cases probably from parents to children.
As shown in the middle part of Table 7.10, inter-household trans­
fers declined in response to wage arrears. For the male elderly, the 
percentage giving transfers dropped by 1 0  percent more than those 
receiving transfers. In addition, in Ruble per capita, transfers given 
also fell by more than transfers received, leading overall to a net
21 Wage arrears have no impact on the number of hours worked in the job for 
which wages are outstanding.
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gain of R80, or 8  percent of the wage arrears shock. Relative to their 
male counterparts, the female elderly continued to give more, and 
give more frequently, and suffered from larger losses in transfers re­
ceived. Overall, the elderly women living in arrears households expe­
rienced a modest reduction in net transfers, so that private transfers 
provided no cushion against wage arrears. The differential impact 
on male and female elderly could reflect differences in preferences, 
like altruism of old age women, or, alternatively, a larger exposure 
to wage arrears of households that engaged in private transfers with 
female elderly.
Sales and Borrowing
Permanent income and life-cycle theories of consumption predict that 
a negative income shock should lead to dissaving or borrowing in or­
der to bring consumption in line with the lower level of permanent 
income. 2 2  Due to a legacy of high inflation, difficult economic tran­
sition and fragmented financial institutions, few Russian households 
had any savings, and most assets were held in illiquid forms like 
property. For example, less than one in 11 households report having 
any money savings. As shown in the lower part of Table 7.10, arrears 
households increased the sales of jewellery and property by about 3 
percent compared to non-arrears households, but the difference is 
not statistically significant.
Households also increase borrowing in response to arrears. Over­
all, the share of families engaged in borrowing rose by around 5 
percentage points, so that one in five arrears elderly lived in families 
who borrowed. Finally, an indirect form of borrowing is to run up 
payment arrears. The RLMS recorded whether households were in 
delay of rent and utility payments. The incidence of overdue pay­
ments increased by 6  percentage points, implying that almost one in 
four arrears elderly lived in families that owed rent and utility bills. 
Overall, sales and borrowing rose by 4 percent of the wage shock for
22While expectations are difficult to measure, two thirds of the elderly with 
arrears believed their family would live somewhat or much worse in the next 12 
months than today, and another 30 percent expected nothing to change. This 
distribution changes by little over the course of the wage arrears crisis.
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men, and 1 0  percent of the wage loss for women.
7.3.3 H ealth Impact
The preceding section documented that arrears elderly experienced 
a drop of about 40 percent of household income and a doubling of 
poverty. This section investigates the health implications of this 
income shock, in line with the analysis of Section 6.4. I take a closer 
look at health services and health behaviours in Table 7.11, at food 
and nutrition in Table 7.12 and Table 7.13, and at cognitive functions 
and health outcomes in Table 7.14.
H ealth  Service
The bulk of the health service is funded through the compulsory 
medical insurance system, which levies a 3.6 percent payroll tax for 
private sector employees, in addition to transfers from the federal 
and local budgets for the non-working population and government 
employees. Some medical institutions are also directly funded by 
the federal or local budgets, or owned and run by enterprises. As 
a result, basic health care is free of charge, even though the system 
is chronically underfunded (Gorban and Yudaeva 1999 and Davis 
2001).23
Access to health services was no worse for arrears elderly than 
non-arrears elderly. As the top part of Table 7.11 shows, about four 
in ten old age men, and two thirds of the old age women, had health 
problems during the last month. Among those, between 30 to 40 
percent received prescriptions, or went to see a doctor, most of whom 
were public doctors, and almost nobody paid for the treatment. Just 
over one in ten elderly received a general health check up over the 
last three months, and, again, most elderly did not pay. Based on 
these access indicators, the wage arrears crisis was not accompanied 
by a deterioration in health services provided to arrears elderly.
23In 1995, per capita health expenditure in the USA (US$3,756) was twenty- 
five times higher than that in Russia (US$148).
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Table 7.11: Wage arrears, health service access and health behaviour
Men W om en
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Health serv ice
Health problem last month? 0.018 0.8 0.426 0.0222 0.004 0.3 0.665 0.017
Prescription If health problem last month? -0.013 -0.4 0.386 0.033 0.005 0.2 0.318 0.020
Treatment if health problem last month? -0.006 -0.2 0.371 0.034 -0.007 -0.3 0.358 0.021
Public doctor, if treatment? 0.006 0.1 0.779 0.055 -0.017 -0.4 0.632 0.038
Paid if treatment last month? 0.002 0.1 0.044 0.023 -0.004 -0.4 0.015 0.010
Went for check-up last 3 months? -0.013 -0.8 0.124 0.015 -0.005 -0.4 0.104 0.011
Paid if check-up? -0.049 -2.3 0.021 0.021 -0.047 -1.5 0.056 0.031
Medical Insurance? 0.039 1.9 0.607 0.022 0.014 0.9 0.534 0.019
Health behaviour
Smoker? -0.011 -0.5 0.452 0.022 -0.013 -3.5 0.010 0.003
Cigarettes if smoker (# per day) -0.2 -0.5 7.2 0.4 -0.1 -1.9 0.1 0.1
Smoking (years) 0.50 0.5 28 1 -0.24 -1.5 0.7 0.2
Alcohol drinker? -0.068 -3.3 0.626 0.020 -0.028 -1.8 0.255 0.016
Alcohol consum ed if drinker (g per day) -1.8 -0.5 23 3 0.1 0.3 1 0
Walking (minutes per day) 5.3 0.6 213 10 4.2 0.5 186 7
Observations (#) 1810 2815
Notes: The elderly in arrears h ouseholds are com pared to the elderly in non-arrears households according to spline- 
sm oothina matchina. b a sed  on the orooensitv sco r es  derived from the loort rearession s of Table 7 2  T he "''"'''1”  >•
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H ealth Behaviour
Habits regarding smoking and drinking can directly impact old-age 
health. Heavy drinking and smoking contributes strongly to the risk 
of both cardiovascular diseases and accidents and poisoning, the two 
leading causes according to official mortality statistics. As shown 
in the bottom half of Table 7.11, there is a large difference between 
elderly men and women. While almost every other male elderly 
smokes, fewer than one in fifty female elderly smoke. 2 4  Elderly men 
have smoked on average for 28 years, compared to less than one year 
for elderly women. About seven in ten elderly men drink alcohol, 
compared to less than three in ten women. 2 5  Among those drinking, 
old age men drink on average one bottle of vodka every 40 days, 
compared to one bottle every three years for women.
The wage arrears crisis led to more healthy smoking and drink­
ing habits among the elderly. About one percent of men and women 
quit smoking, and 3 to 7 percent stopped drinking. Among those 
elderly who continued smoking and drinking, consumption remained 
unchanged or decreases slightly. Physical activity is another impor­
tant input into health. The only type of movement for nine in ten 
elderly was walking, which accounted for 3 to 3.5 hours during the 
day. The time spent walking increased by 5 minutes per day in 
response to wage arrears. 2 6
Overall, these findings suggest that changes in health behaviour 
may have mitigated any negative impact on nutrition and health 
outcomes from the decline in household resources, but the effect is 
likely to have been modest. The adjustments may be the direct result 
of the income shock, in order to economize expenses by cutting down 
smoking and drinking. Alternatively, they may represent a response
24By comparison, 28 percent of US men aged 45 to 64 years, and 10 percent 
of those aged 65 years and older, smoke. The corresponding numbers for elderly 
women are 23 percent and 11 percent, respectively (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention 2002).
25By comparison, prevalence of alcohol drinking in the US of those aged 55 
years and older is 57 percent for men and 40 percent for women (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2002).
26These numbers refer to 1995 to 1998 only, as the RLMS did not collect 
information on physical activity in 1994.
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to the deterioration in nutrition and health status as a result of wage 
arrears, as described in the next sections.
Food expenditure
The loss in income through wage arrears is likely to force households 
to reduce cash outlays, including food purchases. As shown in Ta­
ble 7.12, households lowered food expenditures overall and switch 
towards cheaper sources of calories. The elderly women with wage 
arrears prepared food more often at home. The elderly men cut 
back expenses on eating out by one quarter, but the coefficient is 
significant only at the 15 percent level. Both the male and female 
elderly reduced food purchases by 13 percent. These are remark­
able savings, amounting to about one quarter of the wage arrears 
shock. Furthermore, households substituted towards less expensive 
food, both across and within food categories. The share of bread in 
food purchases rose by between 4 to 5 percent, while those of sugar, 
meat and other food fall. Overall, the price of one calorie purchased 
dropped by about 10 percent for women. It fell by 5 percent for men, 
but is not significant at the 1 0  percent level. 2 7
Nutrition
A detailed breakdown of the impact of wage arrears on nutritional 
status is shown in Table 7.13. This analysis draws on comprehen­
sive food intake data based on 24-hour food recall, covering all meals 
irrespective of where they were consumed (home, work, friends, or 
school) and how they were obtained (purchase, home production, or 
donation). Caloric requirements are higher for the prime-age than 
the elderly, men than women, and the physically active than the 
physically idle. For old age men, caloric intake declined by 96 calo­
ries to 2157 calories, and for old age women by 87 calories to 1441 
calories. These levels are far below the RDA for men (2500 calories) 
and women (1950 calories) according to the average body weight
27The calculation is based on determining the caloric content of 48 purchased 
food items, drawing on information in the food conversion table developed for 
the diary section.
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Table 7.12: Wage arrears and food purchases
_________Men__________ ________ Women_______
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
J D ____ (2) (3)____ (1)______(5)___ (6) (7)____(8)_
Eating out (per capita) -30 -1.5 82 20 -2 -0.1 87 20
Food prepared at home (%) 0.002 0.4 0.775 0.006 0.012 1.9 0.795 0.006
Price per purchased calorie -0.05 -1.4 1.00 0.03 -0.10 -3.8 0.96 0.02
Food purchases (per capita) 
Of which (%):
-227 -3.3 1492 74 -204 -4.0 1314 49
Dairy -0.006 -1.2 0.087 0.004 -0.001 -0.3 0.088 0.004
Meat -0.007 -0.7 0.231 0.009 -0.023 -2.7 0.226 0.009
Fish 0.001 0.2 0.035 0.004 0.002 0.5 0.035 0.004
Potato 0.000 -0.1 0.020 0.004 -0.002 -0.9 0.015 0.003
Bread 0.040 3.2 0.290 0.011 0.052 5.1 0.298 0.011
Eggs -0.002 -0.6 0.028 0.002 -0.001 -0.4 0.028 0.002
Fat 0.000 0.0 0.095 0.006 0.005 0.9 0.102 0.005
Fruits 0.000 0.1 0.042 0.004 -0.006 -2.1 0.039 0.003
Sugar -0.017 -2.3 0.103 0.007 -0.015 -2.2 0.099 0.006
Vegetables 0.002 0.4 0.036 0.004 -0.005 -1.3 0.036 0.003
Other food -0.011 -3.7 0.033 0.003 -0.006 -1.8 0.036 0.003
Observations (#) 1810 2815
N otes: The elderly in arrea rs households a re  com pared  to the elderly in non-arrears households 
according to  spline-sm oothing m atching, b a sed  on the  propensity sco res  derived from the logit 
reg ress ions  of Table 7.2. The sam ple  is restricted to worfcer households. The coefficients in colum ns 
1 and  5 a re  the  im pact es tim ates  of w age arrea rs on the  elderly in arrea rs  households. The coefficients 
in colum ns 3  and  7 a re  the level es tim ates  for the elderly in arrea rs households.
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and age of this population.28 The decline in energy intakes implies 
a reduction in a range of nutrients. Daily intakes of protein fell by 
2.7 gram (g) to 45g for women, and 5.9g to 69g for men, relative to 
a RDA of 63g and 50g for this age group. In addition, the elderly 
suffered from multiple deficiencies in intakes of vitamins (vitamin A, 
thiamin (for women only), riboflavin, niacin, vitamin C) and min­
erals (calcium, magnesium and potassium), which were worsened by 
the dietary adjustments in response to wage arrears.29 Finally, these 
deficiencies were unlikely to be compensated through food supple­
ments. Only few elderly reported taking any during the last 7 days, 
and the arrears group had lower consumption levels than the non- 
arrears group.
Cognitive functions
The impact of wage arrears on cognitive functions is measured by 
memory and subtraction scores (Table 7.14). They change only 
slightly for men, and rise by 5 to 7 percent for women. However, 
the prevalence of dementia rises typically only from 65 years of age 
onwards (Schmand et al. 1997). If only this age group is retained, 
wage arrears had a negative impact on the cognition indicators.
Health outcomes
The middle section of Table 7.14 shows that the health status of 
the female elderly was worse than of the male elderly, with more 
functional limitations, higher chest pain incidence and lower self-
280n average, men weigh 74 kg and are 62 years of age. Women weigh 71 kg 
and are 66 years of age. The calorie allowances assume light physical activity 
and a mean environmental temperature of 20 degree of Celsius.
29The RDAs for men and women aged 51 years and older are as follows: vi­
tamin A (men: 3330 IU; women: 2664 IU); thiamin (1.2 mg, 1.0 mg); riboflavin 
(1.4 mg, 1.2 mg); niacin (15 mg NE, 13 mg NE); vitamin C (60 mg, 60 mg); cal­
cium (800 mg, 800 mg); iron (10 mg, 10 mg); magnesium (350 mg, 280 mg), and 
potassium (3500 mg, 3500 mg). The comparisons between estimated and rec­
ommended intakes have to be interpreted with caution (see footnotes in Section 
8 .2.2).
7.3. RESULTS 191
Table 7.13: Wage arrears and nutritional status
Men W om en
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) <7) (8)
Energy (kcal) -96 -2.3 2157 39.4 -87 -3.9 1441 22.3
C alorie-providing nu trien ts
Protein (g) -5.9 -4.4 69 1.4 -2.7 -3.0 45 0.9
Fat (g) -6.0 -3.0 77 1.9 -3.7 -3.4 48 1.0
V itam ins
Vitamin A (IU) -575 -2.6 1276 261 -247 -1.6 910 136
Thiamin (mg) -0.05 -2.2 1.22 0.03 -0.03 -2.5 0.80 0.01
Riboflavin (mg) -0.11 -3.1 1.14 0.04 -0.05 -2.4 0.78 0.02
Niacin (mg) -0.6 -1.9 14.5 0.3 -0.3 -1.6 9.5 0.2
Vitamin C (mg) -0.3 -0.1 58 2 -1.6 -1.2 45 1
M inerals (mg)
Calcium -47 -2.6 582 17 -21 -2.4 431 11
Iron -1.0 -2.5 16.9 0.3 -1.0 -3.7 11.7 0.2
Magnesium -11 -1.7 313 7 -8.0 -1.5 230 5
Potassium -109 -2.1 1961 41 -170 -3.7 1730 40
Food su p p lem en ts  during last 7 d ay s?
Multivitamins -0.02 -2.9 0.025 0.007 -0.02 -2.5 0.040 0.008
Separate vitamins -0 -0.3 0.021 0.006 -0.01 -1.2 0.025 0.006
Minerals -0.01 -1.6 0.006 0.003 -0 -0.7 0.010 0.004
Observations (#) 1810 2815
N otes: The elderly in arrears h ou seh old s are com pared to the elderly in non-arrears 
h ou seh o ld s  according to spline-sm oothing m atching, b a sed  on the propensity 
s c o r e s  derived from the logit regressions of Table 7 .2 . The sam ple is restricted to 
worker hou seh old s. The coefficients in colum ns 1 and 5 are the impact e stim ates  of w age  
arrears on the elderly in arrears h ou sehold s. T he coefficients in colum ns 3  and 7  are the 
level e stim a tes  for the elderly in arrears h ou sehold s.
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Table 7.14: Wage arrears, cognitive functions and health outcomes
___________ Men___________  __________W omen__________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
________________ in(2) 12! if!_!§!____ [§!_!Z!_i§]_
Cognitive functions
Memory score 0.08 0.4 6.9 0.2 0.47 2.6 6.8 0.2
Subtraction score 0.04 0.3 3.3 0.1 0.15 1.8 3.0 0.1
Health o u tcom es
ADL 0.018 2.2 0.239 0.009 0.010 1.2 0.411 0.010
Chest pain? 0.015 0.9 0.140 0.018 0.030 2.1 0.236 0.016
Self-rated health 0.07 2.6 3.1 0.02 0.02 0.7 3.4 0.02
Health ou tco m es (t+1)
ADL 0.029 2.3 0.257 0.012 -0.004 -0.4 0.395 0.011
Deceased? 0.035 2.5 0.071 0.013 0.000 0.0 0.040 0.008
Observations (#) 1810 2815
N otes: The elderly in arrears households are com pared to the elderly in non-arrears 
h ou sehold s according to spline-sm oothing matching, b ased  on the propensity 
sco r es  derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. The sam ple is restricted to 
worker households. The coefficients in colum ns 1 and 5 are the impact estim ates of w age  
arrears on the elderly in arrears households. The coefficients in colum ns 3  and 7  are the 
level estim ates  for the elderly in arrears households.
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rated health.30 Wage arrears resulted in an 8 percent increase in the 
ADL index for men, and a 2.5 percent rise for women, but only the 
rise for men is statistically significant. The effect on men is equivalent 
to the rise in ADL due to aging by 14 months. The incidence of chest 
pain rose for men and women by about 12 percent, but the coefficient 
is significant only for women. Finally, the deterioration in health was 
also reflected in a worsening of the self-rated health status, especially 
for men.
M ortality
Arguably the most severe consequence of a decline in health status 
is death. As argued by Sen (1998), long life is universally valued 
not just because of the intrinsic importance that we attach to liv­
ing, but also as a necessary requirement for carrying out plans and 
projects that we value. Furthermore, associated characteristics of 
high life expectancy, such as low morbidity and high human capital, 
are equally desirable. Mortality statistics can serve as a proxy for 
achievements in these areas (Liao et al. 1999), which are typically 
difficult to measure.
With a few adjustments, the matching approach can be used to 
investigate whether wage arrears led to increased old age mortality. 
I retain only persons with information on survival status in the next 
round, and exclude one-person households, as I cannot distinguish 
death from other reasons for attrition. This reduces sample size 
from 4625 to 3009 elderly. Due to the sampling periods for the 
RLMS rounds, I obtain approximately one-year mortality rates for 
1994 and 1995, and two-year mortality rates for 1996. By merging 
these rounds, I assume that the impact of wage arrears on mortality 
rates is not systematically different for a one-year than a two-year 
horizon.
In view of the relatively small number of reported deaths, it 
is interesting to ask whether RLMS mortality rates are similar to 
census-based statistics. Table 7.15 compares age-specific, one-year 
mortality rates in 1996, as reported by WHO, to those obtained from
30Women are on average 4 years older than men in the sample, but female 
health remains worse when I control for age differences.
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the 1994 and 1995 RLMS rounds. Both series match fairly closely, 
even though the female mortality rates for the top two age groups 
are smaller than for the census data . 3 1
Table 7.15: Comparison between WHO and RLMS age-specific mor- 
tality rates________________________________________________
55-64 ys 
(1)
65-74 ys 
(2)
75+ys 
(3)
1996 WHO
Male 0.036 0.063 0.136
Female 0.013 0.031 0.114
1994 -1996 RLMS
Male 0.032 0.050 0.140
Female 0.017 0.018 0.075
Source: RLMS (1994 to 1996); WHO (2000).
The mortality rate between t and t+1 is determined not just by 
economic factors and current health behaviours, but also linked to 
the stock of health, which reflects the entire history of past health 
inputs and behaviours. The results are shown in the bottom part of 
Table 7.14. Wage arrears increased the probability that an elderly 
dies between two rounds from 3.6 to 7.1 percent for men, whereas 
there was no impact on women. The impact on men is about equiv­
alent to the difference in mortality rates between smokers and non- 
smokers. Similarly, among the elderly who survived until the next 
round, the ADL index deteriorated for men from 0.23 to 0.26, but 
the functional limitations of women were unaffected.
31 The comparison is only approximate, as the WHO series gives crude death 
rates (number of deaths in a population in a year by the total population) and 
the RLSM probabilities of death (number of deaths between two surveys relative 
to the starting size of the population).
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7.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The results so far have demonstrated a consistent deterioration in 
economic and health status of male elderly. The impact on female 
elderly was limited to income, nutrition and chest pains. A number 
of issues require further exploration, including the heterogeneity of 
impacts across subsamples, the definition of wage arrears and DIDM 
estimation.
7.4.1 Subsamples 
Non-working elderly
The total sample contains both working and non-working elderly. It 
is worthwhile to confirm the main results for the non-working sub­
sample for two reasons. First, it ensures that there is no feedback 
from the health status of the elderly to the likelihood of being paid 
wages. Second, working elderly are on average 7.5 years younger 
than non-working elderly, 3 2  and age is itself a key determinant of 
health. Table 7.16 shows the impact estimates for the main eco­
nomic, nutrition, cognitive and health variables for the non-working 
sample only. The male sample is reduced by about 60 percent, and 
the female sample by 30 percent. Without working elderly, the share 
of wage earners among all household members drops by 1 0  percent. 
The absolute size of the wage arrears shock is somewhat smaller, 
even though it is larger as percentage of wage income. Household 
income declined by more than wages, in particular for men, indicat­
ing a failure of arrears households to compensate for wage arrears 
through other income sources.
For women, the impacts on caloric and protein intakes, cognitive 
and ADL scores, chest pains in the last 12 months and self-rated 
health are similar compared to the joint sample of working and non­
working elderly together. By contrast, the impact on the nutrition, 
cognitive functions and health of non-working elderly men are worse 
than for the full sample. Caloric intake dropped more than three 
times as much and protein intake by about twice as much. Mem-
32The correlation coefficient of years of age and non-working is 0.44.
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Table 7.16: Wage arrears and economic and health status: non- 
working elderly only__________________________________________
_______ Men__________   Women
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef
0 )
t-st
(2)
Coef
(3)
SE
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-st
(6)
Coef
(7)
SE
(8)
Economic sta tus (per capita)
W ages -880 -12 355 65 -799 -27 336 27
Income -1010 -10 1422 109 -846 -16 1375 50
Nutrition
Caloric intake -290 -4.7 1821 59 -86 -3.2 1395 27
Protein intake -9.7 -4.8 58 2 -2.3 -2.3 43 1.0
Cognitive functions
Memory score -0.04 -2.0 0.29 0.02 0.01 1.2 0.30 0.01
Subtraction score -0.40 -2.1 2.91 0.2 0.17 2.0 2.6 0.1
Health outcom es
ADL 0.024 1.1 0.362 0.023 0.011 1.2 0.469 0.010
Chest pain? 0.026 0.7 0.216 0.037 0.028 1.5 0.267 0.021
Self-rated health 0.05 0.7 3.4 0.1 0.01 0.3 3.6 0.039
Health outcom es (t+1)
ADL 0.057 2.0 0.393 0.026 -0.005 -0.4 0.447 0.016
D eceased? 0.041 1.2 0.103 0.030 0.00 -0.3 0.054 0.013
Observations (#) 710 1983
N otes: T h e  elderly  in a r re a rs  h o u s e h o ld s  a re  c o m p a re d  to  th e  elderly  in n o n -a rrea rs  h o u s e h o ld s  
accordina to sDline-smoothina matchina. based on the DroDensitv scores derived from the loait
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ory and subtraction scores deteriorated by between 1 0  to 2 0  percent. 
This effect is remarkable, as it is not in response to a personal eco­
nomic shock, but to wage arrears of another household member. 
Functional limitations rose by 30 percent and chest pain incidence 
during the last 12 months by 70 percent. The detrimental impact on 
health persisted to the next round. The ADL score was about twice 
as large as for the full sample, and the absolute change in mortality 
was almost 2 0  percent greater.
The finding of larger impact estimates for the non-working elderly 
men relative to the entire sample of male elderly could have two 
possible explanations. It could suggest a greater vulnerability of 
health to income shocks at older age. 3 3  Alternatively, it may indicate 
that households do not share resources equally. For example, non­
working elderly could suffer disproportionately from the wage arrears 
shock, perhaps to protect the health status and productivity of the 
working members of the households, 3 4  or due to a weak bargaining 
position.
Elderly without medical insurance
The results of Section 7.3.3 suggest that the deterioration in health 
status of arrears elderly was not linked to worse access to health ser­
vices, the elderly without medical insurance present a particularly 
vulnerable group. Compared to those with medical insurance, they 
five in households with 1 0  percent more members, have about 1 0  
percent less assets, are about 2  years older, and have between one 
to two years less education. These factors indicate that these el­
derly may be disadvantaged in dealing with an income shock. This 
is borne out in Table 7.17, which shows impact estimates, based on 
matching arrears elderly without medical insurance to non-arrears 
elderly without medical insurance. For men, the reduction in wages 
and income is lower than for the full male sample. Nevertheless, the 
impact on nutrition, cognitive functions and health is consistently
33The average age of elderly men in arrears households increases from 61.8 
years to 66.2 years when working male are dropped.
34The models of Ray (1998) and Miguel (2003) highlight the desirability of 
unequal resource distribution in case of need in order to sustain a minimum level 
of productivity of at least some household members.
198 CHAPTER 7. THE ELDERLY AND WAGE ARREARS
larger, with the exception of next round’s ADL score. As before, 
women displayed a lower sensitivity to the income shock than men. 
The drop in wages and income was somewhat larger than for the en­
tire female sample, as was the impact on nutrition and health, while 
the changes of cognitive functions were insignificant. Furthermore, 
there was no evidence for worse female health in the next survey 
round.
Table 7.17: Wage arrears and economic and health status: elderly 
without medical insurance and obese female elderly______________
_Elderly without m edical insurance_____________________
____________ M en________________________ W om en_________________O b ese w om en_______
Impact Level Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) M (5) (6) I7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
E conom ic status (per capita)
W age -830.7 -11 589.3 88 -947.2 -22 385.1 42 -756 -12 447 56
Income -816.9 -6 1932 131 -1145 -12 1596 91 -692 -6 1742 129
Nutrition
Caloric intake -234.8 -3.9 2039 71 -114 -2.8 1410 40 -74 -1.9 1496 35
Protein intake -8.7 -3.9 66 3 -2.6 -1.8 44 1.4 -1.7 -1.2 47 1.54
Cognitive functions
Memory score -0.04 -2.5 0.31 0.02 0.01 0.9 0.29 0.01 0.023 1.6 0.36 0.013
Subtraction score -0.03 -0.2 3.0 0.2 0.03 0.2 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.2 0.1
Chest pain? 0.041 1.6 0.145 0.026 0.025 1.2 0.232 0.024 0.045 1.5 0.286 6.028
Subjective health 0.169 3.1 3.178 0.055 0.040 1.0 3.524 0.039 0.053 1.3 3.43 0.043
Health outcom e (t+1)
ADL (t+1) 0.011 0.5 0.278 0.023 0.000 0.0 0.419 0.016 0.005 0.3 0.418 0.018
Mortality rate (t+1) 0.043 2.0 0.080 0.023 -0.003 -0.3 0.040 0.013 0.018 1.4 0.030 0.013
Observations (#) 736 1259 1381
Notes: The elderly in arrears households are compared to the elderly in non-arrears households according to spline- 
smoothing matching, based on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. In columns 1 to 8. the 
sample Is restricted to the elderly without medical insurance in worker households; and in column 9 to 12, to the obese 
elderly In worker households. The coefficients in columns 1, 5 and 9 are the impact estimates ot wage arrears on the elderty 
in arrears households. The coefficients in columns 3, 7 and 11 are the level estimates tor the elderly in arrears households.
Obese old age women
Obesity is extremely common among Russian old age women. Two 
in five female aged 55 years or older are obese.35 Obesity aggravates
35By comparison, the prevalence of obesity among US women aged 55 years 
and older is 27 percent (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002).
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cardiovascular disease and osteoarthritis and increases the liability to 
hypertension and certain types of cancer (Burton and Foster 1988).
Obesity is not correlated with low socioeconomic status. Obese 
women have similar household income, assets and education, and are 
about 2.5 younger than non-obese women. Column 9 to Column 12 
in Table 7.17 show impact estimates of wage arrears for the group of 
obese women living in households with wage arrears, when matched 
to obese women in non-arrears households. Obese women experi­
enced a lower resource shock than the full female sample, with im­
pacts on wages and income about 15 to 25 percent lower. While the 
impact on nutritional status was slightly lower than before, the cog­
nitive indicators no longer improved. More importantly, the negative 
impacts on health outcomes were larger, and statistically significant 
for ADL score, and marginally significant for chest pains in the last 
12 months and self-rated health. Wage arrears also led to higher 
mortality among obese females in arrears households by the next 
survey round . 3 6  These findings document a specific vulnerability of 
obese female elderly to wage arrears.
7.4.2 Definition o f Wage Arrears
The concept of wage arrears employed in the analysis combines two 
dimensions: being owed wages, and not having received any wages 
during the last 30 days. Any household with at least one worker 
who is owed wages and did not receive any wage payment during the 
last 30 days is classified as arrears household. Other families with 
at least one worker are non-arrears households. Table 7.18 displays 
impact and level statistics on dimensions of wage arrears. The arrears 
elderly lived in household whose wage arrears were 40 percent higher 
in terms of the outstanding monthly wage payments per capita, 70 
percent higher in terms of the number of workers with wage arrears in 
the household, and more than double the amount of wage arrears in 
Ruble per capita. For example, while arrears households were owed 
on average R2800 per capita, the matched non-arrears group was
36The detrimental effect of obesity on longevity is an important reason why 
obesity is rarely found among the very old (Burton and Foster 1988).
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owed about R1400 per capita.37 While only one in four workers in 
arrears households received wage payments during the last 30 days, 
about 19 in 20 workers did so in non-arrears households. Thus, 
the main concern with regard to the wage arrears definition is that 
the non-arrears group contains many elderly living in households 
with outstanding wage claims. Including these persons may result 
in lower impact estimates as it blurs the distinction between arrears 
and non-arrears groups.
Table 7.18: Definition of wage arrears: wages owed and wage pay- 
ments in last 30 days__________________________________________
Impact Level
Coef t-stats Coef SE
(i) (2)
Past wage arrears
Month per capita 0.45 6.6 1.5 0.06
Ruble per capita 1482 12 2899 118
# per worker 0.34 19 0.83 0.01
No wage payment last 30 days
# per worker 0.75 120 0.80 0.01
Observations (#) 4625
Notes: The elderly in arrears households are compared to the elderly in non-arrears
households according to spline-smoothing matching, based on the propensity 
scores derived from the logit regressions of Table 7.2. The sample is restricted to 
worker households. The coefficients in Column 1 are the impact estimates of wage 
arrears on the elderly in arrears households. The coefficients in Column 3 are the 
level estimates for the elderly in arrears households.
Table 7.19 presents the impact estimates when the arrears elderly 
are matched only to the elderly from households without any out­
standing back-wages. The number of control elderly declines from 
3300 to 1940, while the number of treatment elderly stays the same.38
37On a non per-canita basis, these amounts are equal to 5.1 monthly waffes
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The size of the wage arrears shock was about 20 percent larger than 
for the whole sample. As before, households could not successfully 
compensate the wage shortfall through other means, and household 
income contracted by slightly more than wages. The impacts on nu­
trition, cognitive functions, chest pains and self-rated health were 
worse for men than women, while other indicators were similar. The 
effects on women’s health were comparable to those measured be­
fore, with the exception of higher effects on chest pains and self-rated 
health. These results imply that using the full control group leads 
to lower, or similar, impact estimates compared to a control group 
that contains only elderly from households without outstanding wage 
claims.
7.4.3 Difference-In-Differences M atching
The matching techniques used so far have not exploited the panel di­
mension of the data set. Difference-In-Differences Matching (DIDM) 
is a modified version of cross-sectional matching drawing on the sam­
ple of elderly with observations in two consecutive rounds. Arrears 
elderly five in households with no wage arrears in the initial (pre­
arrears or pre-intervention) period and wage arrears in the subse­
quent (post-arrears or post-intervention) period. The control group 
contains the elderly without wage arrears in either pre- or post­
arrears period. As with simple matching, treated observations are 
matched to non-treated observations using propensity scores. To en­
sure that the matching is not affected by the assignment to arrears 
status, the propensity scores are based on the characteristics of the 
pre-intervention period only. Separate regressions are run for the 
pairs of elderly from 1994 to 1995, and those from 1995 to 1996 and 
1996 to 1998.
Since the data requirements are more stringent than in cross- 
sectional matching, there is a loss of sample size. In addition, DIDM 
estimation relies on a comparison of the change from pre- to post­
intervention period of the treatment group relative to the control 
group, which implies that only one impact estimate is derived for
pie as the matching procedure results in a slight variation in the number of 
matched treatment elderly.
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Table 7.19: Wage arrears and economic and health status: control 
group without outstanding wage claims_________________________
____________Men___________  Women__________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef
(1)
t-st
(2)
Coef
(3)
SE
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-st
(6)
Coef
(7)
SE
(8)
Economic status (per capita)
Wage -1152 -24 574 41 -1100 -25 438 36
Income -1220 -15 1814 74 -1154 -16 1651 56
Nutrition
Caloric intake -108 -2.4 2148 42 -78 -3.0 1447 24
Protein -5.6 -3.6 69 1 -3.0 -3.6 44 1
Cognitive functions
Memory score -0.01 -1.0 0.34 0.01 0.01 1.8 0.34 0.01
Subtraction score -0.29 -2.5 3.3 0.1 -0.01 -0.2 3.0 0.1
Health outcomes
ADL 0.017 1.7 0.237 0.010 0.006 0.8 0.409 0.008
Chest pain? 0.029 2.1 0.139 0.015 0.049 2.9 0.244 0.015
Self-rated health 0.14 5.0 3.1 0.0 0.05 1.9 3.4 0.0
Health outcomes (t+1)
ADL 0.031 2.2 0.254 0.013 -0.011 -1.1 0.407 0.011
Mortality 0.028 2.0 0.069 0.015 0.003 0.3 0.043 0.009
Observations (#) 1218 1909
N otes: T he elderly in arrears h o u seh o ld s  are com pared  to the elderly in non-arrears 
h o u seh o ld s  iwithout p ast w a g e  cla im s according to sp line-sm ooth ing  m atching, b a sed  
on  th e propensity s c o r e s  derived from the logit reg ress io n s of T able 7 .2 . T he sa m p le  is
restricted to worker h o u seh o ld s. T he coeffic ien ts in co lum n s 1 and 5  are the im pact 
e st im a te s  of w a g e  arrears on the elderly in arrears h ou seh o ld s. T he coeffic ien ts in 
colum n 3  and 7  are th e level e s t im a te s  for th e elderly in arrears h o u seh o ld s.
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each pair of observations. The sample contains 1662 pairs of elderly 
with relevant information on pre- and post-arrears periods. Of these, 
1 0 2 2  are women, of whom 2 2 1  are in the treatment group (no ar­
rears in the pre-intervention period and arrears in post-intervention 
period), compared to 640 men, of whom 154 belong to the treatment 
group. Furthermore, 8  of the treated women, and 9 of the treated 
men, cannot be matched. Overall, compared to cross-sectional match­
ing, the DIDM sample size drops from 4625 to 1662 for the entire 
sample, from 1295 to 375 for the treatment sample, and from 1232 to 
358 for the matched treatment sample. Compared to cross-sectional 
matching, DIDM is based on only 30 percent of the number of impact 
estimates.
Table 7.20 present impact estimates based on DIDM estimation, 
in line with Equation 2.18. The identifying assumption is that the 
matched control group evolve from the pre- to post-arrears period in 
the same way as the treatment group would have done in the absence 
of arrears. For male elderly, wages contracted by around 20 percent 
more than for cross-sectional matching, while income dropped by 
about the same. The reduction in caloric intake was larger, but 
statistically insignificant, and contemporaneous and future health 
outcomes were worse. For female elderly, wages dropped by about 
the same as before, whereas income fells by about 15 percent less. 
Nevertheless, the nutritional and health impacts were slightly larger, 
with the exception of chest pains incidence during the last 1 2  months, 
which were unchanged. As before, the next round’s ADL scores and 
mortality are not significantly different from zero, and the coeffi­
cient on mortality is negative. 3 9  Overall, compared to the estimates 
from cross-sectional matching, the impact estimates are remarkably 
similar, and even larger for some indicators, although they are less 
statistically significant due to lower sample size.
39Since the RLMS provides no information on cognitive functions in 1994, 
the sample size for the cognitive indicators is reduced to 159 matched arrears 
women, and 97 matched arrears men. The estimated impacts are all insignificant. 
However, if I consider the subsample of non-working elderly, which reduces the 
number of the matched treated by 50 percent, the memory score deteriorates sig­
nificantly for men (0.085 with t-statistics of 2.2) but not for women (-0.029 with 
t-statistics of 1.3), while the changes in the subtraction score are insignificant.
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Table 7.20: Wage arrears and economic and health status:
Difference-In-Differences matching____________________________
Men Women
Coef t-st Coef t-st
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic status (per capita)
Wage -1157 -4.3 -796 -4.4
Income -1160 -5.5 -878 -5.8
Nutrition
Caloric intake -128 -1.0 -135 -2.7
Protein -4.9 -1.2 -2.9 -1.2
Health outcomes
ADL 0.030 2.1 0.018 1.5
Chest pain 0.054 1.0 -0.012 -0.3
Self-rated health 0.097 1.9 0.088 1.8
Health outcomes (t+1)
ADL 0.036 2.6 0.008 0.6
Mortality 0.054 2.0 -0.019 -1.2
Observations (# pairs) 640 1022
Notes: The elderly in arrears households are compared to 
the elderly in non-arrears households according to spline- 
smoothing difference-in-differences matching. The
propensity scores are based on the characteristics at t-1, 
derived from the specification of the logit regressions of 
Table 7.2. The sample is restricted to worker households. 
The coefficients are the impact estimates of wage arrears 
on the elderly in arrears households.
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7.5 Conclusion
The chapter has investigated the relationship between economic and 
health status at old age using the example of the wage arrears crisis 
in Russia during the mid-1990s. The analysis has illustrated that 
economic factors can be forceful determinants of welfare and health 
even at old age. Households with wage arrears saw salaries dropping 
by almost two thirds, income falling by more than one third, and 
poverty doubling. Behavioural responses to compensate for the in- 
come drop through higher labour supply, durable sales, or borrowing 
were mostly ineffective due to tight labour markets, low asset hold­
ings, and declining intrarhousehold transfers. The net revenue loss 
amounted to just over five sixth of the wage shocks for men, and 
nine tenth of the wage decline for women.
Elderly cut back on food expenses by reducing food purchases and 
eating out and adjusting the diet towards cheaper calories, economis­
ing expenditures equal to about one quarter of the wage reduction. 
As a result, caloric and protein intakes dropped, although substan­
tially less than household income, and the nutritional content of the 
food consumption with regard to vitamins and minerals worsened. 
Old age health indicators also declined, including functional limita­
tions and mortality between survey rounds.
Wage arrears had a larger impact on male health than on female 
health, even though the income shock was comparable. Protein in­
take dropped by 8  percent for men and 6  percent for women, and 
ADL scores rose by 8  percent for men and 3 percent for women. In 
addition, the negative health impact of wage arrears persisted over 
time for elderly men, but not for elderly women. Old age men living 
in arrears households were almost twice as likely to die, and func­
tional limitations of surviving male elderly rose by over 1 0  percent. 
By contrast, there was no impact on mortality and next round’s 
ADL scores among old age women. Remarkably, the changes in 
self-rated health are consistent with gender differences of objective 
indicators. Self-rated health worsened by 2.5 percent for men, and 
only by 0.5 percent for women. The worse impact of wage arrears on 
male rather than female health status is consistent with the evidence 
on changes in the health of the Russian population during the 1990s.
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One possible explanation for the differential gender impact is health 
behaviour. Men’s past and present drinking and smoking habits are 
systematically more unhealthy.
There is little evidence that alternative explanations can account 
for the findings, including access to health service, environmental 
conditions, drinking, smoking, and physical exercise, other economic 
factors, and feedback from health to income. While the point esti­
mates vary, wage arrears worsen health outcomes over various esti­
mation techniques and sample restrictions. The detrimental impact 
of wage arrears is similar or even larger for elderly without med­
ical insurance, obese women, or when the control group contains 
only those elderly who live in households with no outstanding wage 
claims. For these subgroups, there is also a negative impact on male 
but not female cognitive scores. They fell by 12 percent for men and 
rose by 4 to 7 percent for women. Among vulnerable groups (el­
derly without medical insurance, obese women), health outcomes of 
elderly women deteriorate more consistently than for the full female 
sample, even though the impact remains less than for elderly men.
Chapter 8 
Children and Wage Arrears
8.1 Introduction
Improving child health is one of the eight goals of the Millennium 
Declaration adopted unanimously in September 2000 by the mem­
bers states of the United Nations. Child health has a central role for 
individual well-being, as the first few years of life are essential for 
the later physical, mental and emotional development of a person. 
Temporary shortfalls in health or nutrition can have lasting and irre­
versible effects when occurring during childhood. Differential health 
investments may even lead to poverty and disadvantage transmitted 
across generations, as children of poor parents receive worse health 
investments, which in turn may reduce future earnings capacity.
While it has long been known that great health disparities ex­
ist between rich and poor countries (Grossman 1972), the focus 
has shifted more recently to establishing the within-country cor­
relation between socioeconomic status (SES) and child health. In 
nearly every country for which data are available, children residing 
in households with low income, asset, or education have worse health 
than those children who are better-off (Gwatkin 2002, Wagstaf 2000, 
Menon et al. 2000, and Pradhan et al. 2003). Poor child health 
can result from unhealthy environments, insufficient or unaffordable 
health care, unhealthy behaviours, or lack of food (Allen and Gille­
spie 2001, World Health Organization 1999, and Lavy et al. 1996). 
But what is the role of household income? Does a negative income
207
208 CHAPTER 8. CHILDREN AND WAGE ARREARS
shock lower child health? Can access to free health care and afford­
able nutrition limit the impact of less income? Since alternative 
channels suggest different policy responses, understanding the im­
portance of household resources for child health is obviously impor­
tant.
A number of papers have investigated how changes in economic 
conditions affect health status, but much of the research fails to 
identify an exogenous source for the variation in income (Strauss 
and Thomas 1995). Most studies use reduced-form estimations, with 
only exogenous variables on the right-hand side and provide an es­
timate on the net impact of the exogenous factors. However, in a 
dynamic setting, income, consumption, or assets are endogenously 
determined, and well-off households typically adopt more healthy 
behaviours, and live in areas with a cleaner environment, safer water 
and better health care. This raises the possibility that the estimated 
effects of household resources on child health are likely to be biased 
by the omission of unobserved household or community features. 1
Only few papers have explicitly looked at the impact of income 
shocks on child health. Foster (1995) develops a model of weight 
changes in Bangladeshi children as a result of a weather shock. He 
finds that weight growth for children in landless households was re­
duced in the aftermath of flooding by credit market imperfections. 
Similarly, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) show that drought can lead 
to lower child growth. Duflo (2000) analyses the impact of the South 
African pension program to elderly Africans. She argues that pen­
sions received by women led to a large improvement in the anthro­
pometric status of girls, and an insignificant amelioration of boys’ 
health, but found no effect of the pensions paid out to men.
This chapter follows Duflo (2000) in investigating the impact of 
an exogenous variation to household income on child health. As 
in Chapter 7, wage arrears are the source of the negative income 
shock. During the wage arrears crisis in Russia in the mid-1990s, 
between one third to three fifths of families with young children
1For example, Thomas et al. (1990) conclude that controlling for observed 
community characteristics, the estimated effect of household per capita income 
on child health becomes insignificant.
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suffered from non-payment of wages. 2  Applying matching estimation 
to a nationally representative survey, the study investigates a wide 
range of economic and health measures for children. 3  The analysis 
shows that the welfare of children deteriorates as a result of wage 
arrears.
The reasons for using matching estimation as evaluation method 
are analogous to Chapter 7. To reiterate briefly, matching has im­
portant advantages over regression estimation, as it does not rely on 
a specific functional form, ensures a careful matching of each arrears 
child with comparable non-arrears children and eliminates any ar­
rears children whose observable characteristics fail to match those of 
non-arrears children. Under the assumption of no selection on unob­
servables, matching identifies the impact of wage arrears on children 
with wage arrears. By drawing on firm and regional characteristics, 
the matching procedure ensures that arrears and non-arrears chil­
dren are placed in a common economic and geographic environment. 
Since the anthropometric indicators of children vary by age, I em­
ploy Mahalanobis-matching to obtain a close matching of children by 
age. Similar to Chapter 7 ,1 will also present impact estimates based 
on difference-in-differences matching. The principal advantage of 
this approach is that it allows for selection into arrears status based 
on unobservable fixed effects. However, since the wage arrears cri­
sis affected a significant proportion of the labour force throughout 
the time period under consideration, difference-in-differences match­
ing relies on only half the number of impact estimates compared to 
cross-sectional matching.
Since the incidence of wage arrears is not affected by the health 
status of children in working families, there is no concern about 
contamination of the estimates through a feedback from health to
2Child welfare developments in Russia during the 1990s are analysed in World 
Bank (2002a).
3At least two other papers have recently used matching techniques to look 
at determinants of child health. Jalan and Ravallion (2003) apply propensity 
score matching to cross-sectional data to establish that the prevalence and du­
ration of diarrhea among children under five in rural India are signficantly lower 
for families with piped water than for other families. Galiani et al. (2002) 
use difference-in-differences matching of municipalities in Argentina and estmate 
that child mortality dropped in areas that privatized water services.
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economic status. However, worse child health and high wage arrears 
could both be triggered by a third factor. For example, structurally 
weak regions, sectors and enterprises could have been affected more 
by the non-payment crisis of wages and at the same time have worse 
child health outcomes. I exploit a rich data set to rule out that issues 
like pension arrears, access and quality of health services, variation 
in regional living standards, and environmental conditions account 
for differences in child welfare.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next sec­
tion introduces the data set, lays out the estimation strategy, ex­
plains the choice of the sample, and explores key identification is­
sues. Section 8.3 presents impact estimates of wage arrears on chil­
dren living in arrears households. It discusses the effects on economic 
well-being, including coping mechanisms and health status, covering 
access to health service, health behaviour, nutrition and anthropo­
metries. Section 8.4 scrutinizes the main findings with regard to 
subsamples, wage arrears definitions and estimation techniques. The 
final section concludes.
8.2 Methodology
8.2.1 Sample
Children living in households with workers constitute the focus of 
the analysis. The 1994 to 1998 rounds of the RLMS provide 2797 
observations on children under the age of 7 years, of which 2532 have 
information on anthropometric status. The same definition of wage 
arrears as in Chapter 7 is used. A household is a wage arrears house­
hold if at least one of its members has wage claims outstanding and 
has received no wage payments during the last 30 days. Applying 
this concept, there are 820 children who five in households with wage 
arrears (the treatment or arrears group), and 1977 children who re­
side in households without wage arrears (the control, comparison or 
non-arrears group).
To account for gender differences in child welfare, I will present 
separate statistics for the 408 arrears boys and 412 arrears girls. 
Since Russian fam ilies are small, the bulk of the boys and girls come
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from different families. Only one in four families have more than one 
child under the age of 7, and only 15 percent of the sample come 
from families with children from both sexes under the age of 7  years.
The analysis focuses on the health status of children less than 7 
years of age for three reasons. First, in view of the changing pathways 
between economic and health status over the lifetime (Smith and 
Kington 1997), it is useful to focus on one particular age group. 
Second, as argued in the introduction, health outcomes in the first 
years of life are especially important, as they affect a person’s health 
status throughout the entire fife cycle. Finally, as discussed in the 
next section, the RLMS provides reliable measures of child health.
8.2.2 Child H ealth
The analysis characterizes child health in terms of inputs and out­
puts. Health inputs include food consumption, as measured by food 
expenditures, intakes of calories, protein, fat, vitamins and miner­
als, breast-feeding and food supplements; the use of medical services 
and medicine; health behaviour; and (as input into growth status) 
sickness. Health outputs comprise height-for-age (HFA), weight-for- 
height (WFA), and the derived indicators of stunting and wasting.
Anthropometric Status
Health outcomes are based on anthropometric measures. Growth 
assessment is considered as the best single measurement to define 
the health and nutritional status of children (World Health Organi­
zation 1995). Accumulated episodes of disturbances in health and 
nutrition, regardless of whether they axe the result of unsatisfactory 
food intake or disease, invariably affect child growth. These condi­
tions, in turn, are closely finked to the general standard of living and 
whether a population is able to meet its basic needs such as food, 
housing and health care. Growth retardation in childhood has been 
associated with increased mortality, low cognitive ability, poor mo­
tor development and other impairments in function (World Health
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Organization 1999 and Allen and Gillespie 2001 ) . 4  Growth assess­
ment thus serves as a means for evaluating the health and nutritional 
status of children, just as it also provides an indirect measurement 
of the quality of life of an entire population.
The perhaps most common anthropometric measures of child 
growth status are height-for-age (HFA) and weight-for-height (WFH) 
(Alderman 2000). They are typically expressed as z-scores derived 
with reference to a standard growth curve, as adopted by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) , 5  that establishes the potential upper 
mean limit, and serves a benchmark to measure the impact of nutri­
tional, economic, or any other environmental factors that prevent the 
child to reach full growth potential. HFA is obtained by subtract­
ing each child’s height from the median reference standard and then 
dividing this difference by the standard deviation of the reference 
distribution for a given age and gender. Stunting is defined as the 
incidence of ‘small’ children whose HFA is less than -2, and wast­
ing as the incidence of ‘low-weight’ children whose WFH is less than 
-2 . Stunting is a summary measure of longer-term cumulative nutri­
tional status, or chronic malnutrition. Wasting reflects the result of 
recent undernourishment that has caused tissue loss but has not yet 
affected stature, and is viewed as indicator of acute malnutrition. In 
the empirical findings, I will present both the average z-scores for 
the population under consideration, and the percentage below the 
cutoff level of standard deviations. However, the discussion will con­
centrate on the changes in the shares of stunting and wasting as they 
capture growth shortfalls that endanger child health.
In Russia, 12.5 percent of children less than 2 years of age are 
stunted, compared to 10.5 percent of those less than 4 years of age, 
and 8.7 percent of those less than 7 years of age. By contrast, wast­
ing rates show less age-dependency once children have grown out of 
infancy. Wasting prevalence declines from 3.6 for children less than 
12 months of age to between 2.4 to 3.1 percent for children between
4For example, Pelletier and FYongillo (2002) use cross-country data to demon­
strate that improvements in general malnutrition have a statistically significant 
effect on changes in child mortality.
5The data is compiled by WHO and the National Center for Health Statistics 
(USA) (www.who.int/nutgrowthdb/reference.html).
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less than 2 to 7 years of age.
Evidence from developing countries suggests that the percent of 
stunted children increases over the first two years of age or so, before 
it declines slowly. This does not imply that the nutrient intake and 
status of children are worse at 2  years of age than earlier but reflects 
the cumulative nature of stunting. When children reach the age 
of 2 to 3 years, the nutrient requirements relative to body weight 
fall, and they become less vulnerable to stunting. The growth rate 
of stunted children then becomes fairly normal. There may also 
be some growth catch-up of stunted children even in adolescence 
when adopted in environments where they are well-fed and healthy, 
even though this does not usually compensate fully for failure to 
grow in early childhood (Allen and Gillespie 2001, World Health 
Organization 1999, and Behrman, Deolalikar, and Lavy 1995).6 I 
will therefore study the impact of wage arrears on HFA and stunting 
for children no more than 3 years of age only. In view of the reduced 
sample size, I will group boys and girls together. 7
While stunting and wasting are related concepts, stunting is likely 
to be more useful for a number of reasons. First, young children grow 
fast and nutritional deficiencies can be quickly reflected in growth 
faltering (World Health Organization 1999). Also, as discussed in 
Section 7.2.1, wage arrears are typically persistent, implying lasting 
income reductions that may affect the longer-term health status of 
children. Second, in fine with the experience in developing coun­
tries, wasting has a low prevalence in Russia, while stunting is more 
widespread. 8  Furthermore, Russian children, on average, weigh more 
and are shorter than the reference population. WFH scores for boys 
(girls) less than 7 years of age are on average 0.45 (0.41) standard
6Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) examine the impact of a drought on growth 
in height among children in Zimbabwe. They find that children aged 12 to 24 
months experience growth failure in the aftermath of a drought, but establish 
little impact on children aged 25 to 60 months.
7Compared to the group of children aged less than 7 years, total sample size 
reduces from 2797 to 1052, and the number of arrears children from 820 to 298.
8The global prevalence of child stunting among those less than 5 years of age 
is about 33 percent, and the one of child wasting is about 9 percent (Allen and 
Gillespie 2001). The levels in Russia are comparable to middle-income countries 
in South America.
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deviations above the reference population, whereas the HFA scores 
are 0.23 (0.13) standard deviations below the reference population. 
Third, while larger height is unambiguously better for children, more 
weight is not necessarily a sign of good health. Adult obesity, as one 
of the foremost health problems in industrialized countries, is linked 
to being overweight at young age. For example, almost one in six 
Russian men and two in five Russian women aged 40 years or older 
are obese. Fourth, attempts to model weight rather than height with 
the standard set of individual, household and community determi­
nants have proven to be less successful (Pradhan et al. 2003). Fifth, 
the relationship between height and weight measures is still not well 
understood. The literature has found no apparent correlation be­
tween stunting and wasting prevalence, even though, conceptually, 
stunting should reflect the sum over short-term health status, as 
captured by wasting (Victora 1992 and Alderman 2000) . 9
The anthropometric indicators of child health have various ad­
vantages compared to other measures used in the literature (Mick- 
lewright and Ismail 2001). They do not suffer from problems of 
self-reporting like subjective health indicators, and measurement er­
rors are unlikely to be related with SES. In addition, they concern 
a specific member of the household, side-stepping issues related to 
assigning an individual welfare level from a variables measured for 
the household as a whole. Anthropometric data can be collected 
in relatively short time, while the construction of consumption or 
income aggregates is complex, and involves the imputation of val­
ues for home production, the calculation of rental values of housing 
and durables, dealing with different recall periods, and converting 
nominal into real values.
Other Health Measures
To complement child growth measures, I will present statistics on 
the incidence of sicknesses during the 7 days preceding the survey
9One possible explanation is that children suffering from stunting are ’small’ 
in height and therefore may not have low WFH, even though they may be un­
derweight and suffer from acute malnutrition. In the RLMS data, none of the 
children are recorded as suffering simultaneously from both stunting and wasting.
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(coughs, diarrhoea, congestion, sore throat, teething and earache). 
These indicators will allow me to assess whether any differences in 
anthropometric status could be the result of diseases, which typi­
cally have a direct bearing on the nutritional status of children. As 
one aspect of health behaviour, I report the weekly hours spent by 
children of preschool age in physical activity.
Finally, the chapter will also analyse the role of food and nutri­
tion. As children are fully dependent on others for nutrient intake, 
the main causes of malnutrition are receiving diets of poor quality 
and inadequate quantity, and inappropriate feeding practices and 
behaviours (World Health Organization 1999). A well-balanced diet 
is much more than adequate energy intake, as protein, vitamins and 
minerals are essential for ensuring a healthy growth and development 
of children (Bhargava 2001 and Pollitt et al. 1993). I will investigate 
the impact of wage arrears on purchases of food items and intakes of 
food supplements during the last 7 days, breast-feeding of children 
up to 2  years of age, and the daily intake of a variety of micro- and 
macro-nutrients. 1 0  The RLMS recorded in 24-hour recall open-ended 
dietary data of up to 35 food items consumed by each person, giving 
rise to overall 1782 entries. Using a conversion table developed espe­
cially by nutritional researchers at the University of North Carolina, 
a detailed picture of the composition of the nutritional balance and 
deficiency emerges.
However, a word of caution is in place. Dietary intakes vary 
greatly from one day to the next, so it is impossible to derive on 
the basis of 24-hour food recall data nutritional deficiencies for a 
particular individual with certainty (Buzzard 1998). Furthermore, 
while much progress has been made in nutritional science over the 
last decades, the understanding of biologic mechanisms remains still 
too incomplete to predict confidently the ultimate consequences of 
eating a particular food or nutrient (Willett 1998).11
10The primary advantage of representing diets as specific compounds is that 
such information can be directly related to the fundamental knowledge of biol­
ogy. However, an analysis based on foods, as opposed to nutrients, is generally 
most directly related to dietary recommendations because individuals ultimately 
manipulate nutrient intake largely by their choice of foods (Willett and Buzzard 
1998). See also the following footnote.
11 The most serious limitation to research in nutritional epidemiology has been
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8.2.3 Estim ation
The basic idea of the identification strategy is to compare child health 
in households with wage arrears to suitable control or comparison 
groups of worker households without wage arrears. The estimation 
follows the same approach as in Chapter 7. The first step is to cal­
culate the likelihood of households incurring wage arrears based on 
logit regressions. With more than nine in ten households having ei­
ther one or two workers, the characteristics of up to two worker per 
household are added separately. I also add a wide range of charac­
teristics including possible proxies for otherwise omitted variables. 
They include the gender of the child, household size, economic de­
terminants (housing characteristics, assets and land and livestock 
ownership) and regional factors (gross regional product, state bud­
getary expenditures and state tax revenues and arrears and settle­
ment type). The model is run separately for each round to ensure 
that arrears households are matched to non-arrears households from 
the same year. The results are shown in Table 8.1.
The estimated PSM scores axe then used to construct the matched 
samples. Gaussian kernel matching is used as the main weighting 
scheme. It draws on all controls to construct a weighted matched 
outcome for each treated unit, and the weights are distributed ac­
cording to the normal distribution. In order to obtain close matching 
between treatment and control children in terms of age, I employ the 
Mahalanobis-metric matching, which looks for the closest match in 
terms of the Mahalanobis distance constructed from the propensity 
score and the month of age (Rubin 1980). Section 8.4 will compare 
these results to those of alternative matching techniques.
the lack of practical methods to measure diet. Food intake data based on short 
term recall may not reflect the actual levels of various nutrients available in 
the body for various reasons, including measurement error, the use of mineral 
or vitamin supplements, the ability to absorb nutrients, and alternative sources 
for some nutrients, like exposure to sunlight. Furthermore, intakes of specific 
nutrients tend to be intercorrelated so that associations with one nutrient may 
be confounded by other aspects of the diet. Also, the intake of one nutrient 
may modify the absorption (like polyphenols contained in black tea which act 
as inhibitor in the case of iron), metabolism, or requirement for another nutri­
ent, thus creating a biologic interaction. Finally, if taken in large doses, some 
nutrients, like vitamin A and vitamin C, can become harmful.
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Table 8.1: Household logit regressions of wage arrears incidence
1994
Coef
(1)
z
(2 )
1995
Coef
O)
z
<4)
1996
Coef
(5) n
1998
Coef
(7) (8)
Male? 0.023 0.1 0.178 0.9 -0.176 -1.0 -0.124 •0.6
Demographics: H ousehold size (#) 0.087 0.8 -0.285 -2.5 -0.022 -0.2 0.065 0.6
M em bers aged  0-15 (#) -0.153 -1.0 0.451 3.1 0.023 0.2 -0.022 -0.1
Housing: Living sp ace  (sq meter) 0.001 0.2 -0.004 -0.6 -0.001 -0.1 -0.015 -1.8
Central heating? 0.165 0.4 0.352 0.9 0.555 1.6 0.363 0.8
Central w ater supply? -0.106 -0.3 0.089 0.3 -0.344 -1.1 -0.149 -0.4
Hot w ater supply? 0.086 0.3 0.147 0.5 0.052 0 5 -0.006 0.0
M etered gas  or electric stove? -0.480 -1.6 0.289 0.9 -0.061 -0.3 0.081 0.3
Central sew erage? 0.307 0.8 -0.724 -1.8 -0.391 -1.0 -0.367 -0.8
A sset index -0.215 -2.2 -0.095 -1.0 -0.086 -1.0 0.110 1.1
Agriculture: Land use? 0.195 0.7 0.319 1 5 -0.456 -1.9 0.018 0.1
Amount of land (sotkas) 0.000 1.3 -0.002 -1.9 0.001 0.6 0.009 0.8
Livestock? 0.338 1.0 0.398 1.2 0.436 1.4 -0.730 -2.1
First worker: Male? 0.415 1.5 -0.058 -0.2 -0.028 -0.1 -0.099 -0.4
Age (months) 0.001 0.7 0.003 2.4 0.000 0.5 0.004 3.6
Education (years) -0.015 -0.3 -0.029 -0.7 -0.043 -1.1 -0.020 -0.4
Tenure (months) -0.003 -2.3 -0.001 -0.4 0.000 0.4 0.000 -0.3
Occupational code 0.0000 -0.4 0.0001 1.3 0.0000 0.0 0.0001 1.6
Em loyee's ow nership (%) 0.087 0.6 -0.258 -1.4 -0.030 -0.2 -0.177 -0.9
Enterprise ownership (Fully public a s  omitted category): 
Som e public? 0.614 2 .3  0.176 0.7 1.154 3.6 0.689 2.4
Fully private? 0.457 1.4 0.551 1.5 0.444 1.3 0.930 2.6
S econd worker: Another worker? -2.668 -2.4 -2.933 -2.5 0.456 0.4 -1.473 -1.2
Male? 0.474 1.4 -0.228 ■0.7 -0.564 -1.7 -0.030 -0.1
Age (months) 0.000 -0.2 0.002 1.3 0.001 0.6 0.004 2.6
Education (years) -0.140 -2.4 -0.114 -1.9 0.076 1.3 -0.142 -2.0
Tenure (months) 0.001 0.3 -0.002 -1.4 0.003 1.8 -0.002 -1 5
O ccupational code 0.0000 0.0 -0.0001 -0.8 0.0000 -0.1 0.0000 -0.6
Em loyee's ownership (%) -0.029 -0.2 0.130 0.6 0.150 0.6 -0.128 -0.6
Enterprise ownership (Fully public a s  omitted category):
Som e public? -0.130 -0.4 -0.225 -0.7 0.442 1 5 -0.371 -1.0
Fully private? -0.257 -0.6 -0.349 -0.9 0.923 2.2 -0.147 -0.3
State-level: G overnm ent expenditure 0.0001 3.0 0.0001 2.4 0.0000 -0.2 0.0001 3.2
(Ruble per capita) Regional tax revenues -0.0001 -1.5 -0.0002 -1.4 -0.0001 -0.6 0.0000 0.1
Regional tax arrears 0.0003 0.6 -0.0008 -1.0 -0.0002 -0.5 0.0000 -0.2
Total tax revenues 0.0000 -0.5 0.0000 -0.8 0.0000 -0.3 0.0000 0.9
Total tax arrears 0.0000 -0.1 0.0003 1.1 0.0001 0.5 0.0000 0.7
G ross regional product 0.0000 -0.2 0.00002 1.9 0.00001 1.3 -0.0001 -4.1
S ettlem ent type (Urban a s  omitted category): 
Suburban -0.261 -0.6 0.202 0.5 0.138 0.3 0.648 1.5
Rural 0.173 0.5 0.503 1.5 0.591 1.9 0.502 1.2
C onstant 1 5 0.9 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7
O bservations (#) 
Log likelihood
832
-377
742
-348
652
-374
571
-297
wtth children less than 7 years of age trom 1994 to 1996.
218 CHAPTER 8. CHILDREN AND WAGE ARREARS
8.2.4 Identification
The matching estimators rely on two conditions: common support 
and no selection bias. The first requirement ensures that in the case 
of matching the counterfactual can be obtained. The second element 
implies that the factors determining the arrears status should not 
themselves be correlated with changes in the outcomes of interest. 
The issues are now discussed in turn.
C om m on Support
By imposing the common support, I drop those arrears children that 
cannot be matched to control children. Before kernel matching, the 
estimated propensity scores for those with and without wage arrears 
are, respectively, 0.424 (standard error of 0.214) and 0.228 (standard 
error of 0.171) for boys, and 0.450 (0.208) and 0.239 (0.170) for girls. 
Imposing the common support leads to a loss of 25 arrears boys 
and 16 arrears girls, leaving 383 observations of arrears children. 
After matching, the average propensity scores across the two groups 
almost coincide (female arrears group: 0.400 (0.009); female non- 
arrears group: 0.396 (0.009); male arrears group: 0.434 (0.011); male 
non-arrears group: 0.429 (0.011)).
Selection bias
The matching approach does not correctly identify the impact of 
wage arrears if arrears households experience shocks apart from wage 
arrears with an independent effect on child health. I now consider 
possible causes of such selection bias, similar to the discussions in 
sections 6.4.2 and 7.2.7.
Selective m igration  Workers may seek to relocate from high- to 
low-arrears regions in search of a better job. Table 8.2 shows impact 
estimates of wage arrears on relocation, missing information and job 
tenure of workers living in households with children less than 7 years 
of age, based on the logit regressions of Table 7.1. Overall, about 18 
percent of the workers dropped out of the survey in the next round.
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About one third of them moved away, and for the bulk of the oth­
ers the cause of the attrition is missing.12 For missing observation 
and relocation, the dropout rate of workers with wage arrears is no 
higher than for those without wage arrears. The coefficients were 
close to zero and statistically insignificant. The table also shows the 
matching estimates of the impact of wage arrears on job changes 
since end 1993, just prior to the beginning of the wage arrears crisis. 
About 60 percent of these workers had been employed in their cur­
rent jobs since before 1994. The job mobility of workers exposed to 
wage arrears was no higher than those without wage arrears, possibly 
because workers are afraid of losing back wage entitlements.
R everse causality  Could the deterioration in health status be 
the cause rather than effect of wage arrears? This is unlikely for 
two reasons. As argued in Section 7.2.1, wage arrears are primarily 
explained by regional, sectorial and enterprise characteristics, in ad­
dition to worker features, like tenure and qualification level, but are 
unrelated to health status. Further, the focus is on the health status 
of children who do not earn wages or incur wage arrears.
Fiscal crisis Another concern is that wage arrears could be just 
one symptom of a more general decline in well-being of workers and 
their dependants in certain regions, sectors and enterprises. How­
ever, the matching procedure ensures that arrears households are 
paired with non-arrears households from similar areas. Arrears and 
non-arrears households are therefore likely to be exposed to simi­
lar regional shocks. Section 8.4 will present impact estimates when 
children are matched only within their own state. Second, I can 
study the impact of certain measures directly to see whether they 
can account for lower health status of arrears children. The most 
obvious issue is whether arrears households lose social entitlements. 
The RLMS reports on a number of such programs. As shown in the 
top part of Table 8.3, the differences in outlays between arrears and 
non-arrears children were too small to be economically important.
12Information on individuals m issin g  from the previous survey round is pro­
vided by other household members. If entire households drop out of the survey, 
then no information on the reason is available.
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Table 8.2: Wage arrears, worker attrition and job tenure
Coef t-stats
(2)
Missing observation (t+1)? -0.008 -0.7
Moved away (t+1)? 0.006 0.6
Job tenure since end 1993? 0.008 0.5
Observations (#) 3067
Notes: Workers with wage arrears in households with
children are compared to workers without wage arrears in 
households with children according to Gaussian kernel 
matching, based on the propensity scores derived from 
the logit regressions of Table 8.1. The coefficients are 
impact estimates of wage arrears on workers with wage 
arrears.
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The total effect on government benefits is statistically insignificant, 
and amounts to no more than one percent of household income.
Table 8.3: Wage arrears, government transfers and self-assessed en­
vironment
Boyg Girls
Coef
(1)
t-st
(2)
Coef
(3)
SE
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-st
(6)
Coef
I7)
SE
(8)
Government transfers (per capita)
All benefits -28 -1.4 181 16 -26 -1.7 149 13
Pensions -10 -0.6 119 13 -18 -1.5 87 10
Unemployment benefits 4 0.7 7 4 -1 -1.5 1 1
Child benefits -17 -2.2 52 5 -6 -0.9 55 7
Fuel benefits -1 -2.6 1 0 0 0.0 2 2
Apartment benefits -2 -2.4 2 1 0 -0.3 2 1
Grants -1 -1.6 1 1 -1 -0.5 2 1
Environment
Family member chronically ill due to pollution? 0.020 0.9 0.191 0.022 -0.009 -0.5 0.159 0.018
Deterioration in garbage collection 0.02 0.6 2.1 0.04 -0.05 -1.1 2.0 0.04
Deterioration in air quality 0.03 0.9 2.3 0.02 0.00 -0.1 2.3 0.02
Using new method for cleaning air? 0.038 2.8 0.078 0.014 0.009 0.9 0.040 0.009
Deterioration in water quality 0.03 1.2 2.3 0.03 0.05 1.8 2.3 0.02
Using new method for cleaning drinking water? -0.014 -0.5 0.274 0.021 -0.060 -2.0 0.232 0.019
Willing to pay government for clean air or water? -0.019 -0.6 0.376 0.023 -0.031 -1.0 0.369 0.023
Observations (#) 1267 1265
Notes: I he children in arrears households are compared to the children in non-arrears households according to Gaussian 
kernel matching, based on the propensity scores derived trom the logit regressions ot Table 8.1. The sample Is restricted to 
worker households. I he coetticients m columns 1 and 5 are impact estimates ot wage arrears on the children in arrears 
households. The coefficients m columns 3 and 7 are the level estimates lor the children In arrears households.
Pollution Another possible cause for the poor child health is 
pollution of the environment. The RLMS asked household heads to 
assess changes in a range of environmental factors, as shown in the 
bottom part of Table 8.3. Compared to the control group, heads of 
households in wage arrears families believed that environmental con­
ditions have either improved, or changed little over the 12 months 
preceding the survey. The only exception is water pollution, which 
was rated by heads of arrears girls as about 5 percent worse than by 
those in the control group. However, this deterioration did not lead 
arrears households to adopt new methods for cleaning air, possibly 
suggesting that air pollution may not have worsened severely. Fur­
thermore, the incidence of chronic diseases of family members due 
to pollution was not significantly different between arrears and non­
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arrears families. Finally, arrears households also displayed no higher 
willingness to pay the government for clean air or water. Overall, 
based on these assessments, arrears children were not exposed to 
systematically higher pollution.
8.3 Results
8.3.1 Economic Impact
The wage arrears crisis had a dramatic impact on living standards 
and child health. Table 8.4 displays the levels before and after wage 
arrears separately for the treatment and control group. Families were 
highly dependent on wages which accounted for close to two thirds 
of household income. Wage arrears reduced wage income of the 
treatment group by between R700 to R766 per capita (PPP$295 to 
PPP$320),13 or by almost 60 percent. For boys in arrears households, 
income from home production and financial income also declined. 
The overall reduction in per capita income was almost 20 percent 
higher than per capita wages and equalled to close to half of house­
hold income. By contrast, arrears girls benefited from a rise in home 
production and little change in financial income, and the drop in 
income was slightly less than the one of wages, and equal to about 
40 percent of household income. Poverty rose by three quarters for 
girls and doubled for boys, leaving more than two thirds of the ar­
rears children in households with inadequate means to afford basic 
necessities.
8.3.2 Coping Strategies
This section takes a closer look at three types of household responses 
to wage arrears, namely labour supply, sales and borrowing and pri­
vate transfers. Taking into account various behavioural adjustments, 
households were only able to compensate for part of the wage income 
shock. The amount is equal to one quarter of the wage decline for 
boys, and one seventh for girls. Adding the changes in other income
13All Ruble values refer to prices as of June 1992.
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Table 8.4: Wage arrears and living standards (Ruble per capita)
_________Boys__________  Girls_________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
W (2) (3)____ (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
W ages -766 -12 611 60 -700 -10 539 50
G overnm ent transfers -28 -1.6 181 15 -26 -1.7 149 13
H om e production -115 -3.4 231 27 80 2.6 302 34
Financial income -53 -2.8 0.5 0.3 -2 -1.1 3 2
Incom e -961 -12 1024 63 -648 -9.1 993 49
Incom e poverty (%) 0.349 12 0.687 0.023 0.296 10 0.679 0.022
O bservations (#) 1267 1265
N otes: The children in arrears hou sehold s are com pared to the children in non-arrears 
h ou seh old s according to G aussian  kernel matching, based  on the propensity sco res  
derived from the logit regressions of Table 8.1. The sam ple is restricted to worker
h ou sehold s. The coefficients in colum ns 1 and 5 are impact estim ates of w age arrears on 
the children in arrears hou sehold s. The coefficients in colum ns 3  and 7 are the level 
estim ates  for the children in arrears households.
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sources as discussed in the last section, arrears households with boys 
incurred a net resource loss equal to the drop in wages, while arrears 
households with girls managed to compensate one fifth of the wage 
reduction.
Labour Supply
To the extent that wage income is shared among household members, 
standard labour supply theory suggests that the wage arrears shock 
can affect labour supply of all adult members of the arrears house­
hold. In arrears families, more than one third of the members were 
employed, and each worker held about 1 . 2  formal or informal jobs. 
The top part of Table 8.5 shows that total number of job holdings 
per worker remains unchanged in arrears households relative to non- 
arrears households. The total number of hours worked per worker 
during the last month and last week (from the time usage section of 
the RLMS) declined by about 10 percent for workers in households 
with boys, and increased by about 5 percent in households with girls. 
The failure of a labour supply response is likely to be related to the 
dire job market situation. Official unemployment rates were close 
to 1 0  percent and three fifths of the workers were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ 
concerned about losing their job. Two thirds of the workers believed 
that in case of a job loss it would be ‘absolutely uncertain’ or ‘fairly 
uncertain’ that they would find another job.
Private Transfers
If members of different households care about each others consump­
tion, a decline in income of one family should trigger an increase 
in transfers received from other households. Private transfers are 
widespread. More than six out of ten households were involved in 
receiving or giving transfers. With transfers in Russia typically go­
ing from old to young, households with children received more than 
they give, and the net effect was an increase of almost one fifth of 
household income of participating families. As shown in the middle 
part of Table 8.5, households gave less frequently and lower amounts 
but received more often and higher amounts in response to wage ar­
rears. Overall, boys living in arrears households experienced a net
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Table 8.5: Wage arrears and household coping strategies
________ Boys__________ __________ Girts________
Impact Level Impact Level
C oef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
-111____ (2) (3)____ (41_____ (5)___(6) (7)___ ^
Income with transfers, sales etc.
(per capita)
-773 -6.8 1577 97 -552 -6.0 1353 67
Employment (per worker)
J o b s (#) -0.01 -0.4 1.23 0.03 0.00 -0.1 1.23 0.02
Hours worked last month -18 -4.6 155 4 8 1.8 168 3
Hours spent working last week -5 -4.2 41 1 3 2.5 46 1
Private transfers
Private transfers given? -0.086 -2.8 0.405 0.025 -0.029 -1.0 0.396 0.025
Transfers given if given (per capita) -30 -0.5 313 49 -55 -0.5 415 89
Private transfers received? 0.012 0.4 0.332 0.023 0.044 1.7 0.321 0.022
Transfers received if received (per capita) 25 0.2 604 96 63 0.5 629 106
Net transfers (per capita) 21.004 0.4 75 38 26 0.4 22 44
Sales and borrowing
Sold jewelry or property? 0.007 0.4 0.319 0.02 -0.022 -1.3 0.290 0.02
Borrowing? 0.098 4.0 0.339 0.02 0.047 1.8 0.297 0.02
Unpaid rent or utility bills? 0.094 4.3 0.342 0.02 0.109 4.2 0.343 0 .03
S ales, borrowing, unpaid bills (per capita) 168 2.8 478 54 70 1.9 338 39
Observations (#) 1267 1265
Notes: The children in arrears households are compared to the children in non-arrears households according 
to Gaussian kernel matching, based on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions ot Table 8.1.
The sample is restricted to worker households. The coetticients in columns 1 and 5 are impact estimates ot wage 
arrears on the children in arrears households. The coetticients in columns 3 and 7 are the level estimates for the 
children in arrears households.
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transfer increase in absolute terms of about 4 percent, and girls of 
about 1 1  percent.
Sales and Borrowing
A negative income shock should lead to dissaving or borrowing in 
order to bring consumption in line with the lower level of permanent 
income. As shown in the bottom part of Table 8.5, about 30 percent 
of households were engaged in asset sales, borrowing, or delaying 
payments of rent and utility bills. In response to wage arrears, there 
was little change in the sales of jewellery and property, but a sharp 
increase of up to 1 0  percent of households engaged in borrowing, 
or running up rental payment arrears. The impact amounted to 22 
percent of the reduction in wages in arrears households with boys, 
and to 1 0  percent of the wage loss in arrears households with girls.
8.3.3 H ealth Impact
The preceding section documented that arrears children experienced 
a drop of about 40 to 50 percent of household income, and a 75 
percent to 100 percent rise in poverty. This section investigates the 
health implications of this income shock, along the lines of Section 
7.4. I take a closer look at health services and health behaviours 
(Table 8 .6 ), sickness and physical activity (Table 8.7), food purchases 
(Table 8 .8 ), nutrition (Table 8.9) and anthropometric status (Table 
8.10).
Health Service
As explained in Section 7.3.3, the bulk of the health service is funded 
through the compulsory medical insurance system. Basic health care 
is free of charge, even though the system is chronically underfunded. 
Access to health services was no worse for arrears children than non- 
arrears children. 1 4  Table 8 . 6  shows that about four in ten boys and
14There is no information in the RLMS on the quality of health service. For 
example, Barber and Gertler (2002) find that in Indonesia the quality of child 
care processes are positively associated with child growth, while access variables 
axe not.
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girls had health problems during the last month. Among those, 
between 50 to 60 percent went to see a doctor, most of whom are 
public doctors, and almost nobody paid for the treatment. A similar 
percentage obtains prescriptions, and about one third of girls and 60 
percent of boys received them for free. Close to three in ten children 
went for a general health check up during the last three months, 
and, again, almost nobody paid for the treatment. Based on these 
access indicators, the wage arrears crisis was not accompanied by a 
deterioration in health services provided to arrears children. Arrears 
children relied also more often on public doctors, and were less likely 
to pay for health treatment, perhaps due to the larger coverage with 
medical insurance.
Table 8.6: Wage arrears and access to health service
________ B oy_________   Girls________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st C oef SE
J l l _____ l i l___ £3)_____ £4]______ £5)_____ £6]__ £7]____ £§}_
Health problem last month? 0.028 1.1 0 .389 0.029 -0.009 -0.3 0.389 0.025
Treatment if health problem last month? -0.023 -0.5 0.579 0.037 0.074 1.5 0.608 0.039
Public doctor, if treatment? -0.073 -1.0 0.538 0.059 0.150 2.1 0 .663 0.054
Paid, if treatment? -0.010 -0.6 0.013 0.014 -0.012 -2.0 0 .000 0 .000
Prescription if health problem last month? 0 .0018 0.0 0.529 0.043 0.079 1.8 0.545 0.046
Paid, if prescription? -0.188 -2.7 0.609 0.051 -0.039 -0.6 0.684 0.052
W ent for check-up last 3  months? 0.018 0.7 0.282 0.025 0.001 0.0 0 .280 0.021
Public doctor, if check-up? 0.030 1.1 0.969 0.018 0.000 1.1 1.000 0.021
Paid, if check up? -0.032 -1.1 0.020 0.013 0.010 0.9 0 .010 0.010
Vaccination last 3 months? 0.040 1.5 0.324 0.025 -0.041 -1.5 0 .356 0.026
Paid if vaccination last 3 months? -0.018 -1.7 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.1 0.032 0.016
Medical insurance? 0.050 1.9 0.577 0.025 0.072 3.0 0.596 0.022
O bservations (#) 1267 1265
Notes: The children in arrears households are compared to the children in non-arrears households according 
to Gaussian kernel matching, based on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions of Table 8.1.
The sample is restricted to worker households. The coefficients in columns 1 and 5 are impact estimates of wage 
arrears on the children in arrears households. The coefficients in columns 3 and 7 are the level estimates for the 
children in arrears households.
Sickness and Physical Activity
Table 8.7 shows two separate inputs into anthropometric status. 
Wage arrears could be associated with sickness, which in turn may
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retard child growth.15 Yet, there was no evidence of an increase in 
colds, diarrhoea, congestion, sore throat, teething, or earaches as a 
result of wage arrears. Similarly, children with and without wage 
arrears engaged in similar amounts of regular physical activity, sug­
gesting that child development is not hampered by lack of sports, 
out-door activities and the like.
Table 8.7: Wage arrears, sickness and physical activity in the last 7 
days_________________________________________________________
_________Boys__________  Girls_________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cough 0.014 0.4 0.310 0.030 -0.069 -1.9 0.289 0.024
Diarrhea -0.004 -0.3 0.037 0.010 0.007 0.6 0.025 0.010
Congestion -0.026 -0.8 0.293 0.026 -0.030 -0.9 0.347 0.028
Sore throat -0.028 -1.1 0.112 0.018 -0.003 -0.1 0.144 0.021
Teething 0.015 0.8 0.101 0.021 0.024 0.9 0.126 0.020
Earache 0.008 0.6 0.030 0.011 -0.018 -1.6 0.014 0.007
Regular physical 
activities (hours/week)
0.2 0.4 1.8 0.424 0.1 0.7 1.3 0.194
O heon/ofiA nc I U \ 1QC7
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and consumed food more often at home. They also reduced their 
expenses of eating out by one fifth to one quarter, and cut back 
on food purchases by 12 to 16 percent. While these are remarkable 
savings, they made up no more than 7 to 9 percent of the wage 
arrears shock. Households also limited outlays not evenly across food 
groups. Arrears households with boys increased the share of bread 
and potato expenses in food purchases by 6.5 percent, and lowered 
purchases of fish, meat, fats, fruits and vegetables. Similarly, arrears 
households with girls cut back on purchases of dairy products, meat, 
fruits and vegetables.
Table 8.8: Wage arrears and food purchases_______
_________ Boys_________   Girts______
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eating out (per capita) -22 -1.3 89 13 -23 -2.0 74 11
Food prepared at home (%) 0.035 2.1 0.666 0.015 0.030 1.9 0.662 0.013
Food eaten at home (%) 0.025 1.8 0.852 0.015 0.015 0.9 0.838 0.016
Food purchases (per capita) -30 -2.3 223 12 -40 -3.0 205 11
Of which (%):
Dairy 0.017 2.2 0.111 0.006 0.010 1.4 0.108 0.007
Meat -0.024 -1.8 0.204 0.010 -0.032 -2.3 0.189 0.010
Fish -0.001 -0.3 0.023 0.005 0.009 3.0 0.026 0.003
Potato 0.001 0.2 0.011 0.003 -0.003 -0.8 0.012 0.003
Bread 0.065 4.3 0.315 0.015 0.023 1.4 0.294 0.013
Eggs -0.001 -0.4 0.022 0.002 0.008 2.3 0.034 0.003
Fat -0.028 -3.7 0.068 0.006 0.007 1.1 0.090 0.006
Fruits -0.003 -0.6 0.056 0.005 0.001 0.1 0.054 0.005
Sugar -0.022 -2.3 0.108 0.009 -0.008 -0.8 0.114 0.009
Vegetables 0.006 0.9 0.041 0.006 -0.007 -1.4 0.029 0.004
Other food -0.009 -2.1 0.042 0.004 -0.007 -1.6 0.048 0.004
Observations (it) 1267 1265
Notes: The children in arrears households are compared to the children in non-arrears households 
according to Gaussian kernel matching, based on the propensity scores derived from the logit 
regressions of Table 8.1. The sample is restricted to worker households. The coefficients in columns 
1 and 5 are impact estimates of wage arrears on the children in arrears households. The coefficients 
in columns 3 and 7 are the level estimates for the children in arrears households.
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Nutrition
A detailed breakdown of the impact of wage arrears on nutritional 
status is shown in Table 8.9. This analysis draws on comprehensive 
food intake data based on 24-hour food recall, covering all meals 
irrespective of where they were consumed (home, work, friends, or 
school) and how they were obtained (purchase, home production, or 
donation).
Energy needs of growing children are high. The basal metabolic 
requirement of children is up to 25 percent higher than that of adults, 
and the superimposed incessant muscular activity of active children 
calls for large caloric expenditure. Wage arrears led to a decline in 
caloric intake by 30 kilocalories (kcal) to 1440 kcal per day for boys, 
and by 90 calories to 1250 kcal per day for girls. The exact energy 
requirements of each child are difficult to determine, and depend 
among others on body size, metabolic efficiency and physical activity. 
To obtain a rough estimate on caloric adequacy, I assume that caloric 
requirements rise between 1 to 7 years of age from 740 kcal per day 
to 2180 kcal per day for boys, and 660 kcal per day to 1960 kcal per 
day for girls (Burton and Foster 1988). This would imply that about 
one in ten children were deficient in caloric intake.
Wage arrears resulted in lower provision not just of energy but 
also of nutrients. In fact, the percentage reductions of caloric intake 
(2 percent for boys and 7 percent for girls) were lower than the 
percentage reductions for the proteins, vitamins (with the exception 
of thiamin for boys) and minerals listed in Table 8.9. This is a sign 
of the deterioration in the nutritional quality of the diet, possible as 
a result of changing the food composition towards a cheaper diet.
Children have higher protein requirements than adults relative 
to body weight as they need to add body tissue. In line with the 
larger reduction in calories, protein intake fell especially for girls but 
the levels remained on average above the RDA of between 16 to 24 
grams for children of 1  to 6  years of age. 1 6
16If energy needs axe not met, protein needs are higher because some of the 
protein is diverted for energy production (Deutsch and Morrill 1993). The Rec­
ommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) are developed by the Food and Nutrition 
Board of the US National Academy of Science (www.nal.usda.gov/fiiic).
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Table 8.9: Wage arrears and nutrition
__________Boys___________  Girls__________
Impact Level Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef SE Coef t-st Coef SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Energy (kcal) -29 -0.8 1442 25 ■ CO ■ ro 00 1253 28
Calorie-providing nutrients
Protein (g) -1.3 -1.2 42 0.8 -3.2 -3.7 36 0.8
Fat (g) -0.2 -0.1 48 1.3 -6.6 -4.2 42 1.0
Vitamins
Vitamin A (IU) -384 -2.9 728 100 -211 -2.3 584 63
Thiamin (mg) -0.006 -0.3 0.637 0.014 -0.090 -5.2 0.568 0.013
Riboflavin (mg) -0.023 -1.0 0.810 0.023 -0.102 -4.2 0.719 0.019
Vitamin C (mg) -7.2 -2.2 99 3.2 -4.5 -1.8 87 2.1
Minerals (mg)
Calcium -24 -1.3 492 13 -48 -2.8 470 15
Magnesium -7.8 -1.4 198 4.6 -30 -5.0 167 3.9
Iron -1.0 -3.0 10.0 0.2 -2.3 -4.5 8.7 0.2
Weight measures
Weight for age 0.029 0.3 0.365 0.069 0.019 0.2 0.341 0.077
Wasted? 0.011 1.0 0.036 0.011 0.010 1.0 0.033 0.009
Observations (# ) 1267 1265
Notes: The children in arrears households are compared to the children in non-arrears 
households according to Gaussian kernel matching, based on the propensity scores 
derived from the logit regressions of Table 8.1. The sample is restricted to worker 
households. The coefficients in columns 1 and 5 are impact estimates of wage arrears 
on the children in arrears households. The coefficients in columns 3 and 7 are the level 
estimates for the children in arrears households.
232 CHAPTER 8. CHILDREN AND WAGE ARREARS
While there is no RDA for fat, the body requires essential fatty 
acids. Fat is a concentrated source of calories and a reserve of energy 
for periods of low caloric intake. However, there is little reason to 
eat fat for the well-fed child. The needs for essential fatty acids are 
met by as little as a tablespoon of vegetable oil per day. Even with 
wage arrears, children received over 30 percent of their calories from 
fats, far in access of this requirement.
Turning to vitamins, vitamin A (retinol) is crucial in maintaining 
various tissues and vision. The required intake of vitamin A ranges 
from 1,250 International Units (IU) for infants to 1,800 IU for chil­
dren of 7 years of age. Children were clearly deficient in vitamin A, 
aggravated through reductions of between 27 to 35 percent as a re­
sult of wage arrears. Thiamin plays a central role in the metabolism 
of both carbohydrate and protein, and is essential for the proper 
functioning of the nervous system. The proportional drop in thi­
amin intake was especially large for girls, and levels were below the 
RDA of 0.7 to 1.0 mg. Similarly, riboflavin provision, which is im­
portant to energy metabolism, eyesight and skin, contracted more 
for girls than boys, and the average intake was below the RDA of 
0.8 to 1.2 mg for children aged 1 to 7 years. These vitamins are pro­
vided among others by meats, vegetables and fruits, suggesting that 
these losses were partly related to adjustments of food purchases as 
described in Table 8 .8 . Finally, vitamin C (ascorbic acid) is essential 
in maintaining the integrity of connective tissue. Vitamin C intakes 
dropped significantly, but the levels remained on average about twice 
as high as the RDA of 35 to 45 mg.
In terms of minerals, calcium is required for bone and teeth struc­
ture, and to support muscle and nerve functions. Children need pro­
portionately large amounts as their skeletons are growing. The RDA 
for children up to 7 years is 800 mg, which is far above the levels 
recorded in Table 8.9. Wage arrears led to an additional 5 to 9 per­
cent reduction in calcium intake, worsening existing deficiencies. In 
this context, the reduced food purchases of dairy products were of 
particular concern as dairy foods provide high-quality calcium in a 
form that the body can absorb quickly.
Magnesium fulfils various roles, including supporting body en­
zymes and maintaining nerve and muscle cells. Intakes in Russia
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were above the RDA of 80 to 170 RDA for children without wage 
arrears, but wage arrears brought girls on average close to the upper 
end of this range.
Children require iron for increasing blood volume and growing 
bodies. Iron deficiency arises from a decreased ability of the blood 
to transport oxygen to tissues, and can result in impaired mental 
development. The RDA for children is 10 mg, irrespective of age. 
Wage arrears reduced iron intake by 9 to 2 1  percent. As a result, 
boys consumed on average just the required amount, and girls had 
a shortage of 13 percent. 1 7  The drop in iron intake was related to 
lower purchases of iron-rich foods, including meat, fish (for boys) 
and fruits.
As shown in the last two rows of Table 8.9, the deterioration in 
the diet led to a rise in acute malnutrition. The incidence of wasted 
children increased by 1 percent to 3.6 percent for boys and 3.3 percent 
for girls. However, while this suggests a large proportional increase 
in wasting, the changes are not statistically significant.
Breast-feeding and nutrient supplements
Feeding practices during the first years of age have an important in­
fluence on the nutritional and growth status of the young child. 1 8  
Breastmilk is generally higher in most nutrients than other food 
available to young infants, and nutrient intake will be lower when 
other foods are introduced too early. Exclusive breast-feeding is 
recommended for the first 6  months of life. In Russia, one in four 
children aged less than 6  months of age are no longer currently breast­
fed, rising to one in two among children less than 12 months. Wage 
arrears increased (although not statistically significant) the breast­
feeding of children less than 24 months of age (Table 8.10), possibly 
due to the efforts of parents to economize on expenses for baby food.
17This finding confirms the results reported in Kohlmeier et al. (1998), using 
the first four rounds of the RLMS during 1992 to 1994.
18Undemutrition, smoking, alcohol, and drug abuse of the mother at concep­
tion and during pregnancy may already have strongly adverse influences on early 
growth of her foetus, and increases the risk of subsequent growth stunting of the 
infant and young child (Allen and Gillespie 2001).
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Nevertheless, more than three in four arrears children in this age- 
bracket are not breast-fed.
Table 8.10: Wage arrears, breast-feeding and food supplementation
_________ Boys_________ _________ Girls_________
Impact______ Level Impact______ Level
Coef
(1)
t-st
(2)
Coef
(3)
SE
(4)
Coef
(5)
t-S t
(6)
Coef
(7)
SE
(8)
Mother currently breast-feeding? 0.065 1.3 0.219 0.057 0.030 0.4 0.250 0.056
(with children less than 24 months old)
Took multi-vitamins? 0.003 0.2 0.157 0.021 -0.031 -1.3 0.134 0.017
Took individual vitamins? 0.015 0.8 0.157 0.018 -0.010 -0.5 0.157 0.019
Took mineral supplements? 0.012 1.2 0.039 0.011 -0.009 -1.0 0.018 0.006
Observations (#) 1267 1265
Kernel matching, based  on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions ot Table 8.1. The sam ple is restricted 
to worker households. The coefficients in columns 1 and 5 are impact estim ates ot wage arrears on the children in arrears 
households. The coefficients in columns 3 and 7 are the level estim ates for the children in arrears households.
Another way to improve the dietary balance of children is to sup­
plement food intake by specific micronutrients. As shown in Table 
8.10, about 15 percent of children received vitamin supplements, and 
about 3 percent mineral supplements. In response to wage arrears, 
there were slight variations in the share of children receiving supple­
mentation, but the changes remained insignificant.
Young Children
Physical growth of children is highly dependent on adequate intakes 
of energy and nutrients. For example, almost one in 6 of the calorie- 
deficient children are stunted, compared to only one in eleven among 
children who receive adequate calories. This suggests that wage ar­
rears may result not just in a decline of the nutritional balance but 
also a deterioration of the anthropometric status.
Table 8.11 shows the impact of wage arrears on the main eco­
nomic, nutritional and anthropometric variables for children up to 3 
years of age. The reduction in wage and income was somewhat larger 
for the whole sample in terms of both the absolute size of the shock
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and the proportional decline. While the drop in energy intakes of 5 
percent was about the same to before, young children display even 
worse iron deficiency. Among arrears children, the shortfall com­
pared to RDA increased from 26 percent to 37 percent. HFA scores 
doubled and stunting rates rose by over 60 percent. The prevalence 
of stunted children in arrears households increased to 14 percent.
8.4 Sensitivity Analysis
This section will explore the robustness of the findings with regard to 
the definition of wage arrears and alternative estimation specification 
and methods. In order to focus on the impact on growth status, I 
present statistics for the group of children up to 3 years of age.
8.4.1 Definition o f Wage Arrears
Households with wage arrears are defined as households with at least 
one member who is owed wages and has no wage payment during the 
last 30 days. All other families are non-arrears households. Table 
8 . 1 2  displays impact and level statistics on dimensions of wage ar­
rears for children up to 3 years of age. Arrears children lived in 
households whose wage arrears are more than two thirds as high in 
terms of the outstanding monthly wage payments per capita, and 
about double in terms of the amount of wage arrears in Ruble per 
capita and the number of workers with wage arrears in the household. 
While only one in four workers in arrears households had received 
wage payments during the last 30 days, about 19 in 20 workers had 
done so in non-arrears households. Therefore, the non-arrears group 
contains many children living in households with outstanding wage 
claims. Including these persons may dilute impact estimates as it 
blurs the distinction between arrears and non-arrears groups.
In Table 8.13, the first set of results present impact estimates 
when arrears children are matched only to children from households 
that are not owed any wages. The number of control children declines 
from 754 to 435, while the number of treatment children stays the
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Table 8.11: Wage arrears and children up to 3 years of age
Impact Level 
Coef t-st Coef SE
(D (2) 0) (4)
Wage per capita -889 -11 442 51
Income per capita -902 -10 879 54
Energy (kcal) -47 -1.3 996 28
Iron -1.1 -2.8 6.3 0.2
Height for age -0.206 -1.5 -0.395 0.125
Stunted? 0.056 2.0 0.143 0.023
Observations 1052
Notes: The children less than 3 years of age in arrears 
households are compared to the children less than 3 
years of age in non-arrears households arrears accor­
ding to Gaussian kernel matching, based on the pro­
pensity scores derived from the logit regressions of 
Table 8.1. The sample is restricted to worker house­
holds. The coefficients in Column 1 are impact estimates 
of wage arrears on the children in arrears households. 
The coefficients in Column 3 are the level estimates for 
the children in arrears households.
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Table 8 .1 2 : Definition of wage arrears
Impact_______Level
Coef t-st Coef SE
in _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Outstanding wage payments
Month per capita 0.46 4.4 1.13 0.07
Ruble per capita 1306 4.5 2605 243
# per worker 0.44 16 0.89 0.01
No wage payment last 30 days
# per worker 0.76 39 0.81 0.02
Observations (#) 1052
Notes: The children less than 3 years of age in arrears households 
are compared to the children less than 3 years of age in non­
arrears households according to Gaussian kernel matching, based
on the propensity scores derived from the logit regressions of 
Table 8.1. The sample is restricted to worker households. The 
coefficients in Column 1 are impact estimates of wage arrears on 
the children in arrears households. The coefficients in Column 3 
are the level estimates for the children in arrears households.
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same . 1 9  The size of the wage arrears shock is 20 percent larger in 
absolute amounts than before but comparable relative to the wage 
level. The impact on HFA is larger and the one on stunting smaller, 
but it still suggests a rise in the prevalence of stunted children by 
over 40 percent.
8.4.2 M atching Techniques 
Alternative estimation
How robust are the impact estimates to variations in the estimation 
approach? Table 8.13 shows four variations to the basic results. As 
argued in Section 7.2.1, wage arrears are concentrated in certain re­
gions. To eliminate the impact of differential regional trends, Panel 
B shows matching estimates where treated observations are matched 
only to observation within the same state. The estimated drop in 
wages is similar compared to before, while the impact on growth 
status is larger. Panel C includes as additional regressors in the 
matching equation the height of the father and mother. These vari­
ables control for one aspect of genetic endowments that influence the 
growth status of children. Due to missing information on parental 
height, the number of observations declines from 1052 to 896. The 
estimates are similar to the basic results, although the impact on 
height for age is no long significant at the 1 0  percent level.
The next panel concerns an alternative cross-sectional matching 
estimators. The nearest neighbour estimator pairs each treated ob­
servation with the control observation that has the closest propensity 
score. The impact on wage is similar to before, while the effect on 
HFA scores and stunting is larger.
DifFerence-In-Differences Matching
The matching techniques used so far have not exploited the panel di­
mension of the data set. Difference-In-Differences matching (DIDM) 
is a modified version of cross-sectional matching drawing on the sam­
ple of children with observations from two consecutive rounds. Ar-
19The estimates on mean values compared to the full sample change neverthe­
less due to a slight variation in the number of matched treatment children.
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Table 8.13: Wage arrears and child growth status: sensitivity analy­
sis
Impact Level
Coef t-st Coef 
(1) (2) (3)
SE
(4)
(A) Non-arrears controls (733 observations)
Wage per capita -1070 -9.5 464 59
Height for age -0.295 -1.7 -0.388 0.126
Stunted? 0.043 1.2 0.143 0.030
(B) Same state only (1052 observations)
Wage per capita -849 -7.3 367 48
Height for age -0.292 -1.6 -0.393 0.138
Stunted? 0.070 1.8 0.148 0.032
(C) Parental height (896 observations)
Wage per capita -721 -11 394 40
Height for age -0.248 -1.5 -0.390 0.122
Stunted? 0.046 1.3 0.133 0.025
(D) Nearest neighbour (1052 observations)
Wage per capita -869 -7.4 469 45
Height for age -0.325 -2.5 -0.481 0.101
Stunted? 0.061 2.2 0.147 0.024
(E) DID matching (616 pairs of observation)
Wage per capita -308 -2.3 707 115
Height for age -0.302 -1.9 -0.097 0.127
Stunted? 0.039 1.0 0.079 0.024
Notes: The children less than 3 years of age in arrears households are compared to the 
children less than 3 years of age in non-arrears households, based on the propensity scores 
derived from the specification of the logit regressions of Table 8.1. The sample is restricted to 
worker households. The coefficients in Column 1 are impact estimates of wage arrears on the 
in arrears households. The coefficients in Column 3 are the level estimates for the children 
in arrears households. Apart from Panel D, the estimates refer to Gaussian kernel matching. 
Panel A refers to the whole control group; Panel B to children within the same state only; 
Panel C includes parental height as determinant of the logit regressions; Panel D refers to 
Nearest Neighour matching; and Panel E to DID matching for children up to 5 years of age.
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rears children live in households with no wage arrears in the initial 
(pre-arrears or pre-intervention) period and with wage arrears in the 
subsequent (post-arrears or post-intervention) period. The control 
group contains children living in households without wage arrears in 
both pre- or post-arrears period. The identifying assumption is that 
the matched control group evolve from the pre- to post-arrears pe­
riod in the same way as the treatment group would have done in the 
absence of arrears. As with simple matching, treated observations 
are matched to non-treated observations using propensity scores. To 
ensure that the matching is not affected by the assignment to arrears 
status, the propensity scores are based on the characteristics of the 
pre-intervention period only.
The additional data requirements led to a loss in sample size 
relative to cross-sectional matching. DIDM estimation relies also on 
a comparison of the change from pre- to post-intervention period of 
the treatment group relative to the control group, which implies that 
only one impact estimate is derived for each pair of observations. To 
ensure an adequate sample size, I include children up to 5 years of 
age in the pre-intervention period. The sample contains 616 pairs of 
children, among which are 164 pairs of arrears children. In spite of 
the extended age-bracket, DIDM relies on only half of the number 
of impact estimates compared to cross-sectional matching.
The final set of results in Table 8.13 shows the impact estimates 
based on DIDM estimation, in line with Equation 2.18. The decline 
in wages was only about one third of the drop estimated with cross- 
sectional matching. In spite of the lower income shock, the increase 
in HFA score was larger and statistically significant. Furthermore, 
stunting rates rose by 3.9 percent, almost halting the trend decline 
in stunting prevalence as children grow older. Among the arrears 
children, stunting rates dropped from 8.7 percent to 7.9 percent be­
tween pre- and post-intervention period , compared to a reduction 
from 7.9 percent to 2.6 percent for control children. Due to the small 
sample size, only the impacts on HFA are statistically significant.
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8.5 Conclusion
Wage arrears worsened the welfare of children less than 7 years 
of age in Russia during the mid-1990s. Households with wage ar­
rears experienced salary losses of almost 60 percent and a doubling 
in poverty. Behavioural responses to compensate for the income 
reduction through higher labour supply, private transfers, sales of 
durables, or borrowing were partly successful, generating about one 
quarter of the wage decline for boys and one seventh of the wage 
reduction for girls. Adding changes in other sources of income, the 
net loss was the same amount as the wage drop for boys, and four 
fifth of the wage decline for girls.
Wage arrears led to a deterioration in health among affected chil­
dren. Children with wage arrears had lower intakes of calories and 
a worse nutritional balance than children without wage arrears, al- 
thoug the impacts on caloric intake were typically not significant. 
This contributed to deficiencies in the provision of vitamin A, thi­
amin, riboflavin, calcium and iron among arrears children. The de­
terioration in the diet also increased wasting by about 1  percent for 
boys and girls from around 2.5 percent, but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. More importantly, the stunting prevalence 
among arrears children up to 3 years of age increased in the basic 
estimation from 8.7 percent to 14.3 percent. While the coefficient 
estimates depend on the specific estimation technique and sample 
restriction adopted, stunting rates increase no less than 3.9 percent­
age points, and the rise in HFA scores is in most cases statistically 
significant.
I have used a rich data set to exclude alternative causes than the 
non-payment of wages for the worse growth status of children with 
wage arrears. Access to health service, child sickness, physical ac­
tivity, variation in regional living standards or environmental factors 
do not account for the differences in child height. The findings sug­
gest that wage arrears led to growth retardation through a decline 
in energy provision and a deterioration in several micronutrient de­
ficiencies.
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
The last chapter brings together some of the main findings of Part 
II. It brings together the key results, compares impact estimates and 
draws policy conclusions.
9.1 Findings
This section brings together some of the main empirical findings. 
While the differences highlighted in Table 1 . 1  make a comparison of 
point estimates across chapters problematic, it is still instructive to 
look at the sign and magnitude of key coefficients. Figure 9.1 to 9.8 
present the comparisons. The numbers for Chapter 5 compare 1998 
outcomes to counterfactual outcomes assuming government transfers 
at 1994 levels. The other numbers refer to the treatment effect es­
timates on the treated, i.e. households with pension arrears in 1996 
for Chapter 6 , households with elderly and wage arrears from 1994 
to 1998 for Chapter 7 and households with children and wage arrears 
from 1994 to 1998 for Chapter 8 . The coefficients are obtained from 
the basic OLS or probit estimations (Chapter 6 ) or cross-sectional 
matching estimation (Chapters 7 and 8 ) . 1
1To ensure comparability to the wage arrears analysis, the conclusion includes 
additional estimates for Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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9.1.1 Income shock
Figure 9.1 displays the broad measure of income, which includes 
wages, government transfers, home production, financial income, re­
ceipts from assets sales, borrowing, unpaid bills and private transfers. 2  
The height of the columns corresponds to per capita income with­
out arrears of the arrears group. It has three components. ‘Other 
income’, marked by the bold parts of the columns, refers to the out­
come with arrears for the arrears group. ‘Endogenous response’, 
displayed in white, shows the income mobilized by arrears house­
holds in response to arrears. ‘Impact’, displayed as the shaded area, 
represents the net change in income due to arrears . 3  The size of 
the income shock, as a percentage of broad income, was somewhat 
higher for pension arrears (39 percent) than for wage arrears (35 
percent for both household types). The reduction in government 
transfers between 1994 and 1998 amounted to close to 20 percent of 
1994 household income.
9.1.2 Endogenous response
Households managed to compensate part of the income shock from 
other sources. Pensioners were hit hardest by the arrears shock but 
responded most effectively in terms of raising additional revenues. 
Pensioner households replaced almost one quarter of the pension 
shock, while worker households mobilized additional revenues of no 
more than 10 to 1 2  percent (Figure 9.1). This might be related to 
the fact that the pension arrears crisis was more short-lived than the 
wage arrears crisis and allowed for a labour supply response.
2Figure 9.1 is based on tables 6.10, 7.9, 7.10, 8.4 and 8.5. For ex­
ample, Column ‘Chapter 7 Wages’ has a height of 2618 Ruble per capita, 
which is equal to the gender weighted average of non-arrears income levels: 
(1810*(831+1873)+2815*(1758+805))/(1810+2815). The impact equals 815, 
which is equal to the gender weighted average of the reduction in income 
due to arrears: (1810*831+2815*898)/(1810+2815). The endogenous response 
equals 110, which is equal to the gender weighted average of the difference in 
the reduction in income to the wage reduction: ((1810*(968-831)+2815*(898- 
805))/(1810-l-2815). The numbers for Chapter 6 are based on new calculations.
3In general, if the shaded area is above (above) the horizontal axis, then 
arrears led to a decrease (increase) in the outcome variable.
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Figure 9.1: Income shock, endogenous response and other income in 
Chapter 6 to Chapter 8
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The derivation of Figure 9.1 is explained in Footnote 2.
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Figure 9.2: Household revenues and endogenous response in Chapter 
6 to Chapter 8
1500 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B Impact 
fl Actual
-300
C6 Sales C7 Sales C8 Sales C6 Priv. C7 Priv. C8 Priv. C6 Oth. C7 0th. C8 Oth. 
etc. etc. etc. tms. trns. trna. inc. inc. inc.
The derivation ot Figure 9 2  n  explained in Footnote 4.
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Accounting for the endogenous response, the net impact of the 
income shock was comparable in the three chapters both in absolute 
terms (around R700 to R800 per capita) and as a share of non-arrears 
income (around 30 percent).
Figure 9.2 separates the endogenous response into three types: 
sales, borrowing and unpaid bills; net private transfers; and other 
income before pensions (for pension arrears) or wages (for wage 
arrears).4 The sum of the difference between actual and counter- 
factual for the three responses equals to the endogenous response of 
Figure 9.1. Sales, borrowing and unpaid bills was the most impor­
tant response, and net private transfers the second most important 
response, in all three simulations. Pensioner households were also 
able to compensate about one sixth of the size of the pension loss 
through higher labour supply, but these gains were more than offset 
through losses in other income sources. By contrast, households were 
not able to take on additional jobs in response to wage arrears, most 
likely because of the depressed state of the labour market.
9.1.3 Poverty
Across the board, the payments crisis deteriorated poverty, nutrition 
and health outcomes. In general, the impact was worse for pension 
arrears than wage arrears, even though the income shocks after en­
dogenous responses were comparable. This could suggest that these 
responses might have been costly in terms of reduced leisure, more 
stress, loss of assets or future commitments. In addition, the wage 
arrears crisis stretched over a number of years while the pension cri­
sis unfolded suddenly, perhaps aiding households to anticipate better 
likely consequences of the non-payment of wages.
As a result of arrears, consumption poverty rose by 100 percent 
in pensioner households, by 40 percent in worker households with 
elderly and by 30 percent in worker households with children (Figure
4Figure 9.2 is based on tables 6.10, 7.10, and 8.5. For example, Column 
‘Chapter 7 Sales etc’ has a height over zero of 335 Ruble per capita, which is 
equal to the gender weighted average of the level entries in the last row of Table 
7.10: (1810*321+2815*344)/(1810+2815). The numbers for Chapter 6 are based 
on new calculations.
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Figure 9.3: Consumption poverty in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8
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The derivation ot Figure 9.3 is explained in Footnote S.
9.3). Poverty increased by 15 percent nationwide due to changes in 
government cash transfers.5
9.1.4 Nutrition
Compared to the drop of income and consumption and the rise in 
poverty, nutrition deteriorated more modestly (Figure 9.4).6 This 
suggests that households reduced non-food expenditures and pur­
chased cheaper calories. As for poverty, the impact of pension arrears 
on nutrition was larger than of wage arrears.
5With the exception of the Column ‘Chapter 5’, the numbers of Figure 9.3 
are based on new calculations. ‘Chapter 5’ is based on the decomposition in 
Table 5.15 using propensities to consume of 0.89 for pensions and 0.34 for child 
benefits.
6Figure 9.4 is based on the first row of tables 6.8, 7.13, and 8.9.
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Figure 9.4: Caloric intake in Chapter 6 to Chapter 8
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The derivation of Figure 9.4 is explained in Footnote 6.
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Figure 9.5: Function limitation in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7
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The derivation of Figure 9.5 is explained In Footnote 7.
250 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
Figure 9.6: Mortality rate between survey rounds in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7
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The derivation of Figure 9.6 is explained in Footnote 8
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9.1.5 H ealth
Pension and wage arrears worsened health outcomes of old age men 
but not (or only little) of old age women. The functional limitation 
score increased by 1.8 to 3.1 percent for men and 0 to 1 percent for 
women (Figure 9.5) . 7  Mortality rates doubled for men and changed 
little for women (Figure 9.6) . 8  The analysis does not pinpoint the 
reasons for the different effect on men and women. One possible 
explanation is health behaviour. Men’s past and present drinking 
and smoking habits are dramatically more unhealthy, making their 
health status more vulnerable to economic shocks. The larger impact 
of wage arrears on men’s health is consistent with the evidence on 
changes in the health of the Russian population during the 1990s. In 
line with the findings for poverty and nutrition, pension arrears wors­
ened functional limitation and mortality more than wage arrears.
For children of up to 3 years of age, wage arrears increased stunt­
ing rates from around 8.7 percent to 14.3 percent (see Table 8.11).
9.1.6 H ealth service
Chapters 6  to 8  found little support for alternative explanations for 
the decline in welfare than the payment crisis, including other eco­
nomic factors, the environment, physical activity and health service. 
For example, there was little change in health service utilization. 
Individuals with health problems in arrears households sought treat­
ment about as often as individuals from non-arrears households (Fig­
ure 9.7) , 9  and payment for treatment remained the exception also for 
persons from arrears households (Figure 9.8) . 1 0
7Figure 9.5 is based on sixth row of Table 6.8 and the third row of Table 7.14.
8Figure 9.6 is based on first row of Table 6.9 and the last row of Table 7.14.
9Figure 9.7 is based on the third row of Table 7.11 and the second row of 
Table 8.6. The numbers for Chapter 6 are based on new calculations.
10Figure 9.8 is based on the fifth row of Table 7.11 and the fourth row of Table 
8.6. The numbers for Chapter 6 are based on new calculations.
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Figure 9.7: Treatment in response to health problems in Chapter 6 
to Chapter 8
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The derivation of Figure 9.7 is explained in Footnote 9.
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Figure 9.8: Payment for treatment in Chapter 6 to Chapter 8
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9.2 Policy Lessons
A number of policy implications emerge from the thesis. First, gov­
ernment transfer and wage arrears are associated with large welfare 
costs for the recipients and their dependants. The first priority is to 
prevent such episodes from re-occurring. As emphasized in Chap­
ter 4, the payment crisis was part of a wider arrears crisis involving 
transfer, wage, enterprise and tax arrears in both the public and 
private sector. While the payment problem would not have become 
so endemic without the difficult economic transition, it had direct 
fiscal origins related to a weak budgetary system where transfer en­
titlements and payment discipline were subject to political economy 
influences. The government promised increases in social entitlements 
based on unrealistic economic growth and budgetary revenue pro­
jections, only to impose later ad hoc sequestration and payment ar­
rears. An accumulating public debt crowded out private investment 
through high interest rates, further lowering economic growth and 
tax revenues. The decentralization of the government sector resulted
0.045
a  Impact 
■  Actual
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in large differences in the provision of public services across states, 
compounding existing regional inequalities. This situation under­
mined the government’s ability to respond effectively to the dete­
rioration in living standards. The crisis came only to an end once 
economic growth gathered speed in the aftermath of a large max- 
coeconomic adjustment in the late 1990s. To avoid such scenarios in 
future, a stable macroeconomic environment and a transparent and 
efficient fiscal system are important. The challenge is to embed social 
policies in an macroeconomic and fiscal framework that enhances the 
realism of policy making. Social policy should reflect national prior­
ities while taking into account resource and implementation realities 
over the medium term. In addition, the system of fiscal federalism 
has to ensure a match between revenue raising capacity and social 
needs in economically weak regions.
Second, another priority is to assist households in coping with 
changes in economic circumstances, including the transition phases of 
reforms in public transfer and pension systems. Providing education, 
improving access to productive resources and expanding markets all 
help people to reduce and mitigate exposure to risk. Furthermore, 
establishing clear and secure property rights and transparent rules 
for the purchase and sale and holding and use of assets will facilitate 
households’ risk management. In addition, institutions which enable 
individuals to smooth consumption and self-insure, such as secure 
financial instruments, are valuable. 1 1
Households may sometimes not be able to absorb a change in 
economic circumstances by themselves without large, and possibly 
permanent, welfare loss. The thesis presented evidence that house­
11 Insurance schemes can be specifically designed to deal with the impact of 
a non-payment crisis. In South Korea, more than 15,000 firms went bankrupt 
during December 1997 to April 1998 and could not pay severance payment and 
wages to their employees (Phang and Kim 2001). To protect the livelihood of 
laid-off workers and their families, the government established the wage claim 
guarantee system. Under the system, workers forced to retire due to their em­
ployer’s bankruptcy receive their wage arrears for their last three months of work 
and severance payment for the last three years from the fund in lieu of payment 
by the employer. The system was financed by a levy imposed on firms, which 
was 0.2 percent of total payroll in 1998, as well as a budget outlay of 190 billion 
won.
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holds managed to compensate at most one quarter of the income 
shock, and suffered from worse nutrition and health, sometimes with 
irreversible consequences (mortality and stunting). Basic safety nets 
are required, especially for vulnerable groups. Such households in­
clude the elderly, as they may be too old or too sick to work, and, 
in the case of Russia, typically receive little help from their children. 
Similarly, families with young children deserve special attention, as 
nutritional and education deficiencies in the early stages of life can 
have lasting consequences. Temporary social schemes, like public 
works programs, may help in situations where a depressed labour 
market makes it impossible even for the working-age to earn wage 
income.
Large cash transfers such as pensions can also be an important 
component of the social safety net (Case and Deaton 1998). Accord­
ing to economic theory, cash transfers are always part of a first-best 
transfer scheme. Cash can be targeted directly to the desired bene­
ficiaries, it allows recipients freedom of choice in their spending, and 
it avoids the losses that are associated with providing goods whose 
shadow value to the recipient is less than their cost to the provider. 
The distortionary effect of cash transfers on labour supply is likely 
to be insignificant in a context of under- and unemployment. 1 2  How­
ever, the experience in Russia and other countries has shown that 
cash transfers are often not viable for demographic and economic 
reasons, axe difficult to administer, may not reach their intended 
beneficiaries, and may not be politically sustainable. To function 
effectively, they require strong political commitment and adminis­
trative capacity for book keeping, raising taxes, channelling funds 
and fighting corruption.
Third, even in the absence of income support and risk mitigation 
schemes, policies should aim to break the link from low income to
12In the context of famines, Dreze and Sen (1989) find that distributions of 
cash remedy the failure of entitlements and allow the market to deliver food 
efficiently in response to the appropriate price signals. The literature gives also 
a number of arguments for why non-cash transfers might be useful. Donors have 
preferences over the consumption pattern of the beneficiaries (Garfinkel 1973); 
in-kind transfers can correct other distortions (Guesnerie and Roberts 1984) or 
screen out undesirable recipients (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982), as in food-for- 
work schemes.
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poor diet. Nutritional programs, such as dietary counselling, breast 
feeding promotion and food fortification and supplementation can 
save lives, increase human capital, improve work productivity and 
reduce the burden on public health systems.
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